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In this study, I analyze eight novels from the tumultuous decade of the 1790s: 
Ann Radcliffe's The Mysteries ofU40lpho (1793) and The Italian (1798); Eliza Parsons' 
The Castle ofWolfen bach (1793) and Eleanor Sleath's The Orphan ofthe Rhine (1798); 
Regina Maria Roche's The Children ofthe Abbey (1796) and Clermont (1798); Eliza 
Fenwick's Secresy; or, the Ruin on the Rock (1796) and Mary Wollstonecraft's The 
Wrongs ofWoman, or Maria (1798). The novels I examine are unified not only by the 
decade in which they were written, but also by the discursive fields that shape their 
presentation of the female body. My analysis, influenced by the poststructuralist work of 
Michel Foucault and by feminist studies, focuses on specific cultural fields that enable 
me to approach the female Gothic in its rich historical dimensions. 
I illustrate that eighteenth-century medicine and law exerted considerable 
influence over the ways in which women perceived themselves, their bodies, their 
choices, their virtue. Because neither medical nor legal discourse is seamless, the Gothic 
novelists I examine are able to respond with their own versions of female physicality as 
they attempt to imagine women's agency. Exposing the ideological work of such 
dominant discourses, the novels in this study offer representations of the female subject 
that break down binaries of mind and body, as well as reason and emotion. Since the 
heroines reflect an embodied self that might participate in self-determination, I focus on 
particular medical and legal attempts to inscribe the female body. In turn, I demonstrate 
that the heroines often deploy a rhetoric ofjustice that empowers their struggles to 




I argue that female Gothic novelists were intimately aware that certain popular 
medical ideas created barriers between them and their claims to natural and legal rights. It 
is my claim that as medicine studies, explains, defines, cures, and confines the body, it 
shapes women's relationship to the legal discourse that offers or denies them political 
identity. In turn, I assert that the novelists' creation of a recognizable female protagonist 
indicates their attempts to imagine a subject that can maintain physical, emotional, and 
moral integrity in the face of injustice. In the interstices between body and emotion, 
public and private, justice and love, these women construct the Gothic female self. 
VB 
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Situating the Female Gothic: Critical and Theoretical Contexts 

I 
Emily St. Aubert, in Ann Radcliffe's The Mysteries ofUdolpho, puts on a brave 
show of feminine assertion and resistance when the villain Montoni demands her estates. 
He cruelly taunts and berates her for this stubbornness, hinting that he might allow his 
henchmen to violate her. Having attempted tears of supplication and emotional appeals, 
Emily finally calls upon her legal rights in order to repel Montoni's claims on the 
property she inherits from her aunt. In several scenes, she engages in a calm, self-assured 
dialogue with Montoni, who sneers at her confidence and demands that Emily concede 




mysterious groans interrupt one of their conversations, however, Emily sinks weakly into 
a chair, overcome by terror that has sapped her strength. This scene represents the 
strange juxtaposition between assertive claims and physical weakness often expressed in 
the Gothic romances that flourished in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. 1{ 
., 
While passionate villains, virtuous maidens, exotic locales, perilous travels, ruined castles 
and abbeys, wild thunderstonns, secret inheritances, murderous crimes, discovered 
kinships, and domestic resolutions are all generic elements of the Gothic, the most 
enduring feature-so strikingly demonstrated by Emily St. Aubert-remains the 
sensitive, threatened, resistant female body. 
I I use "novel" and "romance" interchangeably throughout this study. Contemporary readers would have 
used the term romance to indicate the narrative's anti-mimetic qualities; however, I also use the term novel 
as the label most modem readers would recognize and as a way of recognizing the narratives' engagement 




Yet narratives dominated by threatening circumstances and emotional responses, 
female authors repeatedly create a paradoxical figure: the Gothic heroine whose fragile 
body appears to undermine by her bold claims. As the female protagonist trembles, sinks, 
faints, among other sensitive physical responses, she also assertively insists that certain 
rights belong to her. The heroine's "Gothic body," with its "violent, vulnerable 
immediacy" (Bruhm xvii), and her reliance on personal rights present a conflict that 
draws on eighteenth-century medical and legal discourses. Although both discourses 
present particular subjectivities for eighteenth-century women, they seem to offer 
conflicting versions of the female self. In this study, I argue that female Gothic novelists 
were intimately aware that certain popular medical ideas created barriers between them 
and their claims to natural and legal rights. It is my claim that as medicine studies, 
explains, defines, cures, and confines the body, it shapes women's relationship to the 
legal discourse that offers or denies them political identity. In turn, I assert that the 
novelists' creation of a recognizable female protagonist indicates their attempts to 
imagine a subject that can maintain physical, emotional, and moral integrity in the face of 
injustice. In the interstices between body and emotion, public and private, justice and 
love, these women construct the Gothic female self. 
In this study, I analyze eight novels from the tumultuous decade of the 1790s: 
Ann Radcliffe's The Mysteries ofUdolpho (1793) and The Italian (1798); Eliza Parsons' 
The Castle ofWolfen bach (1793) and Eleanor Sleath's The Orphan ofthe Rhine (1798); 
Regina Maria Roche's The Children ofthe Abbey (1796) and Clermont (1798); Eliza 
Fenwick's Secresy; or, the Ruin on the Rock (1796) and Mary Wollstonecraft's The 
Wrongs ofWoman, or Maria (1798). The novels I examine are unified not only by the 
..­
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decade in which they were written, but also by the discursive fields that shape their 
presentation of the female body. My analysis, influenced by the poststructuralist work of 
Michel Foucault and by feminist studies, focuses on specific cultural fields that enable 
me to approach the female Gothic in its rich historical dimensions.2 In this chapter, I 
summarize the critical conversation about the Gothic and my stake in this discussion. I 
also outline the contours of eighteenth-century medical and legal discourses, which as I 
argue throughout my study frequently overlap in the Gothic novel. 
Discourses of Gothic 
Even as scholars continue to spill much ink within Gothic studies, there remains 
significant work to be done in the field. 3 Because the Gothic is a vast field, every 
configuration has shifted, even if slightly, the meaning of the novels. For instance, 
putting Radcliffe in the context of the French Revolution4 or in a study of Gothic originsS 
2 One of the dangers inherent in a study devoted to women's bodies and rights is the reification of sexual 
difference. For example, critics have challenged the category of female Gothic itself on the basis that 
gendered terminology reproduces sexual binaries. See James Watt Contesting the Gothic; Robert Miles 
"The Gothic Aesthetic: The Gothic as Discourse"; David Richter, "The Reception ofthe Gothic Novel in 
the 1790s." These charges, however, have been answered by critics who fmd the term productive. Kari J. 
Winter also explains that "the different subject positions of men and women [novelists] did not lead 
inevitably to misogyny on the one hand and feminism on the other" (92). Furthermore, E. J. Clery has 
rewritten the term as "women's Gothic" in order to shift attention to the active passion within the novels. 
I use the term "female Gothic" to highlight the gender politics that underlie much of the Gothic genre, 
particularly those novels written by women. 
Part of that work, in fact, is excavation. As more eighteenth-century works-fiction, drama, poetry, 
treatises, pamphlets, history-are digitized and become accessible through the internet, the broader the 
field will become. As texts that were previously unattainable except through expensive travel and time­
consuming archival research are now becoming available and even searchable online, the potential for new 
historical connections has increased exponentially. 
4 See Claudia Johnson's Equivocal Beings, which argues that the French Revolution was a powerfully 
disruptive event that reworked the meaning of sensibility and gender. Women's novels, Johnson explains, 
reflect the uncertain gender status of sentimental men and active women. As Johnson examines Radcliffe's 
novels, she also analyzes works by Wollstonecraft, Burney, and Austen. 
5 Michael Gamer examines the genre's origins in Romanticism and the Gothic: Genre, Reception, and 




has yielded very different results, which reaffinns the supple quality of "Gothic" and its 
continued significance for literary studies. Yet such studies are not adequate to all 
purposes. Scholars demonstrate a continual need to reestablish the meaning of the 
powerful, popular Gothic genre, and my study examines a specific set of cultural issues 
that eighteenth-century women novelists addressed. The writers in this study express the 
reality of the female body, its perils and pleasures, its natural and constructed fOnDS, its 
central place in the experience of gender. More specifically, I claim that the novelists' 
attention to the female body intersects with contemporary medical and legal concerns that 
influenced notions of self and identity. For women in particular these two "master 
discourses" touched nearly all aspects of their lives. In distinct ways, both medical and 
legal discourses defined who they were and regulated what they could do. The novels in 
this study, written largely for a female audience, illustrate the intersection of "Gothic 
bodies" with medicine and law. 
My work builds on Steven Bruhm's examination of the nerved mind in his study 
Gothic Bodies: The Politics ofPain in Romantic Fiction. His considerable introduction 
explains the ways in which pain, as both physical event and aesthetic experience, draws 
attention to the body's psychological activity (4, 12-13). Drawing on medical discussions 
of the brain and nerves, Bruhm explains that Robert Whytt, a pioneer in eighteenth­
century neurophysiology, challenged Decartes' model of the disembodied soul: "Whytt 
hypothesized that the soul extends from the brain down the spinal column, through the 
nerve endings, and to all parts of the body" (11). Whytt's assertions that the mind and 
body were intimately, physiologically connected enable Bruhm to develop a "politics of 




subjection to political forces; imagining pain as a means of encouraging and rejecting 
political sympathies (27-29). I find Bruhm's focus particularly relevant to my discussion 
of the science of sensibility. As I argue throughout this study, but particularly in chapter 
one, the embodied mind poses a challenge to women writers, whose relationship to their 
bodies was troubled by scientific and cultural assumptions about the women's 
weaknesses. Although Bruhm's study sets up a valuable theoretical and historical 
framework, his analysis of Radcliffe's novels, which I address in my first chapter, 
neglects the gendered aspects of the body and mind. Furthermore, while he makes a 
connection between medicine and law by describing Emily's body as her "property in the 
self," he fails to consider the discursive constraints that women faced. Bruhm asserts that 
the Gothic heroine's empowerment is not necessarily located in her ownership ofprivate 
property, but "is first affirmed at a more basic site, the one at which Locke originally 
located it: in the protagonist's body" (43).6 Although I support Bruhm's identification of 
the site at which Emily is empowered, I argue that medical literature provides a more 
complete explanation of how the gendered body is invested with or denied legal and 
social authority. 
My study also depends in part on David Punter's provocative claims in Gothic 
Pathologies: The Text, the Body, and the Law, as well as the evocative nature ofhis 
work.7 As he discusses Gothic texts from the eighteenth century to the twentieth, Punter 
6 Bruhrn himself concedes that gender is largely absent in his work: "There [is] no chapter on gender 
politics, to which W ollstonecraft and Mary Shelley would contribute (and, I admit, which seems to be 
begged for by the chapter on Radcliffe and Wordsworth)" (xxi). 
7 Punter boldly claims that "in the context ofthe modern, Gothic is the paradigm of all fiction, all 
textuality" (1). PWlter's introduction, which firmly positions him within psychoanalytic theory, indicates 
the ease with which critics might generalize the Gothic genre, or even the Gothic experience. Although 
Punter offers certain compelling insights regarding the function of law and the nature of the body within 
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articulates a connection between the law and the body that proves productive for my 
examination of the female Gothic text: "The law is the performative taken to the highest 
degree, that version of the word which has immediate physical effects, of incarceration, 
for example, ofpain of death. Thus the law forms a frame or grid through which all 
bodies must pass; at the same time, and inevitably, it serves to standardise those bodies" 
(45). In his chapter on eighteenth-century Gothic texts, Punter argues, "Eighteenth­
century fiction, the' site' of the Gothic, is obsessed with the law, with its operations, 
justifications, limits" (19). Such sweeping pronouncements enable him to analyze texts 
such as Tom Jones, Peregrine Pickle, and Sir Launcelot Greaves as well as The Castle of 
Otranto, The Monk, and The Italian within the context ofa Gothic study. Focusing on the 
figures of the attorney and the justice of the peace, on the image of the prison, and on 
representations of trials, Punter argues that the Gothic novel explores through private and 
public experiences "a single oppressive system devoted to the repression, criminalisation, 
and incarceration of the body" as well as "the face--or mask--of terror which the law 
wears to those enmeshed in its toils" (42). 
Since his work abandons the issue of gender as it meanders through three 
centuries of narrative, Punter leaves ample room to develop an analysis of women's 
writing and female bodies.8 I explain more thoroughly how fields of medicine and law, in 
fictional texts, his introduction is incoherent. I utilize his most interesting observations to position myself; 
however, I find that his attempts to draw in all textuality within a generalized notion of"Gothic" dizzying 
and unconvincing. 
8 For example, he notes, "Gothic is thus a fiction ofexile, of bodies separated from minds, of minds without 
a physical place to inhabit, cast adrift on seas of space and time which appear to bear no relation to the 
moral life" (17). Punter ignores the struggles of women writers to portray, without degrading the status of 
either, the female body and mind as inextricably linked; these struggles, I argue, are central to the female 
Gothic novel. Since he does, in fact, examine Radcliffe's The Italian, it is all the more surprising that he 





ways that sometimes overlap and sometimes parallel the other, attempt to produce 
standardized bodies. Like Punter, I focus on the cultural intersections of the body and law 
in Gothic novels. Indeed, his focus inspires my efforts to layer multiple discourses in 
order to discover the nuances of the female Gothic. I argue, however, that women's 
literary expressions of these intersections often complicate or challenge them. In my 
second chapter especially, I examine how women writers embrace ideals of natural law, 
which support a moral order that Gothic heroines follow almost effortlessly. Eliza 
Parsons' The Castle o/Wolfenbach and Eleanor Sleath's The Orphan o/the Rhine 
provide excellent examples of the ways in which female Gothic novels articulate 
women's relationship to positive and natural law, as well as the role of the body in 
understanding and performing moral obligations. 
There have been a number of feminist studies of the Gothic that have also 
informed my approach to the novels presented here. Notably, feminist scholars were 
among the first to "discover" many Romantic-era women writers and to recuperate these 
novels for literary studies.9 In her 1976 text Literary Women, Ellen Moers introduces the 
term "female Gothic," ushering in a new field of study devoted to women authors whose 
heroine-centered fiction addresses fear and terror. 10 Julian Fleenor's 1983 collection The 
Female Gothic sets up many of the stholarly concerns that remain a central part of 
9 Early studies such as Montague Summers' The Gothic Quest (1938) and Devendra Varma's The Gothic 
Flame (1957) offered scholars a new sense of the Gothic novel's literary importance, yet later feminist 
criticism, from which my study draws, provided a more political understanding of women's contributions 
and opened up the field to include more women writers. 




Gothic studies. II In the introduction, Fleenor explains that the spatial imagery-the 
castles, abbeys, forests, prisons--ofGothic novels stands in for the female body, which is 
typically equated with its sexual and reproductive functions. 
My study continues this focus on women's bodies, yet I agree with Kate Ferguson 
Ellis that Gothic spaces represent women's social and symbolic positions. In The 
Contested Castle, Ellis argues that the dominant image of the castle becomes a means for 
women Gothic novelists to critique and resist the notion that the home is "a sphere of 
safety for them" (x). 12 Eugenia Delamotte, in Perils ofthe Night, claims that Gothic 
spaces provide a symbolic language to express anxieties about the boundaries of self. 
Gothic architecture is both "the repository of mystery" and the embodiment of 
"mammoth social institutions whose power transcends that of any individual" (Delamotte 
15, 17).13 Likewise, Diane Hoeveler's Gothic Feminism examines the contradictions of 
the domestic sphere as she argues that social and economic pressures led to the 
phenomenon of "professional femininity" in female Gothic novels. Hoeveler asserts that 
the novelists present a calculated fa~ade of"wise passiveness" that women could mimic 
as they fulfilled their social functions of wives and mothers (7). Combining Ellis'and 
Hoeveler's cultural approach with Fleenor's examination of the female body, I offer a 
Il Although Fleenor claims that the author's sex is irrelevant to the "female Gothic" category, the essays in 
her volume mostly address women writers. Importantly, the woman-centered literature of terror serves as 
the focus of the collection, making the label coherent and productive. 
l2 Her study illustrates the variety of ways that female Gothic novels respond to the emerging capitalist 
economy of the eighteenth century and the resulting shift in gender expectations. As the separate spheres 
became more precisely delineated, women's sexuality also became more strictly monitored, culminating in 
an ideal of angelic purity that was impossible to maintain without a dangerous inexperience or ignorance, 
as Gothic novelists demonstrate. Terror, Ellis argues, is a transgressive response to forbidden knowledge, 
action, and desires. Female characters must subvert their passive, innocent domestic roles by actively 
purifying the castle ofevil and danger. 
13 Delamotte addresses the historical institutions that created barriers for women, but primarily explores the 




cultural analysis of women's "embodied selves" that emphasizes discursive formations 
and literary resistance. 
E. J. Clery's The Rise ofSupernatural Fiction 1762-1800 (1995) establishes the 
cultural conversations in which I take part. In her historical explanation of how the rise of 
supernatural fiction parallels the rise of consumerism, Clery provides a close examination 
of Radcliffe's use of English law that is compelling yet incomplete. Comparing Emily's 
superstitions with her understanding of her legal rights, Clery argues that both are 
products of fancy, rather than firmly rational conclusions. I assert instead that the medical 
constructions of the embodied mind clarify the consequences of the heroine's legal 
claims. Emily is not forced, as Clery insists, to understand that "her qualifications for 
humanity-rationality, emotions-are superfluous" (120); instead, she learns that the 
social discourse that promises and denies her rights is unjust according to its own 
rhetoric. Picking up where Clery leaves off, I further explain the conflict between natural 
and positive law, contextualize this conflict within the practices of eighteenth-century 
law, and elaborate on its significance for female Gothic narratives. Starting with 
Radcliffe's The Mysteries ofUdolpho and The Italian, I claim that the authors in this 
study link the "natural" female body to natural justice. Although the audience may indeed 
be prompted to reflect "on the illusory nature of the law's 'phantom-objectivity,' its 
interested, man-made nature, through a literal-minded representation of the law as 
haunted house" (Clery 126), the female audience is also encouraged to claim rights to 
autonomy and freedom as well as property and protection. 
There have been, of course, gestures toward the medical field. Clery mentions that 
passion, a prominent emotion in Gothic novels, was classified and interpreted within the 
10 
scientific community (Women's Gothic 15). Hoeveler claims that the female novelists 
were responding to the institutions that were organizing their lives, including the medical 
spaces of the asylum and clinic (xiii-xiv). Focusing on Gothic dramatists, Marjean 
Purinton argues, "Both Gothic and science were ... discursive fields upon which 
anxieties about social identity and physicality could be displaced" (135). These critics 
indicate the importance of the medical field to the female Gothic and the potential for 
extended explanations of the ways in which science and medicine influenced fictional 
representations ofwomen. None of these critics, however, addresses the particular 
combination ofmedical and legal discourses that deeply informs the female Gothic 
novels in this study. By examining both discourses, I offer a more complete discussion of 
the female Gothic's "embodied self," which reflects women's physical and emotional 
experiences. The body, therefore, is central to my analysis of the female subject. 
Although I focus on the cultural discourses that construct a "self," the novelists at least 
assumed an authentic, gendered self that interacted meaningfully with those discourses. 
While this presents a certain tension in each of my chapters, the third chapter addresses 
this dilemma more thoroughly by examining the discursive techniques ofperception that 
fmd expression in Regina Maria Roche's The Children ofthe Abbey and Clermont. 
Although I utilize a cultural studies approach in my study, psychoanalysis has 
proven an important means of examining the Gothic self. Using psychoanalytic theory in 
her deconstruction of such binaries as surface/depth, reason/irrationality, 
repression/sexuality, Eve Sedgwick reaffirms the importance of the "self' in the female 
Gothic. She explains, "The self expressed or explored by these conventions is all surface, 






self is at least potentially social, since its 'character' seems to be impressed on it from the 
outside and to be displayed facing outward" (261). By focusing on the "trappings" that 
critics impatiently abandoned, Sedgwick shows that the fictional surfaces not only 
provide generic coherence but also shed light on the problem of personal identity with 
which the Gothic struggles. 
The psychoanalytic work ofEugenia Delamotte, however, draws on such binaries 
to explain the persistent virgin/whore dichotomy within the Gothic novels. In Perils of 
the Night Delamotte argues that only two versions of the self ("the Good Other Woman" 
and the "Evil Other Woman") are available to the heroine. Because both versions are 
"Other," stifled and hidden in the narrative, the heroine ultimately develops no 
autonomous sense of self (Delamotte 154). In tum, Kari Winters explains that the female 
Gothic explores the problems of being the Other, while the horrors of the male Gothic 
stem from a fear of the Other (Winter 92). Anne Williams, on the other hand, argues that 
the female Gothic's "comic plot, its emphasis on terror rather than horror, and its 
insistence on the possibilities of female 'reason' ... not only affirm the possibilities of 
'feminine' strength; they also sketch in the outlines of a female self that is more than the 
'other' as purely archetypal or stereotypical" (138). Although my work does not depend 
on psychoanalytic theory in the ways that Williams' argument does, I agree with her 
stance on the complex nature of the female Gothic heroine. What I demonstrate, then, are 
the ways in which the novels draw on discourses of medicine and law as they present the 
fictional female self. 
I argue that the novels' attention to the body is not necessarily a reflection of 
psychological processes. Clare Kahane, however, uses psychoanalysis to discuss 
-
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pregnancy and childbirth, the differentiating biological processes of the female body, 
which she argues, "can arouse fears about bodily integrity that are intimately related to 
one's sense of self' (345). Juliann Fleenor also relies on mythical or psychological terms 
to explain the meaning of Gothic female identity: "the conflict at the heart of the Female 
Gothic [is] the conflict with the all-powerful, devouring mother" (16). Fleenor argues that 
women's bodies are objects of fear and disgust in a genre that "accepts rather than 
challenges that limited definition of female biology" (15). Fleenor's polarized terms 
"accept" and "challenge" do not adequately convey the complex interaction between 
eighteenth-century Gothic novels and the medical field. Instead, as the authors attempt to 
imagine a female body and "self," they engage with and sometimes challenge the medical 
definitions. Furthermore, the sometimes unsuccessful, capitulatory, or contradictory 
attempts to rework the female subject demonstrate the difficulty of applying such general 
labels as "conservative" and "subversive." 
My focus throughout this study is on the ways in which eighteenth-century 
medical discourse produced legal subjects designed to support British economic and 
social systems. I argue that because women's bodies and their rights are never far apart in 
the female Gothic, the novels demonstrate that scientific explanations are never 
disinterested or objective and have distinctly sociopolitical consequences. Although 
medicine seems to offer an empirical account ofobservable bodily functions, it 
nevertheless attaches cultural meanings to its object. In the sometimes circular economy 
of discourse, medicine also appears to reinforce already-intact assumptions. As the 
female subject lives out the meaning ofher medically-articulated body, her experiences 
are mediated by legal discourse. This normative structure provides a useful triangulation 
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with medicine and the female Gothic because the novels so frequently feature legal 
entanglements. I assert that the medical field creates barriers (whether intentionally or 
not) to women's juridical sUbjectivity. Although the eighteenth-century woman's status 
in law is always problematic, her recourse to a positive legal identity--one which asserts 
rights, claims freedoms, and demands justice-is hindered most profoundly by medical 
or scientific discourse. The Gothic heroines resemble "real" women in that they reflect 
certain processes to which historical women were subjected. The fictional narratives 
allow women to imagine new possibilities for the female subject. Although sometimes 
limited by the discourses with which they engage, the novels challenge or rewrite aspects 
ofmedical and legal discourse in significant ways. 
Discourses of Medicine 
In The Archaeology ofKnowledge, Michel Foucault notes that discourses are 
unified by "the interplay of the rules that make possible the appearance of objects during 
a given period of time" (33).14 My study will discuss the medicalized female body as an 
object that "appears" in eighteenth-century culture. Individualized, objectified, and 
categorized within medical discourse, women's bodies are "objects that are shaped by 
measures of discrimination and repression, objects that are differentiated in daily 
practice, in law, in religious casuistry, in medical diagnosis, objects that are manifested in 
pathological descriptions, objects that are circumscribed by medical codes, practices, 
treatment, and care" (33). As the female body was differentiated within eighteenth­
14 Foucault here describes the discourse of madness, but his general defmition of discourse offers a means 
of analyzing medical science's production of the female body. Although Foucault's description of the ways 
in which discourse constructs its objects applies to both men and women, I focus on the women in order to 
explore the Gothic's persistent attention to the heroine's physicality. 
---
14 
century scientific discourse, its physical variations resulted in a subordinate subject 
position for women. While this subordination might not surprise the modem scholar, I 
argue that the discourse's instability, a feature explored by medical historians such as 
Roy Porter, offered authors alternative possibilities for depicting the heroines' self­
determination and self-control. In his genealogies, Foucault also demonstrates that 
discourses include that which is authorized, dominant, and accepted, as well as that which 
is contradictory, subversive, and rejected; discourse is not only the language of the field 
but also the practices, techniques, and spaces that characterize the field. Gothic novelists, 
I argue, construct a range ofpossibilities for the female medical subject by capitalizing 
on the fluid nature of discourse. 
Because the Enlightenment values of rationality, systemization, and hierarchy 
demand a unified system, medical discourse aimed at a coherent, authoritative narrative 
of the physical body. Christopher Lawrence explains, however, that eighteenth-century 
medical discourse was a loosely designated field of theory, techniques, cures, and 
practitioners. Although efforts were made to differentiate between scientific orthodoxy 
and folk medicine, the medical field "was not closed when compared to today, either 
socially (as an occupation) or culturally (in the meanings given to sickness)" (Lawrence 
7). According to Foucault, eighteenth-century medicine was distinguished by 
[t]he development of a medical market in the form of private clienteles, the 
extension of a network of personnel offering qualified medical attention, the 
growth of individual and family demand for health care, [and] the emergence of a 
clinical medicine strongly centred on individual examination, diagnosis and 




While nineteenth-century medicine increasingly boasted an organized clinical machine in 
which doctors enjoyed a powerful position, the eighteenth century had only begun to 
establish medicine's institutional power. 
One of the reasons that eighteenth-century medicine proved a less totalizing 
discourse was its relationship to the capitalist marketplace. Roy Porter notes, "[I]t was 
quite impossible to draw the dividing lines, separating the sheep from the goats, men of 
integrity from quacks" ("Plutus or Hygeia?" 76). The possibility of corrupt, greedy 
physicians threw doubt on the efficacy or authority of individual practitioners. In 
addition, the consumerist model reigned, as the demand ofpatients or potential patients 
often drove the supply of physicians. 15 Because medicine was a buyer's market in which 
doctors depended on clients' desires and choices, therefore, Porter cautions modem 
scholars not to look at medicine as an encroaching authority on the lives of eighteenth-
century individuals (47). As the newly emerging capitalist marketplace opened up a space 
for all sorts of medical treatments, "many fields of irregular medicine were growing in 
tandem" (44); thus, an alluring variety of treatments were on offer. The democratizing 
effect of commercial medicine, however, was tempered by the specialized training and 
university education of influential physicians. 
Although the disciplinary technologies ofmedicine were not entirely intact, 
science had long been ascendant by the late eighteenth century, disenchanting the natural 
world with rational explanations. Thus, the scientific quality of medical inquiry gave it 
15 Thomas Beddoes, an eighteenth-century physician, initiated one of the great concerns in the medical 
profession: "Medicine had to choose between the cash-nexus and the knowledge-nexus. Medicine could be 
moved by money, or it could be animated and organized by science, by the imperatives of the search for 
truth" (porter, "Plutus or Hygeia?" 87). 
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some authority as it offered empirical ways of understanding the body and its relationship 
to the world. Furthermore, the increased attention to healthy living generated a need for 
knowledgeable managers of physical well-being. Porter admits, "Georgian affluence, 
together with the secular temper of an Enlightenment age in which the claims of the body 
began to take precedence over those of the soul, spelt good times for doctors" (Disease 
40-41). The promise of health, long life, and physical comfort continued to sustain the 
discourse's power. Focusing on the material body, practitioners reaffirmed its centrality 
to a fulfilling life and underscored the need to maintain health through proper medical 
treatment. The priority of bodily claims contributed to the process of individualization. 
Physicians concentrated on the symptoms presented by the patient and delved into that 
patient's lifestyle to determine the cause. They acted as detectives, listening to the 
patient's narrative, and then reasoning the cause through largely deductive means. 
Diagnosis did not simply name the disease or complaint but rather identified a disruption 
in the individual's body. Elite physicians emphasized "the importance of harmony, of 
natural place and the serious consequences of bodily matter crossing its proper 
boundaries" (Lawrence 29). The purpose of medical treatment, then, was to "return [the 
body] to its own natural state" (Lawrence 12). 
Examining and theorizing the body on an individual level, physicians gave 
significance to the particular, the local, the personal. David Armstrong suggests that "the 
process of corporal objectification becomes not a destructive assault on human 
individuality but the very practice through which that individuality is given a literally 
solid foundation and manifestation" (22). In other words, the materiality of the body 






and its accompanying rights. Nikolas Rose illustrates the process by which medicine 
"subjectivized" people-turning them into subjects as well as subjecting them to new 
forms ofpower: 
Medicine was bound up with the delineation of the unique human being, the 
human person in his or her very individuality and vitality, as a possible object for 
positive knowledge; that is to say, as a territory which could be mastered by a 
form of truth regulated by rationalities proper to the codes of scientific reason. 
Medicine was perhaps the first positive knowledge to take the form ofexpertise, 
in which the human being was not only to be known but to be the subject of 
calculated regimes of reform and transformation. ("Medicine" 49) 
Furthermore, Rose argues, "Medicine was linked to the secularization of the ethical 
regimes through which individuals come to describe themselves in the languages of 
health and illness, to question themselves in terms ofnorms of normality and pathology, 
to take themselves and their mortal existence as circumscribing their values" (49). 
Medical discourse coincides with ethical living as "humans have been urged to engage in 
practices of self-formation, to master themselves, improve themselves and regulate 
themselves in the name of certain problems and through the use of certain techniques" 
(69). 
I assert that these processes are explored and often resisted in the female Gothic 
novel. In emphasizing the productive aspect of medicine, therefore, I do not wish to 
suggest that the experience of medicine was entirely positive for women. While medical 
discourse can be seen as producing the conditions of selfhood, the definitions ofwomen's 




medicine "produced" the body, it also created the conditions by which the body would be 
dominated, especially the female body, whose "natural" unruliness demanded particular 
kinds ofexternal and internal control. Woman's individuality and body are inextricably 
linked in eighteenth-century medicine: knowing her "self' as a discrete individual, she 
also knows her body as a danger to her "self." I argue that the women novelists in this 
study demonstrate an understanding of female bodies and minds that was rooted in the 
medical field. Subjected to the technologies of medicine in ways that estranged and 
objectified their bodies, women experienced scientific praxis in intimate and immediate 
ways. Even the experience of gender difference was mediated by science. According to 
Thomas Laqueur, medicine invested the human body with two distinct sexes. Laqueur 
argues that anatomical representation shifted from a "one-sex" to a "two-sex" model over 
the seventeenth century: while early medical treatises depicted the female body as an 
inverted male body, with direct correspondences in genitalia and bodily fluids, by the 
latter part of the century medicine assumed a fundamental difference between male and 
female anatomies. Such gendered differences became an important part of medical 
discussions beyond reproductive equipment. With the two-sex model, biological 
differences "spoke" more authoritatively for social differences, as the material body 
seemed to present natural grounds for disparities in social, political, or legal status. 
The struggle over gender in medicine continued through the eighteenth 
century. In The Mind Has No Sex? Londa Schiebinger argues that "the ascendancy of the 
male expert" in gynecology had serious, practical consequences: "Women lost control not 
only over their own health care, but over definitions of their own minds and bodies as 
well" (118). Once women were displaced from medical practice, she continues, "this 
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exclusion was made to seem natural. Physicians would-in the absence of women-
develop a picture of female nature that suggested that women were inherently 
unscientific" (118). Schiebinger explains that because women's subordination was at 
odds with Enlightenment values of equality and natural rights, eighteenth century 
thinkers turned to science to "provide objective evidence in the debate over woman's 
intellectual and physical character" (215). The natural world, therefore, becomes the final 
arbiter in this political dilemma: "Within this framework, an appeal of natural rights 
could be countered only by proof of natural inequalities .... [I]f women are to be 
excluded from the polis, one must demonstrate a 'natural difference' between men and 
women in order to legitimate that exclusion" (Schiebinger 216). As 1 will argue 
throughout this study, medical discourse, providing the basis for individuality yet 
withholding its attendant rights, is a profoundly conflicted arena for women. A scientific 
field, medicine offered a narrative of identity that was difficult to resist. 
Nonetheless, women were not necessarily passive recipients of medical practice 
or theory. While many theories of the nature of female bodies and minds did influence 
women's conception of themselves, there existed a parallel practice that sometimes 
contradicted dominant medical thought. As their writings attest, women continued to 
practice medicine in the domestic sphere, and this self-care is recorded in the domestic 
medical receipt books that assisted them in managing their households. 16 They contain a 
variety of cures that women received from family members, other women, physicians, 
16 Beddoes, however, deplored not only the entrepreneur-physician but also the "private practitioner," the 
lay person who considered herself well-versed in medical theories and remedies. He saw the influx of 
domestic medicine publications as a perfect example of both evils; in these self-help books, medicine was 
compromised and commercialized (Porter, "Plutus or Hygeia?" 79). In other words, Beddoes advocated a 
specialist approach to medicine. 
-
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and newspapers. 17 Lady Eleanor Dundres' receipt book, for example, has an "oppening 
draught [sic]" from Dr. Ford, "a cheap laudanum" and "the strong opium pills" from Dr. 
Wardrop. Lucy Culley's book contains a remedy for cancer involving a poultice ofhot 
turkey figs copied from the newspaper. In Memory, Wisdom, and Healing, Gabrielle 
Hatfield discusses the shift from "popular" or "folk" cures to professional medicine, 
claiming that "with the so-called 'rationalization' ofmedicine in the eighteenth century, 
the medical profession was at pains to distance itself from the non-scientific remedies of 
the past" (l0). Domestic receipt books sometimes provide a glimpse of vestigial folk 
practice. In Ann Ward's receipt book is a remedy for convulsive fits that seems almost 
superstitious: "Take a live pigeon and pluck the feathers from its breast, then hold the 
breast of the pigeon to the pit of the child[' s] stomach till the fit leave the child which 
will convulse the pigeon." 
This history of home-based medicine and remedies, although influenced and 
sometimes supplanted by professional science, offered women opportunities for self-care 
as they managed their own health. These conflicting views are both represented in the 
eighteenth-century domestic receipt books, which reveal not only women's frequent and 
unremarkable involvement with medical practice but also their confidence in some 
physician-prescribed cures. What modern scholars might see as a dichotomy between 
medical knowledge and folkloric beliefs about the body is instead a continuum of facts, 
practices, and beliefs in which one will find conflicting views that co-exist, struggles 
between long-held wisdom and emergent knowledge, and a range of ideas that make up 
17 See Sandra Sherman's article "Printed Communities: Domestic Management Texts in the Eighteenth 
Century," which argues that such volumes created communities ofwomen readers and writers, especially 
when recipes were authorized through personal recommendations. 
....­
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the discourse. Eighteenth-century women's participation in medical practice through 
domestic receipt books suggests that women could participate in the discourse that 
studied, defined, and diagnosed their physical and mental states. 18 I assert that just as 
historical women refused to relinquish entirely the management of their bodies, so 
fictional Gothic women resisted domination. As they struggle for control over their 
bodies, the heroines reflect a discursive struggle that has consequences for their juridical 
identities. 
Discourses of Law 
Like medicine, the law offers a set of norms that systematizes human bodies and 
activity. In Whigs and Hunters, E: P. Thompson reflects on the law as both a series of 
rules and proscriptions and as an ideology (260). Thompson notes that in order for law to 
be effective, it must systematically adhere to a logic of equality, universality, and justice 
that is generally free from external manipulation. Moreover, law must actually enact 
justice, at least sometimes.19 These qualities create faith in the power, efficacy, and 
necessity of law, producing in turn an ideology that people internalize (263). According 
to Ludmilla Jordanova, law is also a human science that shares features of medical 
discourse: 
18 Hatfield also notes that professional physicians were often too expensive and unavailable for rural 
populations, which made domestic medicine a necessary alternative even when orthodox medicine was 
deemed superior (15). Household books, also kitchen or domestic books, provide a glimpse of the 
alternative practice. Within the domestic sphere, women could manage their bodies and still employ the 
official medical knowledge promoted in their culture. 
19 Thompson does, however, assert, "The greatest ofall legal fictions is that the law itself evolves, from 




The law and its applications are not self-evidently part of human science but are 
nonetheless relevant. First, law provides an important setting within which 
distinctions acquire their felt quality, where a society reworks its fundamental 
categories, albeit within fairly firm constraints. Second, law, as theorized and 
practiced, aimed at a certain consistency, a systematic quality that makes it akin to 
the project of a human science. In the process, it relied on assumptions about 
human nature, which aspired to be more than the opinions of a select few and to 
be based upon a deeper understanding ofhumanity. Those who tried to theorize 
sexual behavior and human nature had both legal codifications and legal practice 
available to them as part of their mental armory. (157) 
Jordanova here refers to the enlightenment project ofwhich both science and law are a 
part. Medical and legal discourses strive for an objective uniformity, as they "practice" 
on the physical body. Attempting to create a rational system of knowledge and 
regulation, law achieved the status of "master science, at once a design for living and the 
ultimate hermeneutic tool" (Zomchick 29). Such a master science or discourse could 
authorize a number of possible identities for the "juridical subject," who is "both an 
object of visible and invisible forces of power as well as a subject empowered by her or 
his internalization of that same law" (Zomchick xv). The juridical subject, therefore, is a 
positive, active figure that extends the promise of self-determination and individual 
autonomy within an authorized script. 
In John Locke's work on the sociopolitical individual, upon which much of 
eighteenth-century legal discourse depended, the body assumes central importance. His 




Forming the basis of rights, "Property" refers to distinct, physical bodies that are owned 
by self-determining individuals. This body then serves as the foundation for contractual 
exchange between individuals, as each owns a body and the labor that body produces. At 
the heart of contract theory is the original "property in the self," which the fully-realized 
juridical subject uses to claim ownership, natural rights, and individual autonomy. 
Women's problematic relationship with contract theory, however, poses difficulties to 
their juridical subjectivity. As Carol Pateman and Susan Staves argue, the "self' to which 
Locke refers is distinctly male. Pateman's and Staves' attention to gender, their insistence 
on the physical, turns the idealized "self' into the particular, material person.20 What 
female Gothic novelists do, then, is depict the female body not simply as property, but as 
the physical source of reason, emotion, intellect, and morality-in short, the material 
embodiment of an authentic self. Such a formulation shifts the novels' articulation of 
property in the self to a more general notion ofjustice that also finds expression in legal 
discourse. 
For eighteenth-century England in particular, the law served not only as an 
instrument of hegemonic class power but also' as the foundation for national or even 
personal identity. Women, however, experienced legal discourse in another way. The 
principle of coverture-women's loss of legal identity as they become wives-
transferred legal responsibilities and rights to men. As legal records demonstrate, 
eighteenth-century women were never truly erased from the law. As femes sole ap.d as 
widows, women often participated in legal and economic activities. Additionally, 
20 Carol Pateman's The Sexual Contract and Susan Staves' Married Women's Separate Property serve as 
two benchmark studies of women's relationship to legal philosophy and practice in the eighteenth century. 
While I rely on their theoretical articulations, I examine various legal treatises to discover moments of 
resistance to dominant ideas about women and law. 
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married women were involved in endeavors, such as businesses, that required legal 
sanctions. As critics have noticed, the female Gothic addresses the problem ofcoverture 
and its impact on women's inheritance and property ownership. Although the female 
protagonist in Gothic novels is nearly always single, a feme sole, she is also a minor or 
"infant" who has limited potential for legal activities. Examining the ways in which 
marriage, coverture, and inheritance structure women's lives, the scholarly conversation 
about legal matters in the Gothic tends to emphasize law's oppressive functions. I argue 
that female Gothic novels demonstrate that women are often displaced in legal discourse 
because the medical field constructs a female body that cannot bear the weight of active 
citizenship. Governing women's lives through coverture and property laws, the legal 
field also shaped women's relationship to justice and natural rights. The female Gothic 
persistently invokes the discourse by presenting legal tangles, complications, and 
resolutions. Significantly, however, women often seem estranged from the mechanisms 
of law that ostensibly protect them. 
As Gothic novels show female characters' troubled experiences with legal issues, 
they seem to indicate flaws in positive law and to depend largely on versions of natural 
law for the restoration of order and justice. The institutions, personnel, and procedures 
that make up "law" are also known as positive law, in which "no element of law preexists 
an act of the state" (Schmidt xv). Dennis Schmidt explains, "Unlike positive law, which 
varies according to time and place, natural law is based upon invariant fundamental 
principles that provide nonns for justice" (xv). Natural law also provided powerful 
justification for moral living: "the law that preserved the stars from wrong was also the 





terms that were used to validate eighteenth-century cultural practices, enable these novels 
to depict spaces of authority and resistance for their heroines.21 Natural law theory, then, 
asswnes an important role in the female Gothic. 
. Samuel Pufendorf, in The Whole Duty ofMan According to the Law ofNature 
(1691), explains, "The Law ofNature asserts that this or that thing ought to be done, 
becasue from right Reason it is concluded that the same is necessary for the Preservation 
of Society amongst men" (preface, image 7). Like Pufendorf, William Blackstone refers 
to the need for rational faculties to understand natural law. When God "created man, and 
endued him with freewill to conduct himself in all parts of life, he laid down certain 
immutable laws ofhuman nature, whereby that freewill is in some degree regulated and 
restrained, and gave him also the faculty of reason to discover the purport of those laws" 
(Blackstone 1.39-40). Human reason, therefore, becomes the primary faculty by which 
one ascertains "what the law of nature directs in every circumstance in life" (Blackstone 
1.41). Because reason is not perfect or infallible, divine or revealed law supplies a 
corrective to flawed understandings ofnatural law. Blackstone declares, "[u ]pon thse two 
foundations, the law ofnature and the law of revelation, depend all human law; that is to 
say, no human laws should be suffered to contradict these" (1.42). 
The uneasy consciences of Gothic villains support Blackstone's assertion that "the 
laws of eternal justice" and "the happiness of each individual" are inextricably connected 
(40). Because Gothic novels frequently deliver punishments and resolutions to crimes 
21 Indeed, both legal and medical discourses demonstrate the power of appeals to nature. lordanova 
explains, "The constant reliance on 'nature' provided a semblance of stability, although in fact it was 
notoriously hard to pin down" (159). The use of "nature" in scientific and legal language, which appeared 




outside of a court system, they indicate flaws within positive law which can be corrected 
only through a return to a higher authority.22 As Pufendorf and Blackstone explain, the 
divine origins of law-that is, naturallaw-can supply just such deficiencies in positive 
law. In all the novels explored here, women's experiences with positive law are troubled 
and conflicted. I argue that the "Radcliffean" school, with its romantic conclusions, 
indicates that natural law, judiciously administered through positive laws, ultimately can 
provide justice for wronged women. The tragic novels ofEliza Fenwick and Mary 
Wollstonecraft, however, present an unbridgeable gap between positive laws and ideals 
ofjustice. At the heart of each novel, then, is a vision ofjustice that supports the Gothic 
heroine, whether or not the conclusion ends with empowerment and fulfillment. 
The first chapter will discuss the ways in which Ann Radcliffe's novels The 
Mysteries ofUdolpho! (1793) and The Italian (1798) reject cultural constructions of 
sensibility. Returning to sensibility's medical roots, I argue that the novels depict the 
female body in ways that acknowledge and resist medical discourse. In so doing, the 
novels demonstrate that the body serves as a crucial means ofestablishing knowledge and 
justice. My second chapter takes up the problems historical and fictional women faced 
when they experience crimes and injustice. As I analyze Eliza Parson's The Castle of 
Wolfenbach (1793) and Eleanor Sleath's The Orphan ofthe Rhine (1798), I assert that the 
conclusion's portrayal of abrupt conversions enables the narratives to present "natural" 
justice that upholds the heroines' moral understanding. The intricacies ofnatural and 
22 Noting that female characters' conscious self·worth supplies them with a measure of power, Delamotte 
also argues that this power must be supported by Providential rescue and does not necessarily provide 
women with positive identities. Delamotte argues that providential rescue works as a deus ex machina that 
saves the virtuous heroine but provides her with no positive identity (33). 
.­
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positive law, which fonn the basis of my discussion, enable the authors to avoid the 
problematic aspects of each and to present a just conclusion to the heroines' suffering. In 
turn, I argue that although these novels share the dubious distinction of being named in 
Jane Austen's Northanger Abbey, they are more than mere literary curiosities. 
The third chapter also discusses neglected Gothic novels: The Children ofthe 
Abbey (1796) and Clermont (1798) by Regina Maria Roche. As part of the "Radcliffean 
school," these two texts offer romantic endings that justify the heroines' choices. In this 
analysis, however, I examine cultural techniques of perception that structure women's 
experiences. Whereas the first two chapters focus on the heroines' sensitive bodies, this 
chapter investigates technical structures within medical and legal discourse that lead to 
claims of truth. The notion, stemming from cognitive science and Cartesian philosophy, 
that perception does not provide easy access to reality has devastating consequences for 
the heroines, who experience the social gaze in deeply personal ways. Yet the novels 
provide an implicit critique of medical and juridical perception, enabling the heroines to 
establish their own sense of morality and to follow their notions of natural law even at the 
risk of social condemnation. This optimistic vision turns tragic in Eliza Fenwick's 
Secresy, or Ruin on the Rock (1796) and Mary Wollstonecraft's Maria, or the Wrongs of 
Woman (1798), which the fourth chapter will examine. These radical authors present 
heroines who resist yet ultimately succumb to the power of social institutions. Although 
the heroines of each novel also follow their conscience, their understanding of"natural" 
laws ofjustice and morality, they are confined by medicine and law in tragic ways. Their 
bodies display the effects of institutional forces, which are depicted as diseased and 




resistance displayed in each novel within this study. I assert that medicine and law 
produce remarkably similar effects on the Gothic's embodied female self. These eight 
novels, however, do not simply replicate the discourses but engage with them, and often 
resist them, as they present heroines who are neither completely determined by nor 
completely free from their bodies. 
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Chapter Two: 
Bodies of Knowledge and the Sensible Mind in Ann Radcliffe's The Mysteries of 
Udolpho and The Italian 
My discussion of Ann Radcliffe's The Mysteries ofUdolpho (1793) and The 
Italian (1798) is shaped by two concerns. First, Radcliffe's use ofsensibility, a concept 
loaded with cultural baggage, is rarely examined in its medical sense. The receptivity of 
the body to sensory impressions-and the subsequent creation of ideas-serves as a 
crucial issue that Radcliffe explores through the heroine's "sensibility." Returning to the 
connection between nerves and knowledge, I argue that Radcliffe's depiction of 
sensibility has implications beyond the aspects that critics typically examine, such as 
imaginative excesses, gendered emotion, and disproportionate sympathy. Instead, the 
heroine's sensitive and susceptible body is responsible for producing knowledge, which 
in turn enables her to claim rights and autonomy. Offering a new sense of the challenges 
and dangers that Radcliffe's heroines face, the medical construction ofsensibility also 
provides a means ofknowledge and selfhood, which leads to the second concern that 
influences my approach to sensibility. Ifwomen's bodies are responsible for knowledge 
(in the sense that the body takes in impressions and forms ideas), then they also 
potentially have power. Indeed, medical theories about the nervous system and its 
relationship to knowledge contain radically democratic possibilities, since the evidence of 
one's own senses and the cognitive ability to develop ideas render external authority less 
totalizing, less responsible for the individual self. The body-knowledge matrix that offers 








Ann Radcliffe's heroines are, if not the first, at least the most famous 
representations of a female subject who defines her body within and against the medical 
field in order to rewrite her juridical status. In these two novels, Radcliffe challenges 
certain repressive aspects of legal discourse and rejects problematic claims within 
medical discourse regarding women's hypersensitivity. 1 Because law and medicine 
provide positive identities as well as potentially liberatory and empowering consequences 
for the female self, Radcliffe never suggests a wholesale rejection of these discourses. 
For example, medical discourse, with its emphasis on the individual, provides a 
foundation upon which people can make claims about autonomy, identity, and 
individualism. Likewise, legal discourse provides a master narrative of individual rights 
and political power that women might access for their own benefit. In The Mysteries of 
Udolpho and The Italian, then, Radcliffe negotiates the constructive and repressive 
aspects ofmedicine and law. I argue that in Udolpho Radcliffe links problematic bodies 
with tenuous legal status and ineffectual claims to rights. Appearing as a pathological 
subject, an extreme version of sensibility, Emily makes claims to knowledge and 
ultimately to rights that seem unstable. Nevertheless, the heroine deploys her body's 
potential by exercising self-control and resisting impressions that would render her 
vulnerable to victimization. In contrast, The Italian's heroine, Ellena, exhibits emotional 
and physical health that provides her with a more secure sense of autonomy, selfhood, 
and agency. Ellena's physical stability and epistemological certainty radically undermine 
1 Interestingly, Radcliffe had family connections in both medicine and law. Her relatives included a few 
respected physicians, one ofwhose patients was Hester Lynch Thrale (Norton 22). Her husband William 
studied for the bar and practiced for a brief time before turning his efforts to the Gazetter in 1791 (Norton 
82). 
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the "facts" produced within the juridical spaces of the novel. Radcliffe's warnings about 
emotion, imagination, and weakness thus become critiques of institutional injustice. 
Nenres and Knowledge: Sensibility and the MindIBody Connection 
In eighteenth-century theories of the nerves, sensory impressions are responsible 
for the individual's understanding of the world. According to G. S. Rousseau, 
seventeenth-century brain scientist Thomas Willis inaugurated a paradigm shift, after 
which "a physiological theory ofperception was a necessary condition to explain feelings 
of every sort (whether genuine or otherwise) and especially the diversity of simple and 
complex passions" (l54)? Because Willis's model of human physiology limited the soul 
to the brain, scientific interest in the nervous system became paramount: "this organ [the 
brain] alone depends upon the nerves for all its functions" (Rousseau 145). In turn, nerves 
"alone can be held responsible for sensory impressions, and consequently for knowledge" 
(Rousseau 146). Grounded in medical theories, sensibility "denoted the receptivity of the 
senses and ... connoted the operation of the nervous system, the material basis for 
consciousness" (Barker-Benfield xvii). John Locke's sensationalist psychology draws on 
Willis's work. According to Locke's schema, as the senses are impressed by outside 
stimuli, the brain processes the sensations in order to create ideas.3 Eighteenth-century 
2 This paradigm's success is measured by the degree to which it "deflected" the efforts of subsequent 
scientists and thinkers-and Rousseau says it was substantial. Scientists turned their attention to the 
functions of the nervous system; moralists built their philosophies on the correspondences between soul 
and anatomy; theologians had to account for the role of physical sensation in their theories of the soul. 
(150-152). Rousseau notes that novels of sensibility and sentiment were unimaginable before the paradigm 
shift. 
3 See Essay on Human Understanding 2.14. Locke argues, "Thus the perception or thought which actually 
accompanies, and is annexed to, any impression on the body, made by an external object, being distinct 
from all other modifications of thinking, furnishes the mind with a distinct idea, which we call sensation;­





French physician Pierre Jean Cabanis, in the preface to his Memoires (1796-1802), 
examines Locke's axiom that "all ideas come to be through the senses, or are the product 
ofsensation" in the light of medical research (qtd. in Cabanis 4, original italics). He 
concludes that "the processes of the intellect and of the will become indistinguishable at 
their root from the other biological actions. The very basis of the moral sciences, and, in 
consequences, these sciences themselves, would be restored to the domain of the 
physical" (6). In A New System ofthe Spleen, Vapours, and Hypochondriack Melancholy 
(1729), Nicholas Robinson explains that although the soul is an immaterial substance, we 
can only know it through the physical body: "Our Knowledge then will be only of [the 
soul's] Faculties, which are Perception, Reason, Understanding, and the Memory. These 
Powers of the Soul are all organical and depend on the Constitution of the Brain, and the 
regular Influences of the Senses, for the Clearness and Distinctness of their Actions" 
(42). 
Drawing on the science ofnerves, medical works dealt with the physical effects 
and causes of emotion. Seventeenth- and eighteenth-century physicians Robert Whytt, 
Nicholas Robinson, Richard Blackmore, and George Cheyne, among others, used 
theories of sensibility in their discussions of emotional disorders such as melancholy, 
hypochondria, and hysteria. The medical account ofknowledge creation suggests the 
potential for causality between the body and the mind. In his discussion of the scientific 
significance of Robert Whytt's project, Daniel N. Robinson explains, "What Whytt is 
attempting to do is provide a biological explanation for a variety of 'nervous' disorders, 
many symptoms of which are primarily or exclusively psychological" (xxx). I argue that 
the physical basis for psychological processes makes the Gothic heroine's trembling, 
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fainting, sinking, and collapsing significant in ways often ignored by Gothic critics.4 
Once the physical basis ofknowledge is established, then physical weakness or debility 
undermines claims to understanding.5 Adela Pinch's study of emotion, Strange Fits of 
Passion, is particularly instructive here. Tracing the late eighteenth-century 
preoccupation with the nature and source of emotion, Pinch notes that Locke's 
sensationalist model of knowledge "brings feeling closer to epistemological matters: 
empiricism allows emotion to be a way of knowing" (19).6 Excessive feeling, however, 
also threatens the ability to know. According to Bruhm, such extreme sensitivity leads to 
absolute pain, which "threatens to render us unconscious, oblivious to any sensation" (6). 
Somewhere between receptivity and insensibility, then, the female subject negotiates the 
connection between mind and body. 
The medically constructed, causal chain for intellectual development offered by 
Willis, Locke, and Cabanis has much significance for women's claims to rationality and 
autonomy. For women, the physical nature of intelligence and agency becomes 
significant when their bodies are defined as inferior to men's. Richard Blackmore, for 
example, argues in A treatise ofthe spleen and vapours: or, hypocondriacal and 
4 Bruhm is a notable exception to this claim. His considerable introduction to Gothic Bodies explains the 
ways in which pain, as both physical event and aesthetic experience, draws attention to the body's 
psychological activity (4, 12-13). He argues that the politics ofpain include: the relationship of individual 
perceiver to society; the body's subjection to political forces; imagining pain as a means of encouraging 
and repulsing political sympathies (27-29). Although Bruhm's analysis sets up important theoretical 
questions, his discussion of Radcliffe's novels neglects the particular dimensions I explore. One area that 
we both address is the "property in the self." Yet, he fails to consider women's troubled relationship to that 
property. 
Kim Ian Michasiw argues that "Emily is enmeshed in a strange epistemological trap" because her senses 
are inadequate "to her 'reasoned' conviction that there is a whole, a pattern" (331). However, Michasiw 
fails to consider the barriers that Emily's own body poses to her understanding and knowledge. 
6 In Howells' analysis, heroines' moral dilemmas over marrying their love interests are "complicated by the 
possibility that feeling may for once be the only adequate criterion ofjudgement" (57). 
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hysterical affections (1725) that the women's "spirits" are "more volatile and subtil [sic], 
and of less Stability and Consistence than they are in ours; and therefore more receptive 
of Impressions, more liable to Dissipation, Disturbance and Confusion" (251). 
Blackmore continues to describe the "Fineness, Delicacy, and Tenderness" ofwomen's 
nerves, "which are not woven of such firm and robust Threads, as they are in Men" (251). 
Physically weaker than men, women also have difficulty resisting impressions; in tum, 
they "are driven by the violent Impulse" (251). John Mullan argues that eighteenth­
century medicine held the position that "woman's body, collapsing or beyond control, is 
the very register ofdisorder" (217). Certainly the female body (and emotional state) often 
appears naturally susceptible, hysteric, and weak in medical treatises, yet Mullan's 
conclusion is debatable. Intriguingly, Blackmore notes that hysterical women exhibit the 
same symptoms as hypochondriacal men, loosening the gender boundaries ofnervous 
disorders. Furthermore, in Robinson's treatise, the "Symptoms that affect Women in the 
Beginning of the Vapours, are so nearly related to those that disorder the Imagination of 
Men under a Fit of the Spleen" that only a small difference in the disorder kept him from 
creating one chapter for the two (211). This instability within medical discourse enables 
Radcliffe to argue against the powerful cultural image ofwomen's physical debility. 
As studies of sensibility literature such as G. J. Barker-Benfield's The Culture of 
Sensibility and John Mullan's Sentiment and Sociability remind ~, female physiology 
and psychology occupied the cultural imagination of late eighteenth-century writers of all 
stripes. Sensibility also constituted an ideology ofbehavior and feeling to which the 
"Proper Lady" was subject. In her study The Proper Lady and the Woman Writer, Mary 





vulnerable and passive. According to Poovey, Radcliffe offers an important assessment 
of women's position: 
[I]n her romances Radcliffe investigates specifically the paradoxical role 
sensibility plays in simultaneously restricting women and providing them power 
and an arena for action. Moreover, Radcliffe uncovers the root cause of the late 
eighteenth-century ideological turmoil, the economic aggressiveness currently 
victimizing defenseless women of sensibility. (311) 
The figure of the Proper Lady, who is also a woman of sensibility, illustrates the 
contradictions and tensions in the ideology. Similarly, Mullan argues that sensibility, as a 
bourgeois construction of class solidarity, organizes the body politic, even if such class 
organization is anxious, indeterminate, and precarious (239). 
As a medical concept, however, sensibility organizes the body: bodily integrity 
creates correspondence among organs (Mullan 228).7 Like Poovey, Mullan stresses the 
ambiguous construction of sensibility. He notes, "Because of the shifting nature of 
sensibility, both privilege and ailment, refinement and excess, this trembling body is 
appropriated by eighteenth-century novelists, male and female, as the sign of a 
sentimental extravagance which may be either stubbornly virtuous or manifestly 
debilitating" (223). As Barker-Benfield explains, sensibility attributed to women special 
intellectual and moral powers, while it also "betokened physical and mental inferiority, 
sickness, and inevitable victimization, circumstances throwing severe doubt on the 
7 Here, Mullan summarizes the position of Michel Foucault (The History ofSexuality) and Christopher 
Lawrence ("The Nervous System and Society"). Mullan devotes much ofhis study to analyzing the 
relationship between sensibility and sociability, or social harmony. That women are often seen as 
particularly susceptible to emotional disorder, Mullan explains, indicates that women are positioned to 





effectiveness of the female will" (36). While Poovey, Mullan, and Barker-Benfield all 
acknowledge an inherent instability that undermines the power of the discourse, none 
locates this instability in the conflicted, consumer-driven, medical field itself. Moreover, 
no critic addresses the connection among the body, sensibility, and knowledge--a 
connection that seems integral to Radcliffe's complex treatment of female agency. 
My study draws on the work that Alan Richardson begins in his British 
Romanticism and the Science ofthe Mind. Challenging scholars of Romantic-era writing 
to pay particular attention to late eighteenth-century developments in brain science, 
Richardson argues that such medical works help contextualize such Romantic concerns 
as ''the relation of the mind to body, the relation of human beings to the natural world, the 
new emphasis on human difference and individuality, the environmental role in shaping 
mind and behavior, the status ofvarious materialist ideologies, even such staples as 
sensibility and the creative imagination" (2). Indeed, Richardson contributes fresh 
perspectives to the age-old "mindlbody" dichotomy: "The 'struggle' between rational 
control and passionate feeling, conscious volition and the physiological rush of intense 
inner emotions, manifests not a split between mind and body but the impossibility of 
every teasing them apart" (102).8 I will demonstrate that while Radcliffe acknowledges 
the body's role in producing knowledge through sense impressions, she also attempts to 
rework the problematic conclusions reached by eighteenth-century physicians in order to 
construct a female subject who can actively claim rights. I argue that in The Mysteries of 
g Here, Richardson refers to Jane Austen's Persuasion, yet this idea seems remarkably appropriate for 
Radcliffe's novels. Ellena shares a remarkable similarity to Richardson's description of Anne Elliot: 
"Marked by a 'strong sensibility' from her adolescence, Anne is represented not as some eviscerated or 
denervated rational agen~ but as an emotive, embodied subject, uncommonly reasonable and also 
uncommonly sensitive" (104). 
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Udolpho Radcliffe illustrates the consequences ofmedical science's account of 
knowledge, and in The Italian, she continues to examine the nature of knowledge, 
particularly the function of"evidence," in women's experience. 
Gothic Debility: The Mysteries ofUdolpho 
Because the senses and the nervous system create a material mind, the physical 
body serves as the basis ofknowledge production for both women and men. The radically 
democratic potential of this medical construction indicates that women's bodies can serve 
as either a locus of power or a barrier to autonomy. Assuming the relationship between 
nerves and knowledge, Radcliffe clearly shows thatthe consequences of pathology 
include forfeiting agency, individuality, and even sanity-and that Emily's dangerously 
delicate body and mind make her vulnerable to threats. Although Barker-Benfield argues 
that "novels of sensibility suggested that women's nervous disorders could be a means of 
self-preservation" (32), Gothic novels contradict this conclusion. In particular, 
Radcliffe's portrayal of Emily, who often falls outsidethe range of strength that medical 
science claims as "normal," simply does not bear out Barker-Benfield's claim. Emily 
must preserve not only her moral superiority, her "mild dignity," but also a semblance of 
health as she attempts to control her emotions and body. The nerved mind thus offers a 
means ofestablishing self-determination, while nervous disorders hinder women's 
autonomy.9 Some physicians, such as Pierre Cabanis, cast doubt on women's ability to 
9 In Mary Wollstonecraft's The Wrongs o/Women, or Maria the impulses of the "nerved mind" are the 
means to self-determination As she argues, individuals who are "dependent on outward circumstance ... 
seldom act from the impulse ofa nerved mind, able to choose its own pursuit" (99). 
.. 
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reason by providing a natural explanation for their deficient nerves, but Radcliffe rejects 
such ideas by suggesting that women can overcome the most "natural" debility. 
Hampered by her body, Emily frequently appears incapable of action and thought, 
rather than modeling virtue and propriety. Robert Miles suggests, "[Radcliffe's] earlier 
fiction, one might say, was locked within the logic of sensibility, whereas The Italian 
breaks out of it, striving for a more general, less gender-specific, examination of its 
discursive resources" (179). Miles further explains that The Italian was produced in 
"conversation" with M. G. Lewis's The Monk. Lewis's graphic representation of the 
passive female body prompted Radcliffe to reassess the ideology of sensibility, which 
resulted in passivity and powerlessness (173-75). I argue instead that Radcliffe intervenes 
in the ideology of sensibility as early as Udolpho as she examines the body's role in 
creating knowledge and critiques medical opinions of women's agency. to 
In Udolpho Emily is subject to medical discourse in two senses: she is a '\ 
symptomatic, diagnosable object, and she is an individuated "self," the product of 
medical values. Thus, her status as an individual, particularly one who struggles for self-
mastery, can be located within medical discourse. ll Although the heroine's internalized 
mechanisms of self-control have ties to the ideology ofpropriety, these mechanisms are 
also shaped by medical promises ofhealth, normality, and fitness. Concentrating on the 
10 Mary Poovey's The Proper Lady provides a seminal examination of this problem. She argues that 
Radcliffe's concern with propriety leads her to criticize sensibility's "disorderly" aspects. In Sensibility: An 
Introduction, Janet Todd argues that heroines who are women of feeling, including Emily, "convey their 
virtue through their meaningful bodies, and the most authentic emotions are signaled not by words but by 
tears, blushes, palpitations, and fainting fits" (120), and Todd notes that Radcliffe paradoxically cautions 
against sensibility's selfish and irrational tendencies (144). Coral Ann Howells in Love, Mystery, and 
Misery suggests that Emily functions as a sensibility rather than a personality and argues that Radcliffe 
demonstrates the dangers ofunrestrained emotionalism (49,56). 
11 Without losing sight ofEmily's fictional and textual status, I would like to suggest that Radcliffe strives 
for a certain level of mimesis in her descriptions ofEmily as a person. In this sense, Emily is a "self' that 
corresponds to the textual representations of real bodies within eighteenth-century medical treatises. 
~ 
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dangers and consequences of the sensitive body, Radcliffe suggests that the healthy body 
offers a potentially powerful means of self-determination and autonomy. It is Emily's 
debility of body that ultimately casts doubts on her capacity for knowledge and her status 
as a "knower." Emily's emotional responses and intellectual capabilities illustrate the 
ways in which the female body can endanger intellectual development, legal autonomy, 
and moral status. Experiencing a variety of relationships that highlight these problems, 
Emily must face and defeat each danger by asserting her will to knowledge and her 
ability to maintain a coherent sense ofselfhood. 
I first assert that Radcliffe places Emily within a discourse of disease. In 
Sentiment and Sociability John Mullan states, "There is always disability .... There is no 
social space for sensibility. Illness is its appropriate metaphor" (239-40). This statement, 
located in Mullan's conclusion, merely hints at a new angle on a familiar aspect of 
Udolpho. Indeed, the claim that illness and disability always accompany sensibility can 
alter radically the ways in which we interpret Emily's sensitive body. In the novel, the 
line between sensibility and illness is razor thin. While exquisite sensitivity may heighten 
responses to landscapes, personal tragedies, and tales of woe, Radcliffe often replaces the 
language of sentiment with a discourse of illness. Emily's condition resembles the 
nervous disorders described in eighteenth-century medical treatises. In the beginning of 
the narrative, 81. Aubert, carefully observing the growth ofEmily's body and character, 
diagnoses his daughter as having "uncommon delicacy of mind" and "a degree of 
susceptibility too exquisite to admit of lasting peace" (5). The reader learns that Emily's 
"sensibility gave a pensive tone to her spirits, and a softness to her manner, which added 





object, Emily's body needs correction and cure. Physician Robert Whytt classifies 
patients with nervous disorders in tenns that sound remarkably similar to Emily's 
representation. According to Whytt's Observations on the nature, causes, and cure of 
those disorders which have been commonly called nervous hypochondriac, or hysteric 
(1765), certain patients "though usually in good health, are yet, on account of an 
uncommon delicacy of their nervous system, apt to be often affected with violent tremors, 
palpitations, faintings, and convulsive fits, from fear, grief, surprise, or other passions" 
(532, my emphasis). Introducing Emily with hypersensitivity as the narrative begins, 
Radcliffe sets up the primary challenge that Emily faces and begins to explore the range 
of responses that stem from the sensitized body. 
George Cheyne's 1733 treatise The English Malady also shaped the physio­
emotional territory that Radcliffe examines and rewrites through Emily's character. As 
this text illustrates, the nervous system provided a framework within which to explain a 
host ofphysical, social, and moral problems. In the mid-eighteenth century, nervous 
disease was part of a phenomenon "semiotically captured by the word 'nerves' and its 
cognates (nervous, neurasthenic, neurotic, etc.) [ which] touched on most aspects of life 
then and was not confmed to a few zones" (Rousseau, Enlightenment 11 7). Doctors like 
Cheyne commented on the inclusiveness of such terminology and attempted to classify 
more precisely the causes, symptoms, and cures of nervous disorders. In the language of 
eighteenth-century treatises on hypochondria and hysteria, Emily appears pathologically 
sensible. 12 Cheyne's "first stage" of distemper includes a host of symptoms that Emily 
12 By contrast, Dale Townshend argues that Emily exhibits psychosis and neurosis in a Lacanian sense. 





experiences: "Lowness of Spirits, Inappetnecy13 [sic], Inquietude, Anxiety, Melancholy, 
Grief" (134). Integrating both physical and emotional symptoms, Cheyne demonstrates 
that the latter are not simply psychological maladies. Instead, emotions are intimately 
related to the physiological system ofnerves, fibers, vessels, and circulation. The 
physical basis of the mind, as medical discourse constructs it, offers Radcliffe a powerful 
metaphor that she weaves throughout the novel. Describing Emily's mental and 
intellectual capabilities within a physical framework, Radcliffe draws attention to the 
illness, health, strength, and weakness of Emily's understanding. 
At the begilU1ing of Udolpho, Emily's father works on her character in much the 
same way that a physician might work on a diseased patient. 14 
He endeavoured, therefore, to strengthen her mind; to enure her to habits of self-
command; to teach her to reject the first impulse of her feelings, and to look, with 
cool examination, upon the disappointments he sometimes threw in her way. 
While he instructed her to resist first impressions, and to acquire that steady 
dignity ofmind, that can alone counterbalance the passions, and bear us as far as 
is compatible with our nature, above the reach ofcircumstances, he taught himself 
a lesson of fortitude; for he was often obliged to witness, with seeming 
indifference, the tears and struggles which his caution occasioned her. (5) 
phallic power and linguistic mastery are located in the Father. "Constructions ofPsychosis and Neurosis in 
Ann Radcliffe's The Mysteries ofUdolpho" Pretexts 9.2 (2000): 175-206. 
13 That is, a lack ofappetite or desire. 
14 Barbara Benedict agrees that these descriptions are scientific. She explains that st. Aubert "revises 
superstition as science. His knowledge of nature, both physical and human, accounts for the sources of 
feelings and sights, explains Emily's experience as universal, and replaces awe with control" (373). Her 




St. Aubert does not experiment on her when he puts obstacles or "disappointments" in 
her way; instead, he inoculates her against future emotional collapse by introducing small 
doses of"disease.,,15 Radcliffe's emphasis on personal mastery, improvements, and 
regulation fits well within medical discourse (Rose, "Medicine," 69). Further, the science 
of sensibility relocates the significance of this scene from the ideology ofpropriety to the 
-creation of factual knowledge. Eighteenth-century physician Nicholas Robinson shows 
that a person's will has the power to overcome "the Impulse, with which the Fibres 
impress external Objects upon the Passions," ifone were to exert one's mind against such 
impulses (49). Emily's resistance to "first impressions" becomes a resistance to her 
body's passive function. Rather than accepting sensual data, the heroine must learn to 
control external impressions. For Emily, managing her responses to stimuli and refusing 
the impressions of outside forces enable her to participate actively in the physiological 
and psychological processes of her body. Focusing on Emily's body and health, Radcliffe 
explores the interdependence ofphysical and mental states-and carves out a space for 
women's self-determination. 
The primary authority in Emily's life, St. Aubert frequently, even obsessively, 
insists that his daughter recognize the value of restraining sensibility and suggests that 
self-command is both possible and necessary. This much-remarked aspect of Udolpho 
generally serves as proof that Radcliffe rejected the fashion of sensibility. However, it 
also signals a complex response to medical constructions of the self. Although her father 
admits that ''there is a period when all reasoning must yield to nature" (21), Emily 
15 Van Sant discusses the use of scientific language in such sentimental novels as Clarissa, explaining that 
references to experiments, tests, and proofs offered novelists a new expression of identity fonnation. I 
argue that Radcliffe also constructs her heroine's identity through medical language, although the particular 







continually struggles against "nature," which Radcliffe aligns with the irrational. St. 
Aubert's lessons are emphasized at length as Emily's parents sicken and die. Her parents 
seem especially anxious that Emily's physical and emotional weaknesses might de~troy 
completely her chances for a peaceful, happy life. As Emily's mother lies on her 
deathbed, st. Aubert tells his daughter that emotion, particularly grief, can be an 
"indulgence," an "excessive" luxury of body that "enervates the mind and almost 
incapacitates it" (20). Here, he echoes Cheyne's discussion of the national and cultural 
causes of certain emotional illnesses. 
Attributing the bulk of nervous distempers to "the Rich, the Lazy, the Luxurious, 
and the Unactive" (20), Cheyne suggests honest living, plain diet, and wholesome 
activity as preventative measures. 16 Cautioned against emotional splurges, Emily 
frequently revisits her father's injunctions after his death: "she remembered how often he 
had blamed her for indulging useless sorrow; how often he had pointed out to her the 
necessity of fortitude and patience, assuring her, that the faculties of the mind strengthen 
by exertion, till they finally unnerve affliction, and triumph over it" (119). Like Cheyne, 
St. Aubert promotes exercise or exertion as a cure for the pathological state, although in 
this case Emily's father refers to a kind of emotional exercise. In both cases, activity 
rather than passivity constitutes a healthy ideal for women and men. 17 Radcliffe approves 
and authorizes Emily's efforts through the domestic sphere, taking every opportunity to 
dichotomize the dangers of passivity and the potential of activity. Sensual impressions 
16 In Rise ofthe Supernatural, E. J. Clery mentions women's long-standing association with luxury. See 
also Barker-Benfield's The Culture ofSensibility for Cheyne's feminization of nervous disorder through his 
discussion of luxury. 
17 Benedict notes, "[S]orrow, and the indulgence of it, induce 'lethargy,' close to the 'idleness' Michel 
Foucault identifies with the idea of madness in the eighteenth century" (371). Emily's "madness" poses a 




may occur on the body, but the nervous system and brain work to process those 
impressions into knowledge. As Emily exerts herself and "exercises" her mind, she 
moves toward personal agency, rejecting cultural stereotypes of sensibility and instead 
embracing the potential ofphysiological psychology to generate personal agency. 
Although the body serves as the primary means of individualism, Radcliffe also 
illustrates that agency was often secured through property. Bruhm raises this significant 
issue, yet his discussion of Emily ignores the complication that the female body presents 
within both medical and legal discourses. I argue that Radcliffe's presentation of the 
relationship between property and women's bodies fluctuates as Emily appears physically 
weak or strong. As her father recognizes, Emily's ability to maintain her property 
depends on her ability to control her body. St. Aubert's lengthy deathbed speeches 
mention both sensibility and property, not only indicating the importance of medical and 
juridical discourses in Emily's life but also exposing the correlation between the two. He 
adamantly entreats, "promise ... that you will never, whatever may be your future 
circumstances, sell the chateau." He also insists that "whenever she might marry, to 
make it an article in the contract, that the chateau should always be hers" (78). In her 
article, "(In)alienable Rights: Property, Feminism, and the Female Body from Ann 
Radcliffe to the Alien Films," Lauren Fitzgerald does note that the Lockean axiom that 
one owns property in the self is more problematic for women; however, her argument 
fails to examine the control that Emily ultimately does deploy. Fitzgerald argues, "The 
final lesson of the novel, however, is that even as the Gothic heroine is self-possessed, the 




her body." Further, "the owner can all too easily become the owned, and inalienable 
rights alienable.,,18 
Radcliffe's savvy use of English property laws, specifically the marriage 
settlements that enabled women to maintain separate property, is certainly noteworthy.19 
This scene, however, demonstrates the opposite of Fitzgerald's claim. Radcliffe does 
realize that, in Lockean terms, Emily's body serves as her original "property." Indeed, the 
self and property can be conflated to provide women with powerful agency. Nevertheless, 
8t. Aubert's fervent demand that Emily keep the chateau, mingled with his warnings 
against "the evils of susceptibility," "self-delusion," and becoming ''the victims ofour 
feelings," emphasizes the inalienable nature of Emily's body (80). According to Locke, 
inalienable rights include life, liberty, and property in the self. In this conception, 
selthood becomes a new "right" that women can claim. lbrough 8t. Aubert's attention to 
the danger that Emily faces through her weak body, Radcliffe demonstrates that Emily 
has a vested, lifetime interest in her "property." His cautions convey the need for women 
to secure property in themselves. Intriguingly, Radcliffe opposes the fungible, 
transferable·quality of property with Emily's selthood, which cannot be bargained away. 
8t. Aubert does not warn Emily about villains, such as Montoni, who might take her 
estates, but about a proper, presumably romantic, marital relationship that serves as feme 
sole's primary ambition. Her father indicates that, as long as Emily can avoid self-
victimization and self-delusion, she can maintain her "property"-in herself and in the 




19 See Amy Louise Erickson's Women and Property in Early Modern England, Susan Staves'Married 








chateau. Thus, danger of delusion, which increases as the heroine exhibits symptoms of 
nervous illness, potentially undermines her assertive claims. These dangers become more 
apparent within the threatening environment of Castle Udolpho, but they begin after the 
death ofEmily's parents. 
Although Emily appears physically weak: in early descriptions, her hysterical 
symptoms appear only when she grieves for her mother and father. Whytt describes 
hysteria as "sudden flushings ofheat over the whole body," "long faintings, in some 
cases, following one another, after short intervals" and "Palpitations, or trembling of the 
heart" (531). Radcliffe taps into these diagnosable symptoms as she maps out Emily's 
responses. In keeping with the physio-emotional diagnosis, Radcliffe describes Emily's 
"greatly enervated" mind and "the infirm state ofher nerves" when discussing her 
wounded feelings (l02). In one scene, Emily is "lying senseless across the foot of the 
bed" (87). Coral Ann Howells argues that the heroine's "anxiety often verges on hysteria 
and hallucination" (Love 50). For Howells, such emotional distress simply reinforces 
women's social passivity, yet Radcliffe specifically shows that Emily works to control 
her always-active body, which in medical terms palpitates, circulates, aspirates, and 
vibrates. Her spells of weakness thus forcefully represent the illness that she attempts to 
resist. Nicholas Robinson notes in his medical treatise, "Every Change of the Mind, 
therefore, indicates a Change in the bodily Organs; nor is it possible for the Wit ofMan 
to conceive how the Mind can, from a chearful [sic] and gay Disposition, fall into a sad 
and disconsolate State, without some Alterations in the Fibres, at the same Time" (178). 
Although Emily never has a cheerful disposition, it is clear that her already susceptible 




that proposes multiple stages of nervous disorder and offers refined distinctions between 
degrees of capacity, Radcliffe demonstrates that while Emily can exhibit a variety of 
nervous symptoms, the heroine retains the capacity to act against her physical 
experiences. 
After her father's death, Emily's responses and resources are tested-and the 
consequences of her body clarified. In particular, Radcliffe explores the ways in which 
Emily's mind, embodied in her susceptible body, might be potentially weak to the point 
ofcomplete unreason. According to Cheyne, the second stage ofnervous distemper 
involves: 
[D]eep and fixed Melancholy, wandering and delusory Images on the Brain, and 
Instability and Unsettlednesss in all the intellectual Operations, Loss ofMemory, 
Despondencey, Horror and Despair, a Vertigo, Giddiness or Staggering ...[Fits] 
of Crying, Grief and Anguish; and these generally terminate in Hypochondriacal 
or Hysterical Fits (I mean Convulsive ones) and Faintings, which leave a 
Drowsiness, Lethargy, and extream [sic] Lowness of Spirits for some Time 
afterwards (138). 
Weeping, trembling, and fainting, Emily exhibits signs of grief as well as disorder. In a 
ghoulish turn, Emily believes that her father's ghost might be the "rustling sound" she 
hears and the moving shadow she sees. Influenced by sad contemplations, "her 
imagination respond[ed] to every impression of her senses [and] gave her a sudden terror 
of something supernatural. She sat for a moment motionless, and then, her dissipated 
reason returning, 'What should I fear?' said she. 'If the spirits of those we love ever 
return to us, it is in kindness'" (108). In fact, "her imagination had deluded her"-the 
.. 
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ghost turns out to be her dog. While this experience illustrates Radcliffe's clever use of 
supernatural atmosphere, it also overlaps with the medical diagnosis that would immerse 
Emily more completely in nervous disorder. The instability ofEmily's senses causes a 
crisis in her understanding, which Radcliffe further develops in subsequent scenes. 
Emily's body and mind are tested in three related ways. First, when Valancourt 
proposes a clandestine marriage, Emily's ability to retain her senses demonstrates her 
ability to maintain her moral status. Second, in the mysterious and frightening castle, 
Emily exhibits a propensity to sensory delusions that destabilizes her capacity for 
knowledge. Although she actively resists the impressions that raise frightening 
possibilities within her imagination, the threat of madness continues to loom as both a 
mental and moral peril. Third, as Emily struggles to marshal her intellectual and physical 
resources, she must defend her legal rights to inheritance when the villain Montoni 
attempts to snatch her property from her. Calling her knowledge into question, Montoni 
argues that Emily cannot comprehend her legal position and insists on his own version of 
the truth. Although Radcliffe makes Emily's powerlessness and vulnerability painfully 
clear, she also demonstrates that Emily's mental strength can overcome at least her 
emotional responses to terrifying threats. 
Under the guardianship of her wealthy and vain aunt, Emily fights against the 
collapse of reason and health as she enters a confused blur of travel, danger, grief, and 
terror. In fact, Emily's passionate feelings threaten her mind and body much more than 
villainous plots. When Valancourt desperately attempts to persuade Emily to a 
clandestine marriage, she falls into a stupor: "She spoke not; her cheek was cold, and her 





appeared to be dying" (155). The connection among the nerves, brain, mind, and reason 
is most striking here. Psychological and physiological stimuli result in a temporary 
trance, as she responds to Valancourt's proposition: 
After a few minutes, she drew a deep sigh, and began to revive. The conflict she 
had suffered, between love and the duty she at present owed to her father's sister; 
her repugnance to a clandestine marriage, her fear of emerging on the world with 
embarrassments, such as might ultimately involve the object of her affection in 
misery and repentance; --all this various interest was too powerful for a mind, 
already enervated by sorrow, and her reason had suffered a transient suspension. 
But duty, and good sense, however hard the conflict, at length, triumphed over 
affection and mournful presentiment. .. and she acted, perhaps, with more than 
female fortitude. (155) 
This curiously gendered exercise in fortitude seems perplexing from a medical 
perspective like Cheyne's. If Emily has entered a non-rational mental state, then the 
triumph of her "good sense" indeed makes little sense. In this scene, as in later scenes, 
Radcliffe subordinates medical discourse to moral, which in turn allows her to explore 
further the juridical dimensions of Emily's experiences. 
Under pressure, Emily almost loses consciousness. Interestingly, this temporary 
inanity comes at a point when Emily is faced with the possibility of changing her legal 
status from feme sole to feme covert. The subject that she will become, a legal non-entity, 
is the subject that she actually is at that moment: an unthinking, unfeeling, and 
frightening nonexistence that offers no real solution to the dilemma with which she is 




property in marriage at this point, those cautions seem oddly appropriate in this context. 
St. Aubert, recognizing that women must transfer control of their property upon marriage 
unless they make legal arrangements, encourages Emily to retain the chateau, almost as a 
physical reminder ofher individual "self." A clandestine marriage to Valancourt would 
not allow her the opportunity to draw up the proper settlements that would ensure her 
property ownership. Even beyond problems of separate property, however, the loss of 
selfhood represented in this scene appears to be the ultimate danger. 
The threat of a final loss of self appears in the frightening atmosphere of Castle 
Udolpho, where Radcliffe most vividly expresses the processes of mind and body. 
Emily's imagination creates her physical reality in several scenes, destablizing her ability 
to know what is happening to her. In one example, Emily responds to "imaginary 
terrors," which cause her to tremble and prevent her from walking or even standing (221). 
Searching for her aunt, Emily speculates on the possible discoveries she might make: 
"Perhaps... I am come hither only to learn a dreadful truth, or to witness some horrible 
spectacle; I feel that my senses would not survive such an addition of horror" (323). 
When the truth is too horrible to discover, the impressions that the senses receive become 
dangerous. As Emily suggests, survival depends on her ability to absorb and process 
sensory data, but she often seems too weak to withstand impressions. In her quest to find 
her aunt, she can scarcely move: "Now that she was so near the sought-for certainty, she 
dreaded to know it, even more than before, and had not fortitude sufficient to speak, or to 
attempt opening the door" (324). 
Unlike the overwhelming spectacle of the rotting corpse behind the veil, these 




she is responsible for successfully understanding the dangers that surround her. Although 
Emily's belief that truth and certainty can be dreadful is entirely reasonable, Radcliffe 
indicates that "positive" or empirical knowledge is difficult for Emily to establish 
because her body and mind together interfere with her activity. For example, as Emily 
imagines her aunt murdered, "she trembled, gasped for breath ... But after she paused a 
few minutes, the consciousness ofher duty returned, and she went on" (323). Faced with 
evidence that suggests violence, Emily cries, "She is dead! ... murdered!--her blood is 
on the stairs!" (324). The narrator continues, "Emily grew very faint; could support 
herself no longer, and had scarcely presence ofmind to set down the lamp, and place 
herself on a step" (324). Indeed, the sensitive heroine attempts "to derive from the whole 
something more positive, than conjecture. But her imagination was inflamed, while her 
judgment was not enlightened, and the terrors ofsuperstition again pervaded her mind" 
(375). 
Emily's incorrect conclusions and her physical weakness are placed together to 
illustrate the sympathy between mind and body, which thwarts Emily's attempts to 
establish certainty. Indeed, women were described in some medical treatises as 
particularly-even essentially-vulnerable to such irrational and incorrect impressions. 
In his discussion of delirium, Cabanis writes, 
In those whose minds have acquired keen and abiding habits of accuracy, such 
erroneous impressions (which rarely strike all the senses at once) can be corrected 
by reason. It is not always exactly the same in women. Their active and mobile 
imaginations do not resist the sensations of the moment. They do not even tolerate 





question the accuracy of these [chimeras] until they have ceased to experience 
them. (65). 
Although Radcliffe's heroine exhibits a similar imagination, she does attempt to train her 
mind and to resist "the sensations of the moment." Cabanis argues that women normally 
have difficulty distinguishing chimeras from reality, while Radcliffe demonstrates that 
Emily's particular weaknesses and debility are abnormal, problematic, and curable. 
Creating moments of resistance to medical opinions, Radcliffe exerts her own power 
within medical discourse. 
Emily's physical vulnerability emphasizes her emotional susceptibility. The 
narrator notes: "It was lamentable, that her excellent understanding should have yielded, 
even for a moment, to the reveries of superstition, or rather to those starts of imagination, 
which deceive the senses into what can be called nothing less than momentary madness" 
(102). Madness has a significant relationship to nervous disorder. In Madness and 
Civilization, Foucault explains that in madness "there is always a secret weakness, an 
essential lack of resistance" (160). In the Castle Udolpho, the threat of madness appears 
again, as Emily rejects her suspicions that Montoni has murdered her aunt: 
[S]he was inclined to corisider these suspicions as the extravagant exaggerations 
ofa timid and harrassed mind, and could not believe Montoni liable to such 
preposterous depravity as that of destroying, from one motive, his wife and her 
niece. She blamed herself for suffering her romantic imagination to carry her so 
far beyond the bounds of probability, and determined to endeavour to check its 
rapid flights, lest they should sometimes extend into madness (342). 
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As Emily learns after "her own credulity had so nearly betrayed her" (379), she needs 
every mental and physical resource at her disposal. Montoni' s attempts to usurp her 
estates show Emily that she must make every effort to repel his arguments, threats, and 
tricks. Madness in the castle environment thus presents a danger to Emily's 
consciousness and her ability to cling to the estates that she inherits. 
Emily's experiences with Montoni allow her a chance to articulate rights that she 
has no need to claim with her father. When Montoni points out the illegality of his wife's 
will and thus Emily's possession of the estates, Emily "calmly" states, "I am not so 
ignorant, Signor, of the laws on this subject, as to be misled by the assertion of any 
person. The law, in the present instance, gives me the estates in question, and my own 
hand shall never betray my right" (380). After dozens of scenes in which Emily trembles, 
weeps, and faints, her moment of clarity, articulation, and strength provides a startling 
contrast. Here, Emily does not even claim conscious worth or moral superiority-two 
qualities that she often relies upon to sustain herself. In its entirety, this significant scene 
merges the problematic female body with legal issues ofproperty. Montoni sneers, "You 
speak: boldly, and presumptuously, upon a subject, which you do not understand. For 
once, 1 am willing to pardon the conceit of ignorance; the weakness of your sex, too, 
from which, it seems, you are not exempt, claims some allowance; but, if you persist in 
this strain--you have every thing to fear from my justice" (380). Referring to 
understanding, ignorance, and weakness, Montoni clearly indicates that Emily's 
knowledge has a suspiciously feeble character, which he continues to claim as he argues 
with her: "I find that you are weak: enough ... to credit the idle assertion 1 alluded to! ... 
Your credulity can punish only yourself; and 1 must pity the weakness ofmind, which 
.. 
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leads you to so much suffering as you are compelling me to prepare for you" (380). 
Again, the ruthless villain draws attention to the weakness that Emily has exhibited and 
resisted throughout the novel. 
Unlike her earlier somatic responses to danger, however, Emily's replies to 
Montoni are confident and secure in this scene: "You may find, perhaps, Signor," said 
Emily, with mild dignity, "that the strength ofmy mind is equal to the justice ofmy 
cause; and that I can endure with fortitude, when it is in resistance of oppression" (380­
381). It is my claim that Radcliffe's references to Emily's strength and weakness of mind 
highlight her sustained interest in women's physical capacity for knowledge. As Emily 
insists on her knowledge of laws that support her rights, which she refuses to give up, she 
rejects the debility that has hampered her agency and autonomy. In contrast to previous 
moments in the text, the narrator offers no reflections, no admonitions, no indications that 
Emily does not see things clearly at this point. Lacking the narrator's intervention, the 
scene depends on dialogue that evokes the physicality of the mind. The physical terms 
deployed here reflect the essential problem of the body: if Emily cannot create 
epistemological certainty, then her claims to legal rights are immediately suspect. 
Radcliffe, however, indicates that Emily can claim the power of law, particularly in this 
moment of threat and terror. 
Although the conflict between Montoni and Emily has been addressed by critics, 
much of the response has been unhistorical at best.2o For example, Kate Ellis explains 
20 Michasiw's position most resembles mine in that she argues, "Emily employs her knowledge [and] 
asserts herself' (335). Yet she believes that Emily depends on a superstitious belief in the positive power of 
law. Likewise, Clery notes that Emily's earlier superstitions infect her legal references with a similar 
credulity. Both critics fall into the trap that Radcliffe strives so hard to avoid. In this scene, Emily fulfills 
the potential of the sensible mind, which, I will argue, The Italian more fully realizes. 
.....­
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that the "legal system of Udolpho protected women to a degree that did not occur in 
England until half a century after the novel appeared" (123). Ignoring the marriage 
settlements and inheritance laws that enabled women to own and bequeath property, Ellis 
relies on a general notion of coverture, which certainly placed women in a vulnerable, 
disadvantaged position but which had l~gallimits enforceable in the courts of equity if 
not common law. On the other hand, E. 1. Clery identifies the scene as a conflict between 
two versions of law: the law of equity and common law. Identifying Emily's stance as 
that of equity, Clery argues that Emily can claim only an ideal of "natural justice." Clery, 
however, does not acknowledge that equity was a legal system equally as codified as 
common law. In A Treatise ofEquity (1793-95), John Fonblanque explains that although 
courts of equity, also called Chancery courts, attempt to enact "natural justice" and ''the 
precepts ofnatural law," they in fact remain part ofpositive laws (9). As Fonblanque 
notes, "But if the law has determined a matter with all its circumstances, equity cannot 
intermeddle; and for the Chancery to relieve against the express provision of an act of 
parliament, would be the same as to repeal it. Equity, therefore will not interpose in such 
cases" (17-18). In fact, although equity might grant relief in the form of a specialized 
remedy, the courts employed recognized remedies, such as trusts, that the common law 
would uphold in disputes. As Judy Cornett explains, one of the maxims of equity is 
"equity regards as done that which ought to be done.,,21 The significance of this scene, 
therefore, does not lie within the conflict between versions of law; instead, it 
demonstrates possibilities for a "weak-minded" woman. Emily's ability to claim legal 
21 I am indebted to Judy Cornett for explaining the distinctions between courts ofequity and common law 
courts, as well as for articulating the problematic historical concerns that these critics elide. 
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rights, or even to trade her rights to the estates for a more prized value, becomes a 
resource that the embodied mind can deploy. 
Threatened in multiple ways, Emily finds strength and power to resist oppression 
and weakness, yet the narrative continues for hundreds ofpages after the threat of 
Montoni has evaporated. External threats, as I have shown, are only part of the problem 
that Radcliffe examines. As Montoni withers away in the background, the novel returns 
to the moral-emotional challenges that demand the heroine's physical and mental 
exertions. Through Emily's experiences with Valancourt and her meeting with 
Laurentini, Radcliffe demonstrates that rationality can be disrupted through guilt and 
physical debility as they culminate in madness. Although feisty and superior with 
Montoni, Emily continues to face challenges with her romantic feelings for Valancourt. 
When she hears of VaIan court's depraved Paris excursions and then encounters him at 
the De Villeforts, she faints twice and weeps, even though she "exert[ s] her resolution to 
appear recovered" (508). Because Valancourt's corruption would degrade her, Emily 
decides that she must break their engagement. As she processes the information in 
private, Emily again appears disordered: "when she attempted to think, her mind refused 
controul, and she could only feel that she was miserable" (509). This lack of control, 
while understandable, indicates a correlation between thinking and feeling that Radcliffe 
continues to present as dangerous. 
In their subsequent interview, Valancourt and Emily experience a wide range of 
emotions, and it is clear that Emily remains susceptible to her "agitated spirits" (512), 
''the pleadings ofher heart" (513), "unutterable anguish" and "grief" (515), which 




illness" (518). The conjunction ofmind and body, the mental and physical processes that 
result in secure selfhood, is repeated to excess. Later, anxiety over Valancourt's possible 
death causes her in one instance to develop a "slow fever" (589) and at another time to 
become "so much disordered" that she cannot walk and must sit down on the ground 
(619). Although Emily has learned how to claim her rights and her property, her physical 
state is not much improved. In medical terms, Emily's failure ofhealth and body would 
make her knowledge-especially that of legal rights, illegiJimate authority and unjust 
claims-uncertain at best. Radcliffe, therefore, rejects the medical outcomes in order to 
allow her heroine the capacity to think and act appropriately. 
Emily does not remain in this too-sensitive state for long. Trained by her father to 
exercise her will in an almost physical manner, the heroine rejects grief and masters her 
feelings. As she overcomes emotional and physical symptoms, she re-enters 
consciousness and subsequently avoids the final stage of nervous disorder in Cheyne's 
model. Cheyne argues that a person will die from nervous condition "if not cured in 
either of these two [stages], by the struggling and Efforts ofNature, joined with Art" 
(138). Robinson's medical treatise outlines a similar diagnosis, wherein "the fatal Stages 
... seldom cease to make upon any sudden, surprising, or unexpected Turn ofAffairs, if 
not timely prevented by proper Applications" (233). As she abandons this trajectory, 
Radcliffe demonstrates that Emily's morality is linked to her body in positive ways-as 
Emily recuperates from illness, she exercises agency over her moral status. Robert Kiely 
notes, "The path which Mrs. Radcliffe's virtuous characters must try to keep winds 
literally betWeen the madhouse and the graveyard-that is, between chaotic emotional 
release and an inhuman absence of feeling" (The Romantic Novel, 72). The images of the 
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madhouse and graveyard to which Kiely refers resonate with medicine as it seeks to cure 
illness of mind and body. For Emily, self-mastery involves both her emotions and her 
body, and she is ultimately successful. Yet Radcliffe does present the natural path of 
nervous disease through Laurentini, or Sister Agnes. 
When Emily enters the convent to find the answers to her father's mysteries, she 
comes face to face with her emotional double-and encounters the possible progression 
of her symptoms. Indeed, the possibility of Emily's break with consciousness and 
rationality haunts the text. When she gazes on Emily, Laurentini states, "You are 
young-you are innocent! I mean you are yet!-But you have passions in your heart, -­
scorpions; they sleep now-beware how you awaken them! -they will sting you, even 
unto death" (574). Radcliffe subtly notes that the virtuous heroine faces the danger of 
guilty passion: Emily is "yet" innocent, a precarious state that depends on her continued 
exertions. As Emily responds with compassionate tears, Laurentini raves, 
We are sisters, then indeed .... [M]y eyes could weep-but now they burn, for 
now, my soul is fixed, and fearless! -I lament no more! ... My head burns, I 
believe I am not well. O! could I strike from my memory all former scenes-the 
figures, that rise up, like furies, to torment me!-I see them, when I sleep, and, 
when I am awake, they are still before my eyes! I see them now-now! (575). 
These two women are indeed sisters in thei~ emotional likeness. Emily finds an 
unaccountable familiarity in this madwoman, a familiarity that Sister Frances both 
dismisses and supports: '" You have been interested by the deep melancholy ofher 
countenance,' said Frances, 'and its impression has probably deluded your imagination; 
for I might as reasonably think I perceive a likeness between you and Laurentini'" (578). 
~ 
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I assert that their likeness is most evident in the medical terms that Cheyne employs and 
elaborates, in turn underscoring the difficulty that Emily faces when she must control 
herself. The potential for her body to become unruly, irrevocably beyond her control, 
looms as a threat more devastating than Montoni could ever present. 
As Emily later learns, Laurentini was a victim of her own "ill-governed passion" 
(577). After being forced into an approved marriage, Laurentini committed adultery with 
the man she loved and, upon discovery, was secreted away by her father in a convent. 
The conflicting demands of "love, remorse, and a sense of the duties she had taken upon 
herself in [the convent]" rendered her alternately wild and melancholy. Intriguingly, 
Emily enacts the same moral struggle with Valancourt. In fact, Radcliffe employs 
virtually the same language to describe Emily's predicament, which is "the conflict she 
had suffered, between love and the duty she at present owed to her father's sister" (155). 
Missing from the above equation is "remorse." Emily is, as Laurentini notes, "innocent of 
any great crime" (574). Free from pains of conscience, Emily can experience emotion 
without slipping entirely into madness. Laurentini does not serve simply as the bad, 
"other" woman,22 but as a person whose emotional disorder seems to coincide with that 
of the virtuous heroine. Laurentini' s madness allows Radcliffe to introduce the moral, 
medical, and even political consequences of guilty emotion. Like Laurentini, Emily often 
"sees" the dead, although Emily's "ghosts" are benevolent and beloved.23 With no 
conscious errors, Emily need not fear the ghostly presence of her parents. After 
Laurentini is led away, Emily and Sister Frances discuss Laurentini's condition: 
22 Eugenia Delamotte's argument in The Perils ofthe Night, p. 154 
23 See Terry Castle's "Spectralization of the Other" for further discussion of the ways in which Radcliffe 




"But how rationally she conversed, at first!" observed Emily, "her ideas followed 
each other in perfect order." 
"Yes," replied the nun, "this was nothing new; nay I have sometimes known her 
argue not only with method, but with acuteness, and then, in a moment, start off 
into madness." (575) 
Emily is surprised that Laurentini can even converse with clarity and rationality. 
Again, like Laurentini, Emily has moments of lucidity-even strong political 
statements-but these are often followed by emotional and physical collapse. These two 
women both appear on Cheyne's register ofnervous disorder: they share the melancholy, 
delusory images, fits of anguish, horror and despair that characterize his second stage. 
The troubling connection between Emily's emotion and madness finds resolution 
in the science of sensibility, which Foucault describes as a medico-moral regime. He 
notes that innocence and guilt became the distinguishing features of eighteenth-century 
configurations of madness, since the experiences ofthe body and of the nervous system 
marked the soul (Madness 157-158). One might be innocent because the nervous system 
is beyond one's control; however, one would also be considered "much more guilty, 
because everything to which one was attached in the world, the life one had led, the 
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affections one had had, the passions and the imaginations one had cultivated too 
complacently-all combined in the irritation of the nerves, finding there both their 
natural effect and their moral punishment" (157). Although Emily might still faint or 
even experience temporary suspensions of reason, she will not collapse into permanent 
madness because her moral status is never degraded. Instead, she ultimately restrains her 




While critics attempt to link Emily's successful self-control with the refined 
sensibility that seems to keep her from committing egregious breaches ofpropriety, it is 
more often "sense" that comes to her aid in times of emotional derangement.- The 
distinction between sense and sensibility, therefore, is frequently less clear and precise 
than critics acknowledge. In medical discourse and in Udolpho the mind and its processes 
are often discussed in physical terms (brain, nerves, impressions) that underscore the 
connection between mind and body, thought and feeling, reason and emotion. Physicality 
is both a problem for Radcliffe to solve and a potential solution, which my examination 
of The Italian will explore. Robert Miles hints at the difference in sensibility, but I argue 
that the issue of knowledge and the status of the female body are at stake. This abstract 
concept "knowledge" has practical implications, particularly in legal discourse, where 
knowledge of laws and rights has a profoundly material impact on the heroine's agency 
and autonomy. 
Gothic Health: The Italian 
If The Mysteries ofUdolpho demonstrates the epistemological uncertainty 
generated by the pathological body, The Italian demonstrates the fact-based certainty 
secured by the healthy individual. As she changes her approach to sensibility through the 
figure of Ellena, Radcliffe deploys a rhetoric of natural and legal rights. Robert Miles 
asserts that Radcliffe does examine the "discursive resources of sensibility" (179), which 
I extend to include a physical capacity for active resistance against injustice. Whereas 
Udolpho rejects the "cult" of sensibility and certain medical assumptions about the hyper­




subsequent assertions of rights. Promptly establishing Ellena's fully functional mind, 
Radcliffe reclaims the potential of sensibility through the healthy body. 24 Although the 
dangers of sensibility do not disappear in The Italian, they do not seem to be Ellena's 
primary challenge.25 Instead, Ellena must deploy her understanding, which she cultivates 
through rational exertion and physical self-control, to resist unjust claims that others 
make. As Radcliffe brings the implications of Ellena's production of "facts" into the 
juridical spaces of the Inquisitorial trial, she demonstrates that personal and political 
agency is possible even in the most oppressive of institutions. 
Robert Miles has observed that, in contrast to Radcliffe's earlier novels, The 
Italian explicitly critiques abuse ofpower (180). Patricia Whiting also notes that 
Radcliffe's understanding of law and politics clearly informs her works (492). In 
Fictions ofLaw: An Investigation ofthe Law in Eighteenth-Century English Fiction, Beth 
Swan argues that The Italian "promotes a profound questioning of the legal system and 
its ethics," as it "combines the concerns of romance with those of legal realism" (203). 
As Swan focuses on Vivaldi's experience with the Inquisition, she notes that certain 
practices were uncomfortably close to English law, such as determining prisoners' 
understanding and demanding confessions (198-99). Ellena, too, experiences the effects 
of legal injustices. Critics such as Miles, Whiting, and Swan represent the critical 
conversation that asserts Radcliffe's investment in realistic concerns about power, law, 
24 Gary Gautier asserts, "The Italian arguably resolves the contradictory needs pushing for and against 
hierarchical power structures by way of its deployment of 'sensibility'" (206). Yet, he focuses primarily on 
the cult of sensibility that claimed nobility and refmement were products ofa sensitive mind rather than 
birth. I concentrate instead on Radcliffe's use ofmedical concepts from which "sensibility" originated. The 
implications of medical sensibility, I argue, influence women's ability to claim self-determination. 
2S The problems of sensibility seem, instead, to be displaced onto the hero's body and also explored through 




and injustice. While I agree that Radcliffe exposes women's problematic relationship to 
English law, I argue that she raises the stakes of this problem with her depiction of 
Ellena's body. Because the physical body processes impressions and stimuli in order to 
arrive at complex ideas and knowledge, Radcliffe's construction of the female body has 
distinctly political consequences, as I examined in the previous section. The Italian, 
however, contrasts the body's ability to generate certainty with positive law's difficulty 
in establishing proof. Creating a heroine who is subject to juridical discourse and who 
manages her response to illegitimate power, Radcliffe constructs a place for women in a 
discourse that often hampered female agency. Ellena's complex interaction with powerful 
forces demonstrates the ways in which the embodied mind might create knowledge, 
judgment, and even justice without slipping into a solipsistic individualism. 
Unlike Emily's introduction, Ellena Rosalba's entry into the text comes through 
the perspective of her future lover. This frame shifts The Italian away from the emphasis 
on physical and emotional development within the family that guides the beginning of 
Udolpho. Ellena is thus constructed as an already-complete subject. The lover's 
perspective, however, eroticizes Ellena and focuses attention on the body as love object, 
\ 
rather than the site of subjectivity. Vincentio di Vivaldi encounters Ellena through her 
voice, whose "sweetness and fme expression" indicates "sensibility of character" (5). 
Vivaldi next assesses Ellena's body: "her figure ... had a distinguished air of delicacy 
and grace" (5) Eager to see her veiled face, Vivaldi speculates on the features he would 
encounter, and his fantasies are fulfilled in excess. When Ellena's veil is blown aside, he 
sees "a countenance more touchingly beautiful than he had dared to image. Her features 
were of the Grecian outline, and, though they expressed the tranquility of an elegant 
.. 
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mind, her dark blue eyes sparkled with intelligence" (6). As Radcliffe circumvents the 
potential for Ellena's eroticisation by delaying the presentation ofher body, she also 
takes pains to emphasize Ellena's mental capacities. The body must be "sensible" or 
sensitive in order to generate responses to impressions, but the romantic and erotic gaze 
creates a body that is saturated with sexuality. Vivaldi's eager observations therefore do 
not--on a narrative level-turn into a concrete description ofEllena's body, and even the 
sparse mention ofdelicacy, grace, and outline quickly turns into a discussion ofEllena's 
mind and intelligence. 
In the first characterization, Ellena is partially disembodied and, consequently, 
appears first as a subject. By privileging the voice over the body, Radcliffe positions 
mind over physicality. She repeats the odd use of an alluring voice in Ellena and 
Vivaldi's next encounter, when Vivaldi sneaks onto the Rosalba estate and hears Ellena 
sighing over him. Significantly, this disembodiment of the heroine suggests a strained 
relationship between the physical experience of female emotion and the intellectual 
power available primarily to men. Radcliffe's use of the veil throughout The Italian 
underscores this problem. In "The Character in the Veil: Imagery of the Surface in the 
Gothic Novel," Eve Sedgwick argues that Ellena's veil represents the sexual enticements 
and prohibitions of the hidden female form.26 While the veil can function as a trope of 
sexuality, I argue that it also displaces physicality in a way that does not excise the body 
entirely from the narrative. Instead, the veil refocuses attention on the agency ofthe mind 
that exercises will. Unable to dispense easily with the sensible, knowledge-creating body, 
Radcliffe attempts to remove it from the reader's gaze. In so doing, she also creates a 
26 See also Elizabeth Broadwell's "The Veil Image in Ann Radcliffe's The Italian." 
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mysterious atmosphere, or more specifically, casts mystery on what should be an open 
female self by dividing, if only briefly, the subject from that crucial physical body. 
The role of the body-particularly the brain and nervous system-in creating the 
rational, knowing self is always vexed in Radcliffe's imagination. Easily eroticized and 
sexualized, the female body (including the fictional one) does not proclaim intelligence 
and knowledge without careful narration. The ill, dysfunctional female body also presents 
a perverse threat to the physical brain system's knowledge-producing capacity. When the 
body is healthy and fully functional, however, the self has a far more secure position in 
relation to others. Because Radcliffe creates a rational, healthy person in Ellena, she does 
not have to contend with issues of superstition or credulity, as does Emily, when making 
assertions of rights and expositions on justice. Although medical language is not 
abandoned in The Italian, the terminology dwindles as Ellena's mental processes 
supersede the presentation of her body and as she begins to develop self-assertion 
through her vision ofjustice. 
Before she turns her attention to abuses ofpower and the necessity for justice, 
Radcliffe establishes the romance between Ellena and Vivaldi, which progresses quickly 
under the blessing of Ellena's guardian and aunt, Bianchi. Although Ellena's pride is 
wounded when Vivaldi's aristocratic family refuses to bless his attachment to a lower­
class woman, Bianchi reproaches her: "This is not a time for fastidious scruples ... now 
that a solemn truth calls out to us. My dear girl, I will not disguise my feelings; they 
assure me I have not long to live. Grant me then the only request I have to make, and my 
last hours will be comforted" (38). Bianchi's cool dismissal of what normally would 





improper, behavior. When Bianchi dies, Ellena, like Emily, is left alone in a world none 
too hospitable for the single woman. Her plan to enter a convent for a mourning period 
leaves Vivaldi uneasy and uncertain about their future together. While preparing to move 
out of Bianchi's home, Ellena is kidnapped by order of the Marchesa di Vivaldi, setting 
in motion a series of crimes that showcase Ellena's self-assured claims to justice and 
personal rights. 
Thoughout The Italian, Ellena may exhibit emotional susceptibility when 
contemplating Vivaldi's amorous advances or his family'S proud disdain of her, yet 
experiences of terror and danger force her to marshal both physical and emotional 
strength. When the three masked men break into her home, she runs until they catch her: 
"Her breath and her courage were gone, yet she struggled to sustain herself, and 
endeavoured to ask with calmness what was their errand" (61). When imprisoned in 
various spaces, she seeks escape routes and attempts to discover her location. While not a 
feisty brand of courage and resistance, Ellena's response reflects two important 
principles: self-control and rationality. As Mary Poovey argues, feminine self-control 
characterizes the Proper Lady, as well as provides a means of power, morality, and 
determination. Notably, however, Ellena's rationality offers a more significant entrance 
into the autonomous individuality that appears heavily masculinized in eighteenth­
century discourses. Rejecting the feminized debility that Emily embodies, Radcliffe 
offers through Ellena a sensible body and mind that work together to resist oppression. 
Part of this argument appears in her depiction ofVivaldi who, like Ellena, must restrain 
his passions, emotions, and body in order to function in perilous situations. Vivaldi, 
however, encounters more difficulties because he is the more passionate of the two, and 
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thus the one more susceptible to false impressions and superstition?7 The romantic hero 
often lapses into superstition, making incorrect assumptions and mistaken judgments. 
Ellena's judgment, on the other hand, is often impeccable, just as her body-a healthy 
organism-is reliable in its sensory perception and its will to knowledge. 
As her heroine experiences terrifying ordeals, Radcliffe reworks the cultural 
image of female sensitivity and emotionality, representing Ellena as both decorous and 
assertive. When she "melted into tears," Ellena appears properly feminine, but "the 
weakness however was momentary, and during the rest of the journey she preserved a 
strenuous equality of mind" (63). Significantly, the language of this passage presents two 
possibilities for female physiology: susceptible nerves and strong mind.28 As I argued in 
the previous section, Emily exemplifies the dangers of the embodied mind; here, Ellena 
offers new possibilities for female embodiment. The problem here is maintaining 
composure, which is necessary to make moral choices, in the face of superior strength 
and the threat of force. Although Radcliffe demonstrates anxiety over the potential 
disruption of reason by the body, she establishes the necessity of the body to process 
sensory data rationally and to provide a material basis for knowledge. As Richardson 
explains in his discussion of "Romantic brain science," the mind's reliance on physical 
processes, documented and explored by physiologists, suggested that medical 
27 In one memorable instance, however, Vivaldi seems to transcend his physical condition: "The pain of his 
wounds was no longer felt; it appeared as if the strength of his intellectual self had subdued the infmnities 
of the body, and, perhaps, in these moments ofelevation, he could have endured the torture without 
shrinking" (108-109). Radcliffe indicates that like Ellena, Vivaldi can overcome bodily sensations with 
mental exertions. 
28 Interestingly, "equality" implies not only a sociopolitical position but also a necessary physical balance: 
like the old humoral system, the new brain science also depended upon balance and proportion. 
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interventions could prevent or cure mental deficiencies in ways unimagined before the 
seventeenth century. 29 
Ellena's powerful declaration of her individual rights appears early in the 
narrative, when she is brought before the abbess to choose between an arranged marriage 
and monastic vows. 
"It is unnecessary," said Ellena, with an air ofdignified tranquility, "that I should 
withdraw for the purposes of consid~ring and deciding. My resolution is already 
taken, and I reject each of the offered alternatives. I will neither condemn myself 
to a cloister or to the degradation, with which I am threatened on the other hand. 
Having said this, I am prepared to meet whatever suffering you shall inflict upon 
me; but be assured, that my own voice never shall sanction the evils to which I 
may be subjected, and that the immortal love ofjustice, which fills all my heart, 
will sustain my courage no less powerfully than the sense ofwhat is due to my 
own character." (84) 
Although her body might be subject to forces beyond her control, her will is not. Ellena 
refuses to choose injustice or self-abnegation. The crucial conflict represented here and in 
Gothic novels generally-between external, oppressive, and uncontrollable forces and 
internal, emotional, and controllable resources-is also enacted in the body, according to 
eighteenth-century physicians. Robert Whytt explains, "The voluntary motions are such 
as proceed from an immediate exertion of the active power of the will. The involuntary 
and mix'd motions ... may be aptly enough comprehended under the general 
29 He includes certain scientists already mentioned in this study-Thomas Willis, Robert Whytt, and Pierre 
Cabanis, for example--as well as such luminaries as Erasmus Darwin, Joseph Priestley, and David Hartley. 
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denomination ofSPONTANTEOUS" (1,5). He further notes, "The power of stimuli in 
exciting the muscles of living animals into contraction, is greater than any effort of will" 
(14, 18). In other words, the nervous system and its subsequent effect on the muscles of 
the body can be controlled by the will, but certain motions are involuntary, including 
those in response to outside stimuli. In The Italian, Ellena's body and mind, responding 
to external stimuli, are always assumed to be, at least potentially, under the control of her 
will. Thus, even though she is not responsible for others' actions, she is always 
accountable for her own reactions. In the patriarchal, moral economy of sensibility, the 
so-called involuntary actions of the female body, such as fainting, shaking, or weeping, 
indicate their inability to control themselves. If women demonstrate their feminine 
incapacities through their weak bodies, then Radcliffe overturns this by describing Ellena 
as struggling with and triumphing over her body. Ellena, even if sometimes weak, 
provides the reader with a new version of sensibility. 
As she depicts Ellena's experiences with adversity, Radcliffe brings together 
medical and political terminology, asserting that robust women such as Ellena might 
consult their personal understanding in order to resist oppression. After the abbess 
attempts to force Ellena to submit to the repugnant alternatives mentioned above, Ellena 
reflects on her performance: 
Her judgment approved of the frankness, with which she had asserted her rights, 
and of the firmness, with which she had reproved a woman, who had dared 
demand respect from the very victim ofher cruelty and oppression. She was the 
more satisfied with herself, because she had never, for an instant, forgotten her 




with the weakness of fear. Her conviction of the abbess's unworthy character was 
too clear to allow Ellena to feel abashed in her presence; for she regarded only the 
censure of the good, to which she had ever been tremblingly alive, as she was 
obdurately insensible to that of the vicious. (85) 
Several terms in this particular passage refer to scientific constructions of the female 
body: "passion," "weakness," "tremblingly," and "insensible." To tremble or to be 
insensible-both find expression in nerve science. Whytt's work demonstrates that the 
"vital principle" of feeling is both involuntary and imperative (1). These terms of 
physicality in The Italian, however, are placed within the realm of choice. Instead of 
simply responding emotionally and physically to her captors, Ellena exercises judgment 
to differentiate legitimate from illegitimate claims to authority. Against medical 
formulations of the involuntary physical self, Radcliffe distinguishes Ellena by her 
volition and by her active management of her body. Placed in a discourse in which 
women are contesting scientific, authoritative defmitions and explanations, such scenes 
symbolically disrupt scientific narratives. 
Ellena relies on her own judgment to determine others' characters and to ascertain 
the legitimacy of their claims. She also refuses to feel the pain of criticism when the 
accuser fails to meet her criteria of legitimacy. In significant ways, the heroine's personal 
judgment indicates both an assertive individualism and epistemological certainty. 
Selectively responding to other people allows the female subject to maintain the positive 
aspects of sensibility without succumbing to the indiscriminate acceptance of unjust 
accusations, threats, and criticisms. Although as Julie Schaffer explains, the female 




separated from a community and, unlike Emily, has no ghostly father to remember. 
Radcliffe thus invokes sociability through the discourse of sensibility, even as she 
employs medical terms to establish Ellena's capacity for discrimination and rational 
choice. 30 In so doing, Radcliffe proposes a medical subjectivity that does not interfere 
with women's juridical status. Ellena's body is "tremblingly alive" without the pathology 
ofuncommon delicacy, producing knowledge that is not associated with fantasy, 
uncontrolled imagination, or madness. 
The implications of Ellena's epistemological certainty become clear when she is 
imprisoned. Significantly, Radcliffe forms a parallel between the heroine's encounters 
with the wicked abbess and Vivaldi's experience with the Inquisition. Ellena recognizes 
the power of oaths and words, and she makes every effort to avoid entering a "contract" 
that would make her complicit in the injustices foisted on her by villains. When the 
abbess requires Ellena to choose either the veil or an arranged marriage, "either ofwhich 
would devote her, during life, to misery, and that by her own act," she refuses to choose 
(85, my emphasis). Her voice manifests her will. Part of her body's functions yet 
curiously intangible, the "voice" stands in for her physical presence. Indeed, the verbal 
contract that she so assiduously avoids in this encounter conflates the voice, self, and 
legal status. Ellena enters a juridical discourse that makes demands on her body. 
Similarly, when Vivaldi is asked to swear to honesty during the trial and to secrecy 
afterwards, he hesitates: "Shall I consent to my own condemnation? ..The malice of 
demons like these may convert the most innocent circumstances into matter of 
accusation, for my destruction" (202). When confronted with the Inquisitor's linguistic 




machinations, Vivaldi recognizes that simple assertions of the truth will avail nothing: "I 
will not suffer my assertions to be misrepresented ... or my words to be perverted against 
myself. I have sworn to speak the truth only; since you believe I violate my oath, and 
doubt my direct and simple words, I will speak no more" (203). Both the Inquisitors and 
the abbess assert the legitimacy of their power; however, Vivaldi and Ellena reject such 
claims based on their individual understanding. 
Although Ellena often resists illegitimate authority, one particular accusation-
that she seeks elevated status through marriage-causes her "pride of conscious worth" to 
buckle. Gary Gautier offers one explanation for this tension: "a defining paradox of 
Radcliffe's age, and one which fmds condensed expression in the emerging gothic genre, 
concerns the individual body as a set ofphysiological and subjective registers. Within 
\ 
that field lies the double-pull of self-empowerment and self-abjection" (221). As she 
works to determine the appropriate response to Vivaldi's parents, Ellena does feel the 
weight of self-abjection, yet she ultimately relies on her body-on the knowledge 
generated through her mental processes-in order to arrive at notions ofjustice, which 
she uses to resist the spectacle ofpower deployed by her captors. Her internal debate 
takes on political dimensions as she first explores the possibility of renouncing her 
attachment to Vivaldi. She articulates her need "to retrieve my own esteem by asserting 
my independence" (69). This very individualized sense ofpersonal integrity is 
indispensable to Radcliffe's articulation of female identity. Ellena finally decides to 
marry Vivaldi without parental consent, although the agents of the Inquisition prevent her 
from enacting that decision. That she receives the approbation of Vivaldi's father before 





knowledge of inalienable rights to determine when authority has overstepped its bounds, 
and in her marriage choice, she rejects unjust claims on her behavior. Only the rational 
and healthy-in Enlightenment ideology--can enjoy such discriminatory power. 
Radcliffe illustrates that Ellena's healthy individualism remains intact even 
though she might experience the physical consequences of intense emotion. When, for 
example, Ellena refuses to take monastic vows and then perceives Vivaldi in front ofher, 
she faints (179). When she attempts to meet Vivaldi secretly, she almost sinks with 
emotion and fear. Ellena's anxiety and fatigue threaten her physical ability when she flees 
the convent. Twice she exclaims "0 if my strength should fail before I reach it!" (134), 
yet she successfully escapes. Imprisoned by Spalatro (under Schedoni's direction), Ellena 
surmises that she will be assassinated: "Such sickness of the heart returned with these 
convictions, such faintness and terror, that unable to support her trembling frame, she 
sunk again upon the mattress" (215). While Ellena's emotions do work on her body, 
demonstrating the close connection between the two, Radcliffe turns this connection into 
an opportunity for the sensitive woman to exercise control. Instead of wallowing in 
luxurious grief, such as when she must leave her home, Ellena occupies her time with 
various employments (60). Although Ellena does shed "bitter tears," she quickly dries 
them since "other emotions than those of grief possessed her" (69). Furthermore, even 
when she does not completely control them, Ellena's physical responses to imminent 
death seem completely rational; she operates under correct, logical deductions, as the 
)narrative suggests. 
Ellena's healthy body, functional brain, and intelligent judgment do not, of 




example. Predidated on error, her conclusion indicates the reasonable outcome of flawed 
premises rather than superstitious belief or wish fulfillment. When Schedoni discovers 
the miniature on Ellena's necklace, which she says is the likeness of her father, he 
exclaims that she is his daughter and bursts into tears: 
Ellena wept to see [Schedoni] weep, till her doubts began to take alarm. Whatever 
might be the proofs, that had convinced Schedoni of the relationship between 
them, he had not explained these to her, and, however strong was the eloquence of 
nature which she witnessed, it was not sufficient to justify an entire confidence in 
the assertion he had made, or to allow her to pennit his caresses without 
trembling. (237) 
Schedoni explains that the miniature she owns is his likeness, and gives her an 
expurgated account ofhis past. Although Ellena's emotions impress upon her the 
doubtfulness ofher belief, her commitment to evidence and rational knowledge compels 
her to accept Schedoni as father until proof to the contrary arises: "Though Ellena 
perceived that many circumstances of the relations given by Schedoni, and by Signora 
Bianchi, coincided, and that none were contradictory, except that ofhis death, she could 
not yet subdue her amazement at this discovery, or even the doubts which occasionally 
recurred to her as to its truth" (241). Some tension exists between competing sources of 
knowledge. Ellena needs to trust her judgment, which includes both her emotional 
responses as well as the evidence ofher senses. Disrupting the common opposition of 
emotion and reason, Ellena works through deductive reasoning and physical evidence. In 
her struggle to understand what relationship she has to Schedoni, in addition to 




portrait she cames, and the instinctive responses she experiences. Her doubts continue to 
surface: "Nay, the very looks of Schedoni himself ... renewed the impressions of alarm 
and even of dismay, which she had there experienced. At such moments it was scarcely 
possible for her to consider him as her parent, and in spite of every late appearance, 
strange and unaccountable doubts began to gather on her mind" (250). 
Ellena's struggle between different types ofevidence illustrates Radcliffe's 
critique ofpositive law. Though Ellena, Radcliffe creates a figure that mediates between 
the private, domestic sphere and the public, legal sphere. A typical heroine, Ellena is 
thrust out of the home into a world ofdanger; however, she brings with her the resources 
necessary for successful negotiation with menacing powers. Through her healthy mind 
and body, Ellena must determine truth and justice in her personal experience, yet her 
social interactions make it necessary for her to consider the external objects that help 
construct meaning among individuals. In other words, Ellena cannot retreat to a private 
world of the mind; instead, she has to reconcile her own understanding with the concrete 
realities that surround her. While Ellena relies on her own judgment in order to challenge 
injustice, she does not depend only on her intuitive, emotional responses to arrive at truth. 
In Schedoni' s case, Ellena tempers her emotions with demands for external proofs. Once 
she has those proofs, she attempts to discover their meaning through reason. 
Nevertheless, she does not abandon her emotional responses to that evidence. Radcliffe 
here begins to introduce a subtle critique of the legal system by examining the 
relationship between evidence or proofand personal judgment. Because Ellena's 




presentation or interpretation-even as evidence provides the objective proofs so 
desirable in the "human science" of law. 
The Italian illustrates the ways in which the "facts" of the body generate certainty, 
since the body provides internal evidence that depends on perception, cognitive processes 
and rational thought. Although it accepts external evidence, the embodied mind does not 
fabricate such proofs. In a similar manner, the legal system operates through evidence 
and certainty. The repeated emphasis on evidence or proof in the depiction of the 
Inquisition sustains a set of assumptions about knowledge and justice. Just as scientific 
and legal fields depend on empirical standards to retain their legitimacy, so knowledge 
must be externally substantiated. Both protagonists' desire for proof and for evidence 
contrasts sharply with Emily's and Valancourt's credulity. Whereas Udolpho 
demonstrates the ways in which knowledge and reality can become blurred, The Italian 
examines the need for reliable facts in both personal experiences and public institutions. 
When imprisoned, Vivaldi asks, "Can I believe that ofwhich I have no proof?" to which 
the mysterious monk replies, "Yes, there are cases which do not admit ofproof; under 
your peculiar circumstances, this is one of them; you can act only upon assertion" (322) 
Vivaldi nevertheless remains suspicious and demands substantial proof, determining to 
endure punishment rather than hand over someone whose guilt he cannot prove. This is a 
proper English response to secret plots and covert trials. Because English law demands 
public court proceedings as essential to democratic ideals, representations of clandestine 
meetings and private judgments point to a tyrannical society.3l 
31 That the frightening specter ofthe French Revolution influenced Radcliffe's presentation of the 




Even though proof seems necessary for the legal system to operate justly, 
Radcliffe casts doubts on the self-evident nature of those proofs. When Vivaldi shares 
the information given to him by his mysterious visitor, he urges the inquisitors to attend 
to the report's speculative nature: "what I am going to relate, is a report to which I give 
no confidence, and concerning even the probability of which I cannot produce the 
smallest proof' (327). At this point, his examiners demand to know the authority on 
which he repeated the story. Emphasizing the need for authority when producing 
evidence, this scene evokes eighteenth-century legal practice. Alexander Welsh explains 
that as circumstantial evidence became more common and accepted in criminal trials, the 
need for lawyers to interpret, explain, or refute that evidence became more imperative 
(15-17). Although the aphorism "Circumstances cannot lie,,32 indicated the certainty with 
which some people viewed this kind of evidence, Welsh explains that "evidence of every 
kind has sometimes been faked; and conclusions drawn from the evidence are only 
probable... so it is quite possible to err without lying" (17). 
Evidence, therefore, is not the ultimate authority; evidence does not speak for 
itself. Instead, it is often introduced and supported by personal authority, given credence 
through the status of its presenter. Unlike scientific discourse, positive law depends on a 
particular brand of authorized evidence. Ultimately, what counts as evidence in (what 
example, even the image ofa prison in Gothic romances could serve as a veiled response to the Bastille 
and, in turn, to the Revolution. Such images, however, were ambiguous: "Representations ofprofligate 
European aristocrats or Inquisitional dungeons could be seen as patriotic British attacks on the lamentable 
state ofmanners and society across the channel; or they could be seen as coded assaults on aristocracy and 
institutional despotism everywhere" (71). Like many Gothic critics, Miles reminds us that the political 
upheaval ofthe 1790s informed not only the symbolic topography ofthe Gothic romance but also readers' 
responses to these narratives. See also Women, Revolution, and the Novels ofthe 1790s, edited by Linda 
Lang-Peralta. 




turns out to be) Schedoni's trial, is Father Ansaldo's story ofSchedoni's confession and 
the signed confession of the assassin employed by Schedoni, also notarized by a Roman 
priest. The vicar-general states: "The dying confession of the assassin is certainly of more 
weight than any other evidence" (351). But when Ansaldo cannot attest definitely to 
Schedoni's identity, the vicar-general refuses probabilities and presumptions, instead 
asserting that immoral character can invalidate evidence. In the space where certainty 
seems most imperative, most desirable, most necessary-law-we find a labyrinth of 
evidence, interpretation, belief, and assertion, instead ofa chain ofpositivist 
identification and knowledge. Although Radcliffe utilizes the frighteningly arbitrary and 
exotic Inquisition, she indicates here the ways in which law, as a "master science," can 
prove far less reliable than the discourse admits. This openness and uncertainty provide 
an ideological point of entry into law for women. 
Radcliffe illustrates that law is, after all, a human science, one that demands 
proofs and evidence to support hypotheses of guilt and criminality, yet one that relies on 
personal character, sentiments, and morality. It is this combination of knowable truth and 
unreliable humanity that allows Radcliffe to present her critiques of legal and institutional 
injustices without destabilizing the authority of Enlightenment values. Indeed, Radcliffe 
quite explicitly denounces those who have the power to reconcile unjust positive laws 
with abstract justice. As Vivaldi watches helplessly while Ellena is imprisoned in the 
abbey, he berates the Abate who states, "I make it a rule never to encroach upon that 
[jurisdiction] of another person" (121). The following exchange illustrates the 




problem of positive law that declares itself legitimate through an endless cycle of self­
authorization: 
"And can you endure, holy father," said Vivaldi, "to witness a flagrant act of 
injustice and not endeavour to counteract it? Not even step forward to rescue the 
victim when you perceive the preparation for the sacrifice?" 
"I repeat, that I never interfere with the authority of others," replied the Superior; 
"having asserted my own, I yielded to them in their sphere, the obedience which I 
require in mine." 
"Is power then," said Vivaldi, "the infallible test ofjustice? Is it morality to obey 
where the command is criminal? The whole world have a claim upon the 
fortitude, the active fortitude of those who are placed as you are, between the 
alternative of confirming a wrong by your consent, or preventing it by your 
resistance. Would that your heart expanded towards that world, reverend father!" 
(121). 
Ellena's incarceration provokes a significant discussion about the nature ofjustice. As 
her body is subjected to coercive measures, she hopes for agents ofjustice to rescue her. 
Vivaldi employs the foundational concept ofjustice in his argument against ill-used 
power. Radcliffe suggests that positive law can enable morally vapid people to justify 
their passivity in the face of wrongs; thus, law can be wrong, immoral, even criminal. 
Here and throughout The Italian, Radcliffe shows that positive law can be 
manipulated, that the certainty ofknowledge is undermined by the need for authority and 
personal interpretation, which in tum are subject to the wicked and depraved designs of 
some individuals. Thus, she comes full circle to the individual who defines justice for 
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herself, even if she seeks outside corroboration for her judgments. This again returns us 
to Ellena's emotional and intellectual struggles. When, for example, Ellena contemplates 
the obligations of family and the demands of love, she experiences a painful tension 
between affective relations and personal integrity: "O! miserable alternative! -that I can 
no longer act justly but at the expence of all my future happiness! Justly! An~ would it 
then be just to abandon him who is willing to resign every thing for me?" (69). 
Significantly, Ellena frames her dilemma in terms ofjustice, although it takes two 
forms-justice to herself and justice to her lover. Ultimately, the narrator concludes, 
"love was, after all, the most powerful affection of her heart" (70). As Radcliffe brings 
love within the realm ofjustice, she dissolves the boundaries between private and public. 
Carol Pateman explains that love, a personal, affective response to particular individuals, 
and justice, a public virtue, occupy opposite poles in political economy (20). Radcliffe's 
reliance on justice, then, serves as a framework within which she examines women's 
personal, embodied experiences. 
Critiques of positive law are common in many eighteenth-century works, yet 
female Gothic novels, as I will detail in the next chapter, typically examine issues of 
justice through the female body. As Radcliffe and other women writers address the 
question ofwhere ''justice'' is located, they posit an internally developed sense ofjustice 
based in the sensitive, feeling body. This notion, presented in part through Adam Smith's 
The Theory ofMoral Sentiments, enables Radcliffe to present her conception ofjustice, 
which is based in moral feeling-the heart that expands toward the world-as well as 
rational mental activity. The "natural," healthy body, which can feel and think, becomes 
the first principle ofjustice. Coupled with internal understanding and external evidence, 
..... 
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this principle offers a possible cure to the real pathology presented in Radcliffe's novels: 
positive law gone awry. Ellena, therefore, becomes a radical figure of health, knowledge, 
and morality. She acts appropriately yet assertively, finally enjoying the delights of love 






"Written on the Heart": Natural Law and Justice in the Horrid Novels of Eliza 
Parsons and Eleanor Sleath 
This chapter examines two of the "Horrid" novels mentioned in Jane Austen's 
Northanger Abbey: Eliza Parsons' The Castle ofWolfen bach (1793) and Eleanor Sleath's 
The Orphan ofthe Rhine (1798).1 The two novels are typically compared to Ann 
Radcliffe's work, although Wolfenbach was written before Radcliffe reached the height 
ofher popularity and critical acclaim.2 Like Radcliffe's novels, these texts feature 
innocent, virtuous women exposed to frightening circumstances and criminal plots. In 
Sleath's The Orphan ofthe Rhine, certain scenes even resemble moments from 
Radcliffe's most popular novels, The Mysteries ofUdolpho (1793) and The Italian (1797). 
Because of these similarities, critics such as Bette Roberts categorically dismiss these 
novels as imperfect imitations of Radcliffe. Roberts explains that Austen regarded the 
Horrids "in all likelihood as typical of the very worst of the genre in their blatant 
transgression of self-proclaimed moral and aesthetic standards" (90).3 Roberts levels her 
I In Northanger Abbey the naive heroine, Catherine Moreland, develops a taste for Gothic novels through 
the guidance of Isabella Thorpe. As they discuss the hair-raising delights of Udolpho, Isabella exclaims, 
''Dear creature! ... [W]hen you have finished Udolpho, we will read the Italian together; and I have made 
out a list often or twelve more of the same kind for you." Their conversation continues, as Catherine 
replies: 
"Have you indeed? How glad I am! What are they all?" 
"I will read you their names directly; here they are, in my pocketbook. Castle ofWolfenbach, 
Clermont, Mysterious Warnings, Necromancer of the Black Forest, Midnight Bell, Orphan of the 
Rhine, and Horrid Mysteries. Those will last us some time." 
"Yes, pretty well; but are they all horrid, are you sure they are all horrid?" 
"Yes, quite sure." 
2 Wolfenbach and Orphan are grouped under "Ann Radcliffe and Her Imitators" in the recent microfilm 
collection, Gothic Fiction: Rare Printed Works from the Sadleir-Black Collection of Gothic Fiction at the 
Alderman Library, University of Virginia, 2003. Exerpts from both novels are also included in the chapter 
"Radcliffe and the School ofTerror" in the anthology, Gothic Readings: The First Wave 1764-1840. 
3 Critics suggest that this list represents several strands of Gothic types, including "Radcliffean terror" and 
German horror (Thompson et al. 38). Based on the representative selection, Michael Sadleir concludes that 




objection at the disjunction between the novels' explicit disavowal of sensibility and the 
novels' encouragement of readers' emotional participation, which she argues is more 
jarring than in Radcliffe's works. Furthermore, these novels transgress realistic 
conventions, as the most improbable coincidences and uncharacteristic repentances 
extricate the heroines from danger. 
Yet Roberts spends little time discussing what the novelistic transgressions might 
have meant to their authors and readers. Within their aesthetic transgressions, the authors 
deliberately justify the heroine's subjectivity: her lawfulness, directly contrasted with the 
lawlessness around her, is upheld and rewarded, even at the expense of narrative artistry. 
Radcliffe may have accomplished her happy conclusions with greater facility, but the 
startling disjunctions in Parsons' and Sleath's novels allow us to see more clearly the 
terrain (from horrors, crime, and vulnerability to justice, marriage, inheritance, and 
security) that many women Gothic writers had to traverse in order to create a vision of 
justice for women. This vision is a familiar one: the heroine marries a beloved, romantic 
hero, and the villains are vanquished. Closely examining the ways in which the authors 
construct this denouement, however, yields a more complex picture. I argue that Parsons 
and Sleath promote a version of natural law that sometimes subverts the positive laws 
that operate (or fail to operate) in the fictional worlds they have created, which oftentimes 
reflect the historical realities of eighteenth-century women. Nevertheless, the aulhors also 
incorporate positive law in order to usher in a utopian world of feminine empowerment 
and economic stability. In their sometimes conflicting uses of natural and positive law, 






Definitions of natural law typically emphasize normative behaviors and rational 
knowledge. Lloyd Weinreb explains that "the fundamental assumption ofnatural law was 
that the determinate order of human existence is normative" (97). According to Joseph 
Boyle, natural law is "a set of universal prescriptions whose prescriptive force is a 
function of the rationality which all human beings share in virtue of their common 
humanity" (4). Natural law does not, however, depend on the same model ofpower that 
characterizes positive law. A. P. d'Entreves argues in his discussion ofnatural law, "Law 
does not necessarily require the existence ofa superior and an inferior. Law does not only 
command.... Actually natural law teaches, according to Locke; according to Grotius it 
indicates a particular quality ofactions" (d'Entreves 77). Dennis Schmidt notes that the 
significant difference between legal positivists and natural law theorists is the issue of 
morality: "[P]ositive law theories hold that no element of law preexists an act of the state. 
Consequently, the test of the validity of the law is not moral but procedural" (xv). The 
moral aspects of natural law are particularly attractive to Gothic novelists, as they depict 
an array of ethical "crimes" unpunishable by law. Natural law offers a general plan for 
moral living that extends beyond the categories ofcrime and injury defined by positive 
law. John Alleyne, an eighteenth-century lawyer, offers a practical definition of natural 
law: "Let man so conduct himself, as to secure his own happiness, without invading the 
present, or future happiness of another" (7). Alleyne argues that natural law and natural 
justice should govern, for example, positive laws regarding marriage: 
This relation [marriage between a widower and his wife's sister] adds to the mass 
of human happiness-Nature approves and encourages it-natural law adds its 




forbids the union .... The principles ofnatural justice seem to be decisive in your 
favour-the argument I have used brings conviction to my mind. (12) 
Natural law thus provides access to natural justice, assuring a social order based on 
mutual happiness and respectful individualism. 
The nature and the means ofjustice occupy a central role in Wolfenbach and 
Orphan. One peculiar feature of these novels is that the criminals are not subjected to the 
court system. Instead of being punished through positive law, the villains typically die 
"natural" or self-inflicted deaths,4 or they go into a self-imposed exile. Parsons and Sleath 
locate justice in the "heart," a "natural" identification with moral principles and an 
emotional commitment to moral actions. They indicate that justice can oC,cur through 
feelings. For villainous criminals, such feelings include remorse and guilt, but only at the 
novels' conclusions. For virtuous heroines, feelings support their moral understanding, as 
the novelists return to the body as a source ofmoral knowledge. One significant 
difference between Radcliffe and these two novelists is their treatment of the female body. 
Whereas Radcliffe appears deeply suspicious ofmedical discourse's articulation of 
women's bodies, Parsons and Sleath embrace that construction. Instead of transcending 
their bodies, the heroines depend on them to provide guidance for moral behavior. 
Sensitivity and reason are foundational aspects ofnatural law' s efficacy; that is, the 
person who follows moral sensation, which leads to moral understanding, will avoid 
criminal or unethical behavior. In Wolfenbach and Orphan, moral epistemology 
4 An exception is the death of Paoli, in Orphan. One ofthe male protagonists kills Paoli, a wicked 
henchman of the primary villain, when Paoli attacks him on the road. However, this type of conflict occurs 







establishes the heroines' virtue and supports their assertive claims. The heroine's body 
provides a means of agency, even if it also creates problems and tensions in the narrative. 
The heroines, so receptive and rational, do not need positive laws to govern their 
actions; they govern themselves as they follow the law of nature. Natural law thus 
appears in the novels as prior and superior to positive laws. Nevertheless, Parsons and 
Sleath also recognize that positive law can enact justice through arrangements of property 
and relationships that are secured by the state. The novels end with such legal 
transactions as inheritances and marriages. Carefully describing the legal procedures by 
which women's property and social identity might be secured, Parsons and Sleath uphold 
the necessity and power ofpositive laws. I argue that throughout the novels there exists a 
dialectic between these two forms ofjustice that sometimes results in contradictions, but 
which ultimately resolves itself on the heroines' own terms: the world in which they 
finally begin to reap rewards appears first to be governed by natural law and also 
supported by positive laws. 
Although the desire for freedom expressed in the conclusion is appealing to the 
modem reader, the novelists articulate their solutions to injustice within a structure that 
can turn justice and empowerment into problematic concepts. In States ofInjury Wendy 
Brown argues that it is "freedom's relationship to identity-its promise to address a 
social injury or marking that is itself constitutive of identity-that yields the paradox in 
which the first imaginings of freedom are always constrained by and potentially even 
require the very structure of oppression that freedom emerges to oppose" (7). Brown is 
troubled by the "attachments to unfreedom" often embedded in emancipatory politics 
(xii). She suggests that "a desire for political freedom, a longing to share in power rather 
.. 
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than be protected from its excesses" will enable individuals "to generate futures together 
rather than navigate or survive them" (4). Brown's discussion points to an aspect ofthese 
novels (and the female Gothic more generally) that troubles modem critics. Parsons' and 
Sleath's heroines desire protection, by a divine lawmaker or through human laws, and the 
narratives end with the heroines' survival, rather than with a clearly imagined future of 
freedom and shared power. This failing does not indicate, however, a pervasive "victim" 
feminism, as Diane Hoeveler claims in her study Gothic Feminism. First, the novels do 
end with a vision of shared assets. The heroines enjoy the benefits of property and titles, 
which are supplemented by their marriages. Furthermore, because Parsons and Sleath 
conceive of positive law in multiple ways-as a source of freedom, a source of 
oppression, and even a non-entity-they provide multiple redresses for wrongs. The 
heroines need not identify themselves as victims in order to receive justice. 5 Indeed, the 
novelists imagine justice that does not depend on external enforcement. In such a world, 
the heroines would be free to pursue moral action (in agreement with their natural 
understanding) without being terrorized or violated. 
The Castle of Wolfenbach 
The Castle ofWolfen bach begins with Matilda Weimar's desperate flight from her 
uncle on a dark, stormy night. She takes refuge in a seemingly unoccupied castle that is 
maintained by a couple of elderly servants. Hearing mysterious noises in one wing of the 
castle, Matilda ignores the superstitious warnings of the servants and bravely investigates. 
5 One could argue that the novels cast the heroines as victims ofcircumstances and wicked men, but the 
heroines' claims to moral freedom indicate a measure of self-determination. Particularly in the conclusions, 
the female characters do not need to claim legal retribution, which would entail their self-identification as 





In a gloomy, dilapidated suite, she discovers the long-suffering Countess Wolfenbach. 
Encouraged by the Countess's kindness and gentle interest, Matilda recounts her history, 
which the reader also hears for the first time. We learn that Matilda grew up in the 
country, was cared for by servants, and was left quite alone by her uncle. After a years-
long absence, Weimar returned to find that Matilda had matured into a desirable young 
woman, and he began to pursue a sexual relationship with her. Much of the novel 
involves Matilda's escapes from and encounters with Weimar; however, in a significant 
subplot, Countess Wolfenbach escapes from an abusive husband who has imprisoned her 
in the castle. The British Critic praises The Castle ofWolfen bach: "Taken as a whole, the 
Castle of Wolfenbach is more interesting than the general run of modem novels, the 
characters are highly coloured, and the story introduced in a manner that excites curiosity, 
and in the language of drama, abounds with interesting, though improbable situations" 
(199-200).6 
In Wolfenbach Matilda appears to have an instinctual knowledge of the "law of 
nature" that is consistent with bonum et aequum-the good and the equitable.7 Such 
moral understanding is a significant part of Matilda's character. Although Parsons 
maintains the heroine's "natural" moral knowledge, she supplements it with claims to 
legal protection. Parsons explores the vulnerability of the innately virtuous woman and 
6 Sadleir, however, asserts of Parsons' novels The Castle ofWolfen bach and The Mysterious Warning, 
"These books bear out Professor Oliver Elton's statement that the minor Gothic novelists have no style of 
their own but a sort of'group-style,' as though they were writing mechanically to pattern and according to 
models approved and consecrated by public favor" (13). 
7 This notion comes from the Roman conception of natural law, or ius naturale, which emphasizes the 
universal character of"law," as well as its reasonableness. Instead of equating force and command with law, 
the Romans (drawing on the Stoic model) viewed natural law as the way to fmd the essence oflaw. Unlike 
later natural law theorists (starting with the church fathers of the Middle Ages), the Romans did not view 




indicates that she must develop multiple strategies of resistance when pursued by a 
calloused villain. Thus the narrative trajectory is one ofeducation. While Matilda does 
! 
not learn virtue, she does learn to deploy positive law to her advantage. The heroine 
moves through a series of three encounters with Weimar, her guardian and uncle, which 
mark her progression as a self-conscious juridical subject, one who refers to both natural 
and legal rights in order to resist unjust power. Parsons creates a tension between the 
innate understanding of natural law and the process of learning positive laws, which is 
ultimately resolved in the conclusion. 
In her conversation with the Countess, Matilda reflects on her inability to respond 
to her uncle's inappropriate sexual advances: "I began to be extremely uneasy at 
freedoms I scarce knew how to repulse" (12). This first articulation ofher rights is vague 
and intuitive. Indeed, her rights only emerge as Weimar's "freedoms" violate her. 
Matilda's rights thus appear to be configured in opposition to "wrongs." In Towards a 
Feminist Theory ofthe State, Catherine MacKinnon argues that "the private is the 
distinctive sphere of intimate violation and abuse, neither free nor particularly personal" 
(168). MacKinnon sees the "special protection" ofwomen through positive law as 
another means of reducing women to the status ofperpetual victim. In Matilda's case, she 
has no need to call upon legal or natural rights until she experiences an encroachment on 
them. On the one hand, such an example might support the notion that women's rights 
are typically constructed within the wrongs ofmen or positive laws. However, as Lloyd 
Weinreb argues, "Rights do not require that they be exercised ... [and] the right itself is 
not any indication at all that one ought so to act" (''Natural Law and Rights" 282-83). 
... 

Furthennore, freedom "reflects only the interpersonal aspect of rights and has to do with 
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being free from unjustified constraints imposed by others" (283). Weinreb suggests here 
that natural rights do not depend on violation; they have an objective reality within 
natural law, which exists beyond a binary opposition. Furthermore, the passive 
construction of this freedom suggests that freedom "from" repression has an equally 
important role as freedom "to" act. Similarly, Parsons complicates the passive "woman as 
victim" equation as the novel progresses, particularly as she constructs Matilda's natural 
virtue. 
An early discussion of Matilda's "nature" occurs as Matilda recounts her 
experiences with her uncle. Weimar presents her with his drawings, which are most likely 
pornographic. As she explains to Countess Wolfenbach, "[They] were very beautiful, but 
the attitudes and want of decent drapery confused and hurt me, for although I had never 
received any particular lessons on delicacy or modesty, yet there is that innate virtuous 
principle within us, that shrinks involuntarily from any thing tending to violate that sense 
of decency we are all, I believe, born with" (12). In a departure from modem versions of 
natural law, Parsons claims that Matilda's ideas of morality are innate.s For Matilda, the 
knowledge that her body provides, a sensitivity to morality and justice, is described as 
natural and in-born. Countess Wolfenbach comments, "You are truly good and amiable 
[and] born with sentiments ofvirtue... [N]atural understanding pointed out the right path 
to happiness" (19). Matilda innately knows and rationally accepts the obligations of 
natural law; her body and mind are in a "natural" state that, unlike Hobbes' frightening 
"state of nature," provides moral understanding independent of education and 
8 Parsons also conflates delicacy, modesty, and virtue in this passage, which feminizes morality in 
interesting ways. For this study, however, I will focus primarily on the "virtuous principle" that Parsons 





environment. Natural law theory, according to Joseph Boyle, views moral principles as 
inherently knowable, "the naturally known principles which are written on the human 
heart" (11). Although the application of such principles might involve complex reasoning, 
Boyle continues, most people are assumed to be capable of appropriately applying them: 
[A] person must be able to evaluate and control his or her emotional responses to 
the particularities of the alternatives available if his or her actions are to be 
completely in line with what is good. This evaluation and control presupposes that 
one possess the relevant moral virtues, namely, the character traits through which 
emotional responses are integrated into a morally upright personality. (13-14). 
As I explained in the previous chapter, medical discourse identified the brain, nerves, and 
senses as the starting point for epistemology. The body experiences sensory impressions 
that are processed cognitively, and in turn generate knowledge and ideas. 
Although moral epistemology, in early modem conceptions, works much the 
same way, Parsons departs from the modem versions of natural law that account for 
moral knowledge without depending on innateness. In Ofthe Law ofNature and of 
Nations, Samuel Pufendorf(1632-1694) asserts that it is not "necessary to maintain, that 
the General Principles ofNatural Law, are Innate, or imprinted as it were upon Mens 
Minds from their very Birth, in the manner of distinct and actual Propositions; so as to be 
readily express'd and utter'd by them" (105). He does not abandon the argument for 
innateness altogether. He further explains, "altho' we reject the Notion of those Innate 
Propositions, yet the Knowledge of the Law ofNature is truly and really imprinted on 






105).9 This God-given imprint, as Pufendorf explains, is the capacity for reason: "Thus 
far most are agreed, that the Law ofNature is to be drawn from Man's Reason" (Law of 
Nature 104). Later he mentions, "Therefore when we acknowledge the Law ofNature to 
be the Dictate of Right Reason, our Sence [sic] and Meaning is this, that the 
Understanding of Man is endued with such a Power, as to be able from the 
Contemplation of the Human Condition, to discover a Necessity of living agreeably to 
this Law" (105). Pufendorf argues that we acquire ideas of natural law through 
experience and reason in the same way that children acquire language. It is clear to 
Pufendorf that natural law is not innate because children have no concept of it 
(Hochstrasser 86-87). 
John Locke agrees with Pufendorf: "[M]oral Principles require Reasoning and 
Discourse, and some Exercise of the Mind to discover the Certainty of their Truth. They 
lie not open as natural Characters in graven on the Mind; which, if any such were, they 
must needs be visible by themselves, and by their own light be certain and known to 
every Body" (Essay1.29-30).lO Locke takes pains to argue that, although we might have 
inclinations toward certain impressions, no moml ideas or virtues are innate: 
Virtue generally approved, not because innate, but because profitable. Hence 
naturally flows the great variety ofopinions concerning moral rules which are to 
be found among men, according to the different sorts of happiness. they have a 
9 Jeffery Stout notes that most versions ofnatural law depend on a "promulgator" that must be sufficiently 
authoritative to "overrid[e] any particular legal or moral code devised by human beings" (73). For Aquinas., 
God promulgates etemallaw; for Enlightenment thinkers, reason supplied the place of quasi-divine 
authority; for Kant, "our own self-legislating capacity as rational agents" takes the place of divinity (73). 
10 Locke distinguishes innate from acquired ideas and principles by applying the principle ofuniversality: 
"universally received without doubt or question" (1.30) "carries its own Light and Evidence with it, and 




prospect of, or propose to themselves; which could not be if practical principles 
were innate, and imprinted in our minds immediately by the hand of God. (Essay 
1.32) 
However, Locke notes that "sometimes the Mind perceives the Agreement or 
Disagreement of two Ideas immediately by themselves, without the Intervention of any 
other: And this, I think, we may call intuitive Knowledge. For in this, the Mind is at no 
Pains of proving or examining, but perceives the Truth, as the Eye doth Light, only by 
being directed toward it" (2.131). Locke's discussion does not dispense with natural law, 
but it does address the problem of knowledge. For Locke, all feelings of certainty depend 
on intuition; in turn, even moral knowledge stems from the mind's immediate grasp of 
truth. Whether innate or intuitive, Matilda's knowledge stems from cognitive and 
perceptual abilities that need no outside influence to direct them. Matilda thus appears to 
be a "natural" subject, immediately apprehending moral knowledge and virtuous 
principles. 
Matilda acts appropriately, even when her "virtuous principle" compels and 
justifies an apparently transgressive action-fleeing from her uncle, her legal guardian. 
When she overhears him plotting with a servant to enter her room, Matilda is horrified. 
Even without a worldly education, she understands that Weimar has transgressed sexual 
boundaries by caressing her. She further understands the implications of the plan she 
overhears-strangely, since her sexual innocence would imply a complete ignorance of 
such transgression. Natural understanding, therefore, supplies the knowledge that Matilda 
needs to avoid immoral situations or behavior. She resists Weimar through her choice to 






Matilda's acquaintance with Countess Wolfenbach sets in motion the education that will 
enable Matilda to resist Weimar in new ways. Countess W olfenbach approves of 
Matilda's courage, which has given her strength to leave Weimar. Matilda's bravery also 
allows her to reject superstitious fears and to explore the castle. The Countess states, 
"your courage ... proceeded from a right principle ... and I hope, my dear Miss Weimar, 
you will never want resolution on similar occasions; judge always for yourself, and never 
be guided by the opinions of weak minds" (19). Here, the Countess encourages Matilda 
in her first moves toward an individualistic reliance on her own understanding. Natural 
law theory holds that one can behave morally, even if one's environment-institutions, 
cultural practices, community norms---does not conform to moral principles. Thus, 
natural law promotes the "independence ofmoral knowledge" (Boyle 15). The Countess 
supports such independence. Matilda's inherent abilities, however, must be supplemented 
with education that enables her to understand the ways in which positive law can and 
cannot protect her. Innate virtue offers little protection, as Matilda learns from her first 
encounter with Weimar, and natural understanding cannot substitute for legal rights, as 
the Marquis and Marchioness de Melfort later demonstrate. Although Matilda's 
vulnerability exposes certain insufficiencies of natural law, the conclusion indicates that 
there can be no other remedy for the deficiencies of positive law except a conversion on 
the part of the transgressor and acceptance of the principles of natural law. 
While Matilda rests at the Castle of Wolfenbach, the Countess writes her sister, 
the Marchioness de Melfort, to make arrangements for Matilda's protection. When the 
heroine enters the Countess's bedchamber several nights later and fmds it blood-spattered 




apparent death and her own perilous situation. Yet she bravely follows the Countess's 
instructions, leaving the castle and traveling to the Countess's sister, the Marchioness de 
Melfort, who protects and adopts her. Early in her stay with the Melforts, Matilda notices 
her need for social knowledge: "Matilda was in a new world: the polite and sensible 
conversation she now enjoyed was so different from every thing of the kind to which she 
had been accustomed that she was mortified at her own deficiencies, and most 
assiduously endeavoured to profit by the good sense and elegant manners ofher 
protectoress" (37). The Marchioness in particular serves as a role model for Matilda. I I 
Not only is this noblewoman generous, sensitive, and sophisticated; she is also fully 
knowledgeable about the laws that most concern her daily life. Likewise, Matilda must 
expand her understanding beyond innate moral principles to include legal knowledge. 
When the Marquis and Marchioness hear of the Countess's mysterious 
disappearance, they discuss their legal options. As the Marchioness tells Matilda, they 
had long desired to bring legal action against Count Wolfenbach: 
"The whole affair is certainly very strange: often has the Marquis vowed to apply 
either to the Count or courts ofjustice; but the letters we received were never 
written by her, we could adduce no actual proofs of his guilt, and she continually 
warned us to take no steps without her permission. Thus, in a most unaccountable 




II If, as Roberts suggests, the Melforts are "role models ofhappy parents and families" (102), then they are 




By articulating both the need for justice and the means of achieving justice through law, 
the Marchioness brings the force ofpositive law into this private, familial relationship. 
Moreover, Parsons reveals a tacit approval of such measures, both here and later in the 
novel, as Matilda increasingly demands her rights. Through the Melforts, Matilda learns 
the power and necessity, as well as the deficiencies, of law. The Marchioness draws 
attention to two elements that enable the law to perform its intended purpose. First, 
"actual proofs" or evidence must corroborate suspicions or accusations. Second, the 
victim ofpersonal crimes must cooperate with the legal system. Because the Countess 
wishes to protect her child, as the reader later learns, she refuses to identify herself as a 
victim, choosing imprisonment instead. Because the Melforts can supply neither 
prerequisite for legal action, they are unable to assist Countess Wolfenbach. As they all 
know, the Countess does suffer through her husband's actions. However, positive law's 
basic principles appear to prevent it from enacting justice for the Countess. This muddled 
depiction indicates Parsons' conflicted attitude toward positive and natural law. She 
shows that neither positive nor natural law condones women's exploitation and 
oppression; however, each "type" of law has flaws that allow (if only temporarily) abuses. 
Justice is at the heart of Wolfenbach's plot, as Parsons works through various 
means of arriving at a satisfactory conclusion to women's persecution. David Hume 
argues that justice is a public virtue based on utility and necessity, which would be 
unnecessary if people were benevolent and generous enough to care for others without 
self-interest (409). After considering extreme states ofnecessity and lack, Hume asserts, 
"[T]he rules of equity or justice depend entirely on the particular state and condition, in 




to the public from their strict and regular observance" (410). Since society typically falls 
within the two extremes, Hume concludes, "ideas ofproperty become necessary in all 
civil society: Hence justice derives its usefulness to the public: And hence alone arises its 
merit and moral obligation" (411).12 Parsons does not imagine a golden age or its savage 
counterpart (as does Hume) in which justice is a useless concept; instead, she envisions a 
state in which justice operates on an individual level. A personal commitment to natural 
law would thus entail doing justice to others and to oneself. 
In her second encounter with her uncle, Matilda begins to rely on the language of 
justice and rights as she resists Weimar. When he finds the Melforts and Matilda in Paris, 
he tells the Marquis that he is not her uncle after all, simply a kind-hearted soul who took 
in an abandoned orphan. (Later, he confesses that this was a lie designed to entice 
Matilda into marriage.) The Marquis listens to Weimar's explanations and encourages 
Matilda to have an interview with Weimar, even though the idea frightens her: "Poor 
Matilda dreaded the interview, and the power he might exert over her, yet it was ajustice 
due her own character and friends, that she should confront him" (59). In this as in later 
passages, Parsons employs rhetoric that places justice on a personal, domestic level. In A 
Theory ofMoral Sentiments, Adam Smith notes that "we are said to do injustice to 
12 Hwne here defines justice by its utility in society. In particular, he finds that the necessity for justice 
depends on material lack and conventions ofownership. Impressions ofjustice, while natural themselves, 
are actually impressions of something artificial. Indeed, Hwne believes that man's natural passions will 
lead to injustice. One way that Hume introduces the "law of nature" is by insisting that once rules ofjustice 
are established, "the sense of morality in the observance of these rules follows naturally, and of itself' 
(Treatise ofHuman Nature 533). According to Jonathan Harrison in Hume's Theory ofJustice, Hwne's 
utilitarianism does not provide a consistent concept ofjustice: "[Hume] has not articulately formulated a 
general utilitarian theory about what makes an action right or what makes it a duty, as opposed to what 
makes a personal character trait a virtue" (33). Hume's notions ofjustice generally refer to ''the institution 







ourselves when we appear not to give sufficient attention to any particular object of self-
interest" (425). For Matilda to do justice to herself, she must act in a self-interested 
manner. The sense of equity and rights evoked by ''justice'' therefore becomes a 
significant part of Matilda's experience here, signaling a new aspect of legal existence. 
Instead of remaining a passive victim of others' injustice, the heroine is called to a non­
victim status. 
As Parsons begins to express Matilda's need for personal justice, she indicates 
that women can behave within an ethical framework without sacrificing their sense of 
individual rights. According to John Finnis, "practical reasonableness" characterizes 
natural law: that is, the freedom to direct one's own actions and to behave responsibly 
within a community of other free individuals. Matilda notes that she owes herself and 
others justice. This obligation emphasizes the significance of female individuality, which 
exists comfortably within a community. Parsons attempts to negotiate the divide between 
private and public justice in this scene, as well as in the conclusion. Matilda struggles to 
answer Weimar's proposal of marriage because she is horrified by her utter lack of family 
connections. Roberts rightly notes that Matilda's response here reflects an older 
hierarchy of value, in which noble birth equals moral worth (103). This narrative moment, 
however, allows Parsons to construct another kind of community. The Marchioness, 
seeing Matilda's dilemma, intervenes by stating, "I have adopted you, I love you as a 
child, and will protect you; in me you shall fmd the mother you have lost: fear not 
therefore, my dearest Matilda, to decide as your heart and judg~ment shall direct" (62). 
The Marchioness creates new "bonds of kinships" that undermine Weimar's guardianship 




undennines unjust claims through adoption, she also disrupts the aristocratic privilege 
and entitlement that, in Gothic novels, generally signals lawless individualism. 
After the Marchioness offers her support, Matilda refuses to marry Weimar. She 
initially tells him, "I have no right to refuse, nor any way of discharging the obligations I 
owe you for the care of my early life, but by the sacrifice of the maturer part of it" (68). 
Natural law provides Matilda with notions of obligation, 13 but it does not demand 
sacrifice, which is never obligatory and is always voluntary. Referring to the marriage as 
a "sacrifice," Matilda implicitly critiques Weimar's proposal, even though she exhibits a 
sense ofobligation and duty towards him. Yet she later insists that she will become a nun 
rather than marry Weimar: "I solemnly declare I never will be your wife" (68).14 
Although still concerned about her orphaned status, Matilda refuses a sentimental sense 
of duty to Weimar for his early care. The Countess and the Marchioness have encouraged 
Matilda's decisions, her natural understanding, and her reliance on reason. In this scene, 
their encouragement begins to shape Matilda's responses to Weimar. 
When Weimar pursues his claims in another direction, he raises problematic 
positive laws: "[Y]ou have no right to dispose ofyourself without my pennission; you 
were committed to my care, doubtless by your parents; you may one day be reclaimed; I 
am answerable for the trust reposed in me, and with me I shall insist upon your remaining 
till those to whom you belong appear to claim you" (68). Parsons, an Englishwoman, 
imaginatively invokes laws of guardianship and trusts. Although set in France and 
13 An example of this is the "natural" obligation ofa father to provide for his children. 

14 It is clear that the convent would provide a welcome haven for Matilda. However, her romantic feelings 

for Count de Bouville indicate that marriage will be the eventual "reward" for the heroine. At this point, 








Germany, the novel creates a rhetorical echo ofEnglish law in such moments. IS The 
English treatise, The Laws Respecting Women (1777), describes the ages at which a 
woman receives various legal rights: 
A female at seven years of age may be betrothed or given in marriage; at nine is 
entitled to dower; at twelve is at years ofmaturity, and therefore may consent or 
disagree to marriage; and ifproved to have sufficient discretion, may bequeath 
her personal estate; at fourteen is at years of legal discretion, and may choose a 
guardian; at seventeen may be executrix; and at twenty-one may dispose of 
herself and her lands. (424-425) 
The treatise's author notes that modem women enjoy advantages over ancient Greek and 
Roman women, who ''were never looked upon as ofage, but were subject to perpetual 
guardianship unless they married" (425). Englishwomen "ofage," particularly unmarried 
women, are thus independent legal subjects. Although Matilda is a minor, Parsons 
indicates that Weimar's guardianship is limited, as English law makes clear and as her 
readers would have understood. 
Interestingly, as Weimar pursues those rights, the Melforts indicate that he acts 
inappropriately and unjustly_ The Marquis states, "Without the smallest intent of 
contesting your rights, Sir,. _ .you certainly have too just a sense ofwhat is owing to 
yourself' (69), and then requests that Matilda reside with them for a short time. Parsons' 
word play here indicates the exacting nature of law as well as the limits ofjustice through 
IS In Sterne, the Moderns, and the Novel, Thomas Keymer discusses a theory of intertextuality which 
allows readings that need not be tied to specific allusions, but instead picks up on "a subtextual presence 
that, however large in structural impact or pervasive in thematic significance, may never disclose itself with 
the solidity of verbal echo" (5). Here, the "verbal echo" of English law seems stronger, although this 




positive law. Indeed, "too just" becomes unjust. Most significantly, the Melforts show 
Matilda how to make gestures to others' legal rights, while maintaining her own 
judgment. Immediately afterwards Matilda reflects on her situation: "IfMr Weimar chose 
to exert his right over her, she saw no one to whom she could appeal," so she resolves to 
herself, "ifhe persists to-morrow in exerting the authority he claims over me, I will fly to 
[the convent] for protection" (70), revealing her self-determined choices and resistance to 
claims she will neither recognize nor concede. The law might declare Weimar's 
"ownership" ofMatilda, but she resists his authority by claiming her right to property in 
herself. Through the Melforts, Matilda learns that she might claim such rights-a lesson 
that her "innate" virtue makes her capable of learning. The legal and ideological problem 
in this scene is the "property in self." Matilda asserts her "self' as inviolable when she 
refuses to degrade herself by marrying a man she does not love or respect. 
The Melforts further encourage Matilda's resistance by traveling to England 
before Weimar can manipulate French law against her. Indeed, their suspicions that he 
might use the mysterious lettre de cachet to imprison her prove true; they leave France 
immediately before officers come to claim Matilda. Such covert and sinister legal 
realities are contrasted with English law, 16 which is earlier praised by the French 
romantic hero, Count De Bouville: 
"I consider the English as the happiest people under the sun: they are naturally 
brave, friendly, and benevolent; they enjoy the blessings of a mild and free 
16 Helen Maria Williams details such abuses in her Letters from France. In what she claims is a true story, 
Williams poignantly describes a young married couple tom apart by the husband's father. The father uses 
the lettres de cachet to imprison his son for years before the young man is able to escape. Williams's gothic 
tale seems to be echoed in Matilda's story. In Wolfenbach, the lettres are equally unjust, as Weimar uses it 







government; their personal safety is secured by the laws; no man can be punished 
for an imaginary crime, they have fair trials, confront their accusers, can even 
object to a partial jury; in short, as far as human judgement can be deemed 
infallible" (51). 
Parsons explicitly promotes English law as a model of human justice, a patriotic 
commitment to the ideals of law. Here the novel presents the best possible outcome for 
the lawful subject: integration into a body politic that is healthy, happy, and free. In this 
optimistic vision, impartial positive law has an unmatched transparency that creates a 
near-perfect system. The implication is that continental law does not encourage such a 
political state. The alternative for Parsons-as the conclusion indicates-is a state in 
which individual adherence to natural law will result in a non-coercive social order. Yet 
she does suggest that positive laws have the potential to facilitate and protect freedoms. 
For example, one female character explains to Matilda, "[Weimar] must prove his right to 
you before he can take you from us .... [T]he laws will protect you from injury" (95). In 
fact, the German Ambassador in England explains that Weimar might be "the natural 
protector of the young lady ~ but could not oblige her to marry him-neither could he 
prevent her retiring to a convent, though she might be accountable to him for her choice 
of [convents]" (100). Even German laws, as presented in this example, allow Matilda the 
right of refusal. While the novel never overtly rejects conventional notions ofparental 
authority, Matilda often hears that Weimar is subject to laws that limit his asserted power. 
Indeed, as the Melforts' interactions with Countess Wolfenbach illustrate, positive law 
should be deployed when "authority," whether that of guardian or husband, has exceeded 
its bounds. The domestic sphere should not be a refuge, an impenetrable haven, for 
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criminal activity, and positive laws should protect that sphere. Parsons, however, does not 
naively assume that positive law can prevent or rectify all injustices. 
Countess Wolfenbach's story clarifies the problematic relationship between 
personal and social justice, between the private family and the public legal system. The 
Marchioness earlier explains that she and the Countess were subject to a tyrannical father 
who arranged marriages for both his daughters. Separated from a beloved but poor suitor 
and forced into marriage, the Countess tried to remain emotionally faithful to her husband, 
but found him an unfeeling, jealous man. When her former suitor attempted to contact her, 
she tried to hide his presence from the Count, even though she had done nothing immoral. 
However, the Count discovered and murdered the suitor. The Countess, protesting her 
innocence, was spared the Count's murderous rage, but he shut her up in the castle, 
circulated stories that she had died, and kidnapped their son. In order to sustain his power 
and to ensure her compliance, the Count uses the threat of harm to their son as blackmail. 
The Marchioness knows only part of the Countess's story. Even though the 
Countess does reveal that her husband murdered a servant and clearly intended to murder 
her before she escaped, she hints that she still holds a vow of silence that the "inhuman 
monster" extracted from her (79). The Marquis de Melfort exclaims, "I think, my dear 
sister,...'tis a justice you owe yourself and friends to institute a process against this 
monster," to which the Countess replies, "I shall think of it. .. but I have many 
objections" (82). As with Matilda, Parsons makes justice an individual as well as a social 
matter. The Countess's case is far more complicated. Although the Count has violated 
natural and positive law through murder, the Countess is reluctant to apply to the courts. 





resources to bring him to justice. Her reluctance touches on the problems English women 
faced through coverture. According to A Treatise o/Feme Coverts (1732), women still 
retain some rights to their person: "And though our Law makes the Woman subject to the 
Husband, yet he may not beat her, but she may pray the Peace against him; and he shall 
find Surety that he shall neither do nor procure to be done to her, any Bodily Damage," 
although this claim is undermined by the subsequent clause, "otherwise than appertains to 
the Office of a Husband, and for lawful Correction" (81). In Wolfenbach, as in many 
Gothic novels, crimes against women are made so heinous that no such "lawful 
correction" clause can be applied, even as their virtue makes it clear that they are in no 
need of correction. 
Not only do the Countess's sister and brother-in-law encourage legal action 
against her wicked husbands; they also gently criticize her for not pursuing justice 
through the courts. They indicate that the Countess owes herself this justice, and that she 
will be doing justice to her friends by instituting legal processes against her husband. 
Notably, real women did in fact "pray the Peace" against abusive husbands. In a case that 
sounds much like a Gothic plot, Anne Gregory "appeared to have been very ill used by 
her husband; and to have thereupon fled from him, and come to the defendants [her 
mother and uncle] for security and protection." Anne Gregory was "ready to swear, and 
actually did swear the peace against him. ,,17 Justice Francis Buller explains that "the wife 
is always permitted to swear the peace against her husband," and she may testify against 
him should he "attempt to take her away by force after articles of separation" (287). 
Although articles of separation had no place in the Anne Gregory case, the Court upheld 




her request and "would not order her to be delivered to her husband, as his counsel 
demanded: but on the contrary, told her: 'She was at liberty to go where she thought 
proper.'" Further, the Court provided a constable or bailiff to "secure her from any insult 
in her return to her friends." 
As in the fictional case of the Countess, such legal action proved highly 
problematic for a number of reasons. One issue is present in Anne Gregory's case. As a 
feme covert, she could not plead for herself, as Viner explains: "[I]nfants and feme 
coverts ought to find surety by their friends, and not to be bound themselves" (20.107). 
The case of Earl Ferrers demonstrates the importance of this restriction. Laws Respecting 
Women mentions that two writs of habeas corpus were issued commanding the Earl ''to 
bring up the body of his countess"-that is, bring her to court so that she might receive 
protection if she chose to swear the peace against him-which he promptly ignored. 
Because this husband was a member of the peerage, there was some debate about 
whether the King's Bench could enforce such writs. The wife's brother, Sir William 
Meredith, "judged it prudent to petition the house of lords for their leave to proceed 
against the earl," and with Lord Mansfield's and Lord Hardwicke's support, a resolution 
was passed February 7, 1757 and confirmed on June 8, 1757: "[N]o peer or lord of 
parliament hath privilege against being compelled by process of the courts of 
Westminster-hall, to pay obedience to a writ of Habeas Corpus directed to him" (56). 
After the resolution was confirmed, the Earl produced his wife, who subsequently 
"exhibited articles of the peace against him" (56). This case illustrates the barriers to 
women's ability to swear the peace, as well as the necessity of relatives and friends who 
..... 

will pursue legal means. The wife's access to the courts was further impeded by her 
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husband's rank, which required extraordinary measures to overcome. 18 As a nobleman, 
Count W olfenbach embodies the historical problems that women of rank encountered 
when attempting to "swear the peace." 
Sarah Chapone in her 1735 treatise The Hardships o/the English Laws in 
Relation to Wives offers an important critique \ Chapone makes two primary objections to 
the notion that a wife's ability to "swear the peace" safeguards her from a cruel husband. 
First, Chapone explains, the husband has the "Power to lock up his Wife, and so prevent 
her Complaint" (32). Second, even if a wife was successful in her suit, she would subject 
her family to additional hardships. Chapone writes, "[I]t exposes her to the Resentment of 
her Husband at his Return Home, without abating his Power, which is so great, that he 
may revenge himself a thousand Ways not cognizable by the Law" (32). Further, losing 
the husband's income, especially in the merchant and working classes, would subject the 
entire family to poverty (32). In Wolfenbach, the Countess has another reason to avoid 
the court system: the Count continually threatens to kill their son if she takes any action, 
even that ofdivulging to her family that she still lives. Although the Countess ultimately 
has no need to take legal action, the idea that personal redress of grievances should be 
pursued through legal means challenges the privacy of abusive domestic arrangements 
and gives Matilda a powerful model of individual rights. The Melforts' insistence on 
Countess Wolfenbach's taking legal action against her husband teaches Matilda to value 
not only sentiment but also justice. Nevertheless Chapone's objections remain significant, 
and signal a potential reason for the narrative's ultimate neglect of legal measures. 
18 In an unusual case, a Quaker woman, whose faith prohibited her from "swearing" oaths, was thus unable 
to "exhibit articles of the peace against her husband," and thus could not be protected by the COurts. 18 The 
author notes, "[P]erhaps Mrs. Gumbleton, as she goes in danger ofher life, may dispence with the strict 




The tension between positive law and the abuses ofauthority embedded in that 
law becomes clear as the narrative progresses, especially when the law finally forces 
Matilda to return to Weimar. Back in France, in a convent she intends to join, Matilda is 
told by the mother superior, "Alas! my dear child, I have received an order from the king 
to deliver you to a Mr Weimar, and another gentleman, waiting to receive you" (141). 
This disconcerting move emphasizes the uncertain protection that the law provides 
women. 19 Yet in this third and last encounter, Matilda takes a noticeably frrmer stance 
with regard to her personal rights. Weimer declares himself her "true and natural 
protector" and· the one who "placed" her in the convent. Parsons' savvy placement of 
argumentS ofnature enables her to contrast abuses of natural and positive law. Matilda's 
uncle invokes nature in order to solidify his claims on her, yet Matilda refuses to 
recognize these identifications: 
"It [entering the convent] was my own voluntary choice, Sir, and very distressing 
to my friends, that I persisted in choosing a retirement from the world. .. [Y]ou 
know my motives for quitting your house, and for the subsequent offer of your 
hand, if you really were sincere, I must confess I think circumstances more than 
inclination prompted you to it. How you mean to dispose of me, or by what right 
you assume to yourself to be master of my destiny, I know not; but of this you 
may be assured, no force shall prevail upon me to act contrary to my own 
inclinations and judgement; and since I am not your niece, you have no legal 
authority over me" (142). 
19 Parsons again seems to contrast French tyranny with English law, since Matilda has returned to France. 
While the lettres de cachet are a specifically French abuse, the vulnerability of women to unjust positive 
laws seems most important in this scene. The legality of Weimar's claim rests on his. authority as male 





In an exciting display of rhetorical resistance, Matilda raises several key points. First, she 
notes that her decision to enter the convent was entirely her own, without Weimar's 
involvement. Although her choices are obviously limited, Matilda insists on her right to 
select her residence and refuses to allow Weimar to take credit for the decision. Also, in 
rejecting Weimar's marriage proposal yet again, she bluntly exposes his improper 
motivation. Finally, Matilda denounces Weimar's authority through explicitly legal 
references. Depending on law and on personal judgment, Matilda asserts her right as 
"master" ofher own destiny. She presses Weimar to exert his power illegitimately, 
thereby showing that force characterizes their relationship. 
Indeed, only by sheer force is Weimar able to conduct his schemes, as he refuses 
to let her contact the Melforts and states, "I will not part with you, but where I propose 
carrying you, shall be entire master ofyour destiny .... You are now safe in my 
possession... I'm sorry you made force necessary" (143). Although he previously 
denied their family relationship, Weimar still retains a semblance ofpatriarchal power. 
Zomchick explains that "the family looks back to a pre-social history in which 
associations were imagined to be natural, mutual, and reasonable. The recuperations of 
masculine authority that succeed the originary moment are suspended if not cancelled" 
(14-15). In other words, the family is a "natural" space in'\.Vhich masculine authority has 
no need to reveal itself through force. At this point, however, Matilda has internalized the 
juridical discourse that allows her to assert natural and legal rights, which puts Weimar in 
the position of exposing his manipulative appeals to familial obligation. Because Matilda 
resists Weimar's claims on her person and affections, Weimar must use force to restore 




the coercion upon which his authority is based. For it is not "natural" affection and 
"natural" authority that govern their relationship, but a system of manipulation and 
physical controls that is unmasked only when Matilda refuses to participate voluntarily. 
As they sail from England, Matilda and Weimar initially appear threatened by a 
band ofTurks or Barbary Corsairs who capture their ship. In desperation, Weimar stabs 
both Matilda and himself, although neither fatally. The pirates, however, tum out to be 
generous and protective toward Matilda, who explains that Weimar kidnapped her. 
Weimar, believing that he is about to die, makes a full confession on the boat in the 
captain's presence. In this scene, Weimar demonstrates the conviction of wrongdoing that 
enables the law of nature to guide human action. He acknowledges his villainy without 
being subjected to the sanctions, the force, or the commands ofpositive law. This is a 
significant return to the issue of innate knowledge and moral epistemology. Matilda, at 
the beginning of the novel, is depicted as innately virtuous, but there appears to be no 
corresponding "innateness" in the wicked Weimar and Count Wolfenbach. Instead, these 
two men demonstrate a self-interest that leads them to greed and crime. While Parsons 
leaves this problem unsolved, natural law theory does address the issue of "moral 
diversity and disagreement" (Boyle 18). First, human reasoning is fallible. Also, complex 
moral problems can generate a number ofpotential solutions that, in tum, people might 
disagree over. Finally, diverse cultural and social contexts results in varying applications 
of moral principles (Boyle 19). Boyle argues, however, that natural law's dependence on 
moral knowledge is not undennined by moral diversity and disagreements. Furthennore, 
simply knowing moral principles does not mean that one will obey them, a weighty 





Weimar's feelings of guilt and remorse are natural, that they are the logical consequence 
of criminal or immoral behavior. His effusions of sorrow and remorse stem from an 
internal sense ofblame. Although Parsons does not explore the means by which Weimar 
corrupts his innate sense ofvirtue, it is certainly clear from Weimar's actions that innate 
does not mean compulsory. Only in the conclusion does the villain exhibit an obligation 
to obey the law of nature and finally learns to act morally. 
Parsons does not neglect the role ofpositive law in this scene ofrepentance. 
Weimar stops his story to say, "Before I proceed any further, ...'tis fit an instrument 
should be drawn and signed by me and proper witnesses, proving that I acknowledge 
Matilda to be the only child and heiress to the late Count Berniti' s estates, which I have 
unjustly withheld" (147). At this point, Weimar confesses that he lied about his 
relationship to Matida; he is indeed her uncle, her father's brother. The return to blood 
ties establishes inheritance, which in turn satisfies Matilda's need to be the social equal of 
her beloved. Recovering from the nearly successful suicide attempt, Weimar voluntarily 
exiles himself to a strict monastery. Blackstone would call this a "civil death": "The civil 
death commences if any man be banished the realm by the process of the common law, or 
enters into religion; that is, goes into a monastery, and becomes there a monk professed: 
in which cases he is absolutely dead in law, and his next heir shall have his estate" (I: 
128). Weimar's act serves a dual purpose: it fulfills the debt of death that he owes society 
for murdering Matilda's father (his elder brother) and for kidnapping Matilda as an infant, 
and it releases his property to the rightful heirs.2o 
20 This scene seems to anticipate The Italian. In both novels, the heroine's family is Neopolitan; the 




Countess Wolfenbach also receives justice at the end of the novel. Count 
Wolfenbach's death, brought on by a life of dissolution and profligacy, becomes a 
judgment of "nature" in the Countess's case. Illness thus works as a natural agent of 
justice in the conclusion. Death or exile may provide natural and providential retribution 
for the crimes; however, only legal confession will restore these women to full possession 
of their property rights, and Parsons is meticulous in describing the procedure for such 
restitution, thus underscoring the importance of legal claims. On his deathbed, Count 
Wolfenbach tells the Marquis, "I sent for you, my Lord, not only to hear my confession, 
but to direct me in what manner I must do my wife justice" (138). This justice involves 
drawing up papers that confess his crimes and secure the estates in her name; it also 
involves making those papers legal through the signature of government officials. 
Matilda also receives legal documents to support her claims to title and estates, as noted 
earlier. Importantly, Parsons interrupts emotional deathbed confessions with clear 
directions for lawful restoration ofproperty. She indicates that although the law of nature 
'1.eaches" people that crime demands remorse and repentance, positive laws protect social 
arrangements such as inheritance and property ownership. The ending moves beyond 
affective responses (guilt, repentance, forgiveness) into legal procedures. The relationship 
between natural and positive law appears incongruous at fIrst blush, but gains coherence 
under the general principle ofjustice. Matilda and Countess Wolfenbach are protected 
from further violation with the persecutors' deaths, and their property is returned to them 
.... 

graphically depicts the uncle as both a sexual and physical threat to the heroine. As a result, the function of 
law becomes even more significant. Justice for such violent acts, she indicates, can be served by self­




through legal procedures. Both forms ofjustice serve to empower and liberate women 
who have been vulnerable through much of the narrative. 
In The Castle ofWolfonbach, we find tentative moves to empower women with 
legal discourse, including,the "natural" understanding of moral action and the acquired 
knowledge of legal rights. Parsons particularly explores women's need for positive laws 
to maintain their natural rights. In The History ofWomen (1779), William Alexander 
argues, 
Such privileges and immunities as the French and Italian women derive from the 
influence ofpoliteness, the British derive from the laws of their country. Flowing 
in this channel, though they are perhaps accompanied with less softness and 
indulgence, they have the advantage ofbeing established on a firmer foundation; 
and being dictated by equity and humanity, are less liable to be altered and 
infringed, than if they depended on the whim and caprice which influences 
gallantry and politeness. (313) 
Alexander argues that social custom, such as "politeness," requires continual indulgences 
to remain effective props ofprivilege. Positive laws, on the other hand, have a 
disinterested firmness that depends on justice. What Alexander polarizes, however, 
Parsons unites. She shows that the moral knowledge of natural law (the determinate order 
ofhumanity) can enable people to act equitably without the force ofpositive law, even 
while positive law remains an integral part of the social order. Parsons ultimately presents 
a picture ofjustice that is natural and divine, as well as legal and social: while the 
criminals in this story are punished outside the court system, the women recover their 
property and social identities through positive law. In her fairy-tale conclusion, Parsons 
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subsumes the tension between legal positivism and natural law theory under an imagined 
justice that supports, protects, and rewards virtuous women. 
The Orphan of the Rhine 
In The Orphan ofthe Rhine (1798), Eleanor Sleath develops a vision ofjustice 
that supports-or even exists through-the Gothic female subject. This novel is unusual 
in its proliferation ofplots, all of which intersect at various points in the narrative. In fact, 
Orphan does not focus on its primary heroine, Laurette, until the middle of the second 
volume. Sleath incorporates several stories, including that of Julie de Rubigne, another 
beleaguered heroine who takes in and mothers the orphaned Laurette. The elaborate and 
interconnected narratives add complexity and depth to the female heroine plot that 
Radcliffe creates in The Mysteries ofUdolpho. Even The Italian does not layer stories in 
such profusion.21 E. J. Clery argues that the female Gothic's "bizarre coincidences" 
illustrate "a higher supernaturalism that ensures every 'accident' has its rightful place in 
the schema ofDivine Justice" (Rise 112). She explains that the final explanations "reveal 
the world to be a transparent medium ofdivinity; material existence is suffused by 
religion" (113). What Clery does not address is why women in particular would desire 
such divinity and would depend on a series of coincidences in order to create justice in 
their narratives. Only by examining women's relationship to law-both positive and 
natural--does their reliance on religion and Providence become understandable. David 
211n his introduction to the 1968 reprint of The Orphan ofthe Rhine, Devendra Varma states, "Although 
[Sleath] cannot claim the same degree of fme and feminine skill which Mrs Radcliffe displayed, there is 
still something subtle in her art ofcharacter-drawing and some polish in her style" (ix). Vanna notes that 
The Critical Review (November 1799) "condemned [Orphan] as 'a vapid and servile imitation' of 'the 





Rume argues that property laws and customs ultimately facilitate ''the interest and 
happiness ofhuman society. Where this enters not into consideration, nothing can appear 
more whimsical, unnatural, and even superstitious, than all or most of the laws ofjustice 
and of property" (416). I argue that Orphan's conclusion attempts to envision a social 
order that does indeed facilitate "happiness"-tbat is, the moral feelings and emotional 
rewards of active virtue. Sleath locates justice outside the codified rules of society, even 
as she maintains the need for positive laws to define social relationships and to defend 
property ownership. 
As Julie de Rubigne and the "orphan" Laurette sensitively obey the moral 
obligations of natural law, the villains operate unchecked by conscience or punishment. 
Unlike Parsons, however, Sleath rarely refers to positive laws that might limit the 
villains' power. In Orphan, legal mechanisms of the state are largely absent. Whereas 
Matilda finally learns to assert her legal rights in her discussions with Weimar, Julie de 
Rubigne and Laurette, the heroines of Orphan, do not make similar claims. Julie and 
Laurette make appeals to heaven as the fmal arbiter in the crimes against them, and the 
villains eventually suffer for their wickedness. 22 The novel ultimately validates the 
heroines' faith and virtue with a conclusion that punishes their adversaries and provides 
restitution. By ignoring positive laws throughout most of the novel, Sleath is able to 
imagine justice that punishes all sorts of "secret villainies," not only breaches ofpositive 
law. Sleath's use of natural law, however, is complicated. Although the best means of 
ensuring women's rights appears to be a universal commitment to principles of natural 
22 Laura Hinton's article "The Heroine's Subjection: Clarissa, Sadomasochism, and Natural Law" addresses 
similar issues. She convincingly argues that Clarissa uses natural law to defend her rights. My approach 
differs from hers-not only by examining different novels but also by focusing on the various critiques of 




law, she does not create a world in which only natural law operates. Sleath, like Parsons, 
turns to positive law as she creates a happy ending for her heroines, particularly as she 
introduces documents that will enable Julie and Laurette to claim property. In the final 
scenes, she introduces the state and its laws to uphold the villains' emotional return to 
morality. Although her final solution appears hackneyed and trite to the modem reader-
and perhaps to the original reader as well-it is in fact a complex response to the 
contradictions of legal discourse. 
The heroine of The Orphan ofthe Rhine is ostensibly Laurette, yet the novel 
devotes much space to the story ofJulie de Rubigne, also referred to throughout the novel 
as Madame Chamont, who takes in Laurette as an infant at the Marchese de Montferrat's 
insistence. Once Laurette's early history is established, Julie's tale is provided in several 
chapters. An orphan herself, Julie is placed under the care ofher heartless, ambitious 
aunt after her parents die. Although Julie's mother had cautioned her not to marry outside 
her Catholic faith, the a~t insists on Julie's marrying a wealthy, Protestant suitor.23 As 
her protests go unheeded and as her suitor becomes frighteningly aggressive, Julie 
escapes by marrying the Marchese de Montferrat. Eventually, the Marchese repudiates 
their clandestine marriage and abandons her with their son Enrico, only providing a small 
sum for their quiet, country life. Julie, like many Gothic,. heroines, is sensitive yet 
restrained: "She had endeavoured to reconcile herself to her misfortunes, and to check, as 
much as in her power, the natural sensibility ofher disposition, which she was convinced 
was too acute to admit of lasting comfort" (11). Later, Julie teaches Laurette to reject 
23 Unlike many Gothic novelists, Sleath does not evoke wicked intrigues through her use ofCatholicism. 
Varma observes that Sleath's Catholicism reveals "a contemplative tum ofmind and a high sense of 
religion" and that Sleath's novels "suggest that, to her, peace could be felt only in the solitude ofa cloister, 




sensibility. Julie shapes Laurette's mind, emotions, and understanding, as well as 
monitors Laurette's reading habits. In one passage, sensibility is described as passive, 
debilitating, and undesirable: "[Julie] discountenanced in her young pupil that unlimited 
indulgence, in the passive feelings of sensibility, which inevitably unfits the mind for any 
undertaking that requires firm and vigorous exertion; she knew that, when deeply 
affected by tales of imaginary woe, the mind too often sinks into imbecility" (147). The 
result of such mental incapacity would be a lack of"active benevolence" that could 
provide relief for real problems (147)?4 
Sleath struggles with the issue of passivity throughout the novel. Julie and 
Laurette reject the bodily sensations and mental imbecility of sensibility; however, their 
bodies provide the foundation for moral understanding. Sleath's most explicit statement 
about innate morality comes in the conclusion, when she states, "[The Marchese's] love 
ofvirtue, ofwhich it was evident he possessed no larger a portion than what is 
inseparable from, and inherent in, our natures, was ... weakened by a long course of 
debauchery and immorality" (237). Sleath depends on innateness to make her argument 
for the universality of natural law, yet she notes here that understanding of virtue and 
natural law can be corrupted or strengthened through education and reason. Merely 
hinting at the interplay between innate understanding and the acquisition ofmoral 
knowledge, Sleath turns her attention to the effects ofmaintaining or corrupting that 
24 Published after Udolpho and The Italian, this novel clearly relies on the same suspicion and critique of 
sensibility present in Radcliffe's novels. However, Sleath's emphasis on religion, in contrast to Radcliffe's 
vague, protestant deism, is offered as a substitute for sensibility. While Sleath also advocates reason against 
unrestrained emotion, she places much value on religious faith. She therefore promotes the Providential 




virtue. In the characterization of Julie and Laurette, the author demonstrates that exertion 
and activity must shore up inherent virtue. 
Reason becomes a significant element of this mental exertion toward virtue. Like 
her foster mother, Laurette, the true orphan of the Rhine, is sensitive and emotional, as 
well as intelligent and rational. Her body and mind correspond in "intelligent looks" 
(124), and although she is not a "perfect beauty," the "peculiar elegance of her mind, 
which her amiable monitress had refined and cultivated with unceasing attention, was 
finely portrayed in her features, which were soft, pensive, and interesting" (123). Indeed, 
Laurette guards "against that intellectual weakness, which is sometimes dignified with 
the name of sensibility" and exercises "an undiminished fortitude" instead (145). Her 
romance with Enrico, whose military profession enforces long separations, particularly 
demonstrates her struggle to control her emotional responses. Bette Roberts' argument 
that the "Horrid" women are static characters is nowhere more evident than in Laurette, 
who remains effortlessly good as she continues to follow her understanding of morality. 
Unlike Matilda, Laurette does not learn about her legal rights, nor does she become 
progressively more assertive. This stasis allows Sleath to explore women's relationship to 
natural law, particularly their vulnerability in the face of danger. 
Before she introduces Gothic terrors, Sleath develops the emotional spirituality 
that ultimately supports her heroines in their most perilous states. For example, as Julie 
matures, the "warmth of her affection led her to indulge in that glow of religious 
enthusiasm, which elevates the soul beyond every earthly pursuit, and renders it 
susceptible of the most worthy impressions" (11). The impressionist discourse here 





Sleath with access to an older version ofnatural law articulated by Thomas Aquinas. 
Aquinas illustrates the relationship between natural law and religion, between reason and 
revelation, between philosophy and theology. In Summa The%gica, he states, 
[O]f all others, rational creatures are subject to divine Providence in a very special 
way; being themselves made participators in Providence itself, in that they control 
their own actions and the actions ofothers. So they have a share in the divine 
reason itself, deriving therefrom a natural inclination to such actions and ends as 
are fitting. This participation in the Etemallaw by rational creatures is called the 
Natural law. (qtd. in d'Entreves 43) 
As rational and moral creatures, the heroines consistently exhibit just such a "natural 
inclination" to appropriate behavior and purpose. Although Aquinas's version of natural 
law was largely displaced by Grotius's, considerations of religion in natural law theory 
lingered into the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 25 In Samuel Pufendorf's 
discussions, a divine force (God, Providence, Creator) sets forth rules to which humans 
respond; thus, Pufendorf explains, religion is "the utmost and firmest bond of Humane 
Society" (60). Without belief in a "divine power," only the threat of death can deter the 
malicious, the wicked, and the criminal, although once they shake off that fear, nothing 
can sway them from the path of destructive actions. And should that wicked person be in 
a position ofpower, Pufendorf explains, "he may easily persuade himself that his 
25 Starting with Grotius (1583-1645), natural law took on a more rationalist character, in which the law of 
nature was knowable and obligatory without God's direct intervention. Pufendorfhere is explicit about the 
role of religion and God in natural law. Hochstrasser, however, asserts, "Pufendorfs locating ofnatural law 
in the social instincts and calculations of the individual left little role for religion at all in human life" (71). 
Nevertheless, even if the logical extension ofhis philosophy makes God irrelevant, it is clear that, to 




enterprise is just" (62). Positive law, with its emphasis on external, observable actions, 
cannot easily manage such evildoers: "for the proceedings in humane Courts of 
Judicature being govern'd by Proofs of Matter of Fact all those Wickednesses and 
Villanies which could be secretly acted and without Witnesses, if any thing were to be 
gained by them, would be accounted Dexterities of Wit" (62). 
Pufendorf concludes that "without Religion there will be no Conscience, it would 
not be easie to discover such secret Villanies; they being such as mostly are brought to 
light by the incessant prickings of the Conscience and internal horrors breaking forth 
into outward Indications" (64). Here we see the ways in which feelings and emotion 
create a normative order, in which immoral actions are punished internally. Natural law 
places much emphasis on the individual, on personal judgment and on self-government. 
Indeed, such internal control is the most significant aspect of natural law. According to 
Pufendorf, positive law is limited by its reliance on objective standards of evidence, a 
point illustrated in Wolfenbach when the Melforts cannot prosecute the Count because 
they have no proofs. Although Orphan does not represent the limitations ofpositive law's 
empirical demands, the novel clearly demonstrates the power of conscience. Particularly 
in the conclusion, the "internal horrors" of feeling are solely responsible for the villains' 
confessions, which in tum enable positive law to restore the heroines' property. 
Although Sleath's vision ofnatural law is closely tied to religion, she does not 
ignore the importance of reason, which enables people to construct social institutions that 
will protect and enforce natural rights. In keeping with Pufendorf's and Locke's 
discussions ofthe law of nature, Blackstone explains that reason offers the best means to 






reason is God's primary gift to mankind, enabling individuals to create laws that will 
protect man's ability ''to pursue his own true and substantial happiness" (1: 40). Because 
human reason is not "clear and perfect, unruffled by passions, unclouded by prejudice, 
unimpaired by disease of intemperance," natural law cannot be the sole guide for human 
behavior (1: 41). Blackstone's emphasis on reason and his critique of emotion offer a 
rationale for positive law. While he pays little attention to natural law beyond a cursory 
introduction, Blackstone at least gestures to the law ofnature as he begins his 
monumental Commentaries on the Laws ofEngland. As Rommen argues, "Whoever was 
desirous of representing something as good and worth while had now to make of it a 
requirement of the natural law, and to show that it is a conclusion of reason and that it 
existed in the state of nature" (107). Sleath enters the discourse by depicting women's 
rational, cognitive abilities as well as their religious feelings. The combination of reason 
and emotion produces an active female subject who does not just accept impressions 
passively. 
When their domestic sphere is disrupted by the Marchese, Julie and Laurette 
exhibit a continued commitment to appropriate emotion and rational self-control. In a 
thrilling scene, Julie is kidnapped by the Marchese's accomplices as she attempts to assist 
La Roque, a man who was persecuted and then imprisoned by the Marchese. Misled by 
the Marchese's servant, Paoli, Laurette believes that Julie has been kidnapped by banditti. 
She suspects that Paoli might be involved in the crime, but she does not dwell at length 
on that possibility. When the Marchese de Montferrat moves her to another home, 
Laurette "endeavoured to reconcile herself to a destiny which, from the unlimited power 
which the Marchese possessed over her, she considered as unavoidable" (149). Later, 
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Laurette prepares to meet calamity, and "by opposing the most vigorous efforts ofher 
fortitude, to endure what could not be remedied, and to gain at least, by her most 
strenuous endeavours, the applause ofher own heart" (220). Although Laurette is clearly 
sensitive, and some might argue, a woman of sensibility, Sleath avoids the weakness that 
sensibility connotes through Laurette's calm responses to unpleasant or even dangerous 
situations. Because Laurette's reason is "unimpaired by the disease of intemperance" 
(Blackstone I: 41), she retains an unhampered relationship to the law of nature. Sleath, 
however, waits until the end of the narrative to vindicate her heroine. At the midpoint of 
the novel, Laurette suffers anxiety and fear, even if she is not entirely overcome by terror. 
Indeed, she is threatened by villains who make "the state of nature" their justification for 
criminal acts. Laurette's faith in the underlying purpose and order ofnatural law contrasts 
with the villains' belief in a world governed by self-preservation and self-interest. 
In Orphan self-preservation is ultimately responsible for the violent assertions of 
men over women, the rights of the powerful against the rights of the weak. The wicked 
Paoli, for example, espouses the law of self-preservation. Intriguingly, he seems to be a 
"natural" villain, "a wretch, whose mind, as well as aspect, indicated him a villain, 
marked and selected by Nature for the accomplishment of the most daring and bloody 
purposes" (263). Whether Paoli corrupted any initial virtue or has been destined for evil 
acts, his argument for self-interest raises a significant issue. When Laurette rejects the 
Marchese's amorous advances and marital designs, Paoli advises him to act with decisive 
fmality: 
"Do you cease to remember, my Lord, that self-preservation is one of the first 





forcibly to be rejected, and becomes the master-spring of all our actions? Ifa 
venomous insect assaults us, do we not annihilate it? Who, but a maniac, would 
feel the sting of a serpent, and not endeavour to release himself from its grasp? ­
Would anyone, not divested of reason, endanger his own life by listening to the 
plea of humanity?" (253-54). 
The rhetorical appeals to nature, reason, and humanity, all part of natural law, have a 
logical consistency that is persuasive and seductive.26 In fact, most modern versions of 
natural law, as well as social contracts, included a discussion of self-preservation, 
although most thinkers tempered this notion with theories of mutual interest or sociability. 
Grotius's principle of sociability offered one way to explain the obligations ofjustice. 
Ernst Bloch explains Grotius' s basic argument: "Injustice is that which conflicts with an 
ordered community of individual rational beings, and all that does not come under the 
rubric of injustice is just. ...Justice is all that belongs to the natural instinct of 
sociability" (49). 
In Pufendorf's discussions of natural law, self-preservation is the foundation of 
human nature: 
[Man] accounts nothing dearer than Himself, that he studies all manner of ways 
his own Preservation and that he endeavours to procure to himself such things as 
seem good for him, and to avoid and keep offthose that are mischievous. And this 
26 Intriguingly, this scene is reminiscent of The Italian when Schedoni tempts Vivaldi's mother with legal 




desire ofSelfPreservation regularly is so strong, that all our other Appetites and 
Passions give way to it. (38i7 
In the later Enlightenment, this notion lingered. Blackstone, changing the tenn slightly to 
indicate a more immediate threat to one's person, notes, "Self-defence therefore, as it is 
justly called the primary law of nature, ... [cannot] be in fact, taken away by the law of 
society" (11104). Adam Smith notes, "Every man, is no doubt, by nature first, and 
principally recommended to his own care ... Every man, therefore, is much more deeply 
interested in whatever immediately concerns himself, than in what concerns any other 
man" (181). Although Pufendorf, Blackstone, and Smith would no doubt be repelled by 
the manipulation of this principle demonstrated by Paoli, it is nonetheless significant that 
Sleath would refer specifically to "natural" principles here. For Sleath, the law of nature 
does not become a state of nature-that is, a Hobbesian vision of savage lawlessness. 
However, she recognizes the power of Hobbes' theory. 
She indicates that the villains see the world as a Hobbesian "state of nature," in 
which self-preservation justifies any action. In Leviathan (1651), Hobbes writes, 
The right of nature, which writers commonly call Jus Naturale, is the liberty each 
man hath to use his own power as he will himself for the preservation of his own 
nature; that is to say, of his own life; and consequently, of doing anything which, 




27 Hochstrasser argues that, according to Pufendorf, concern for self-preservation is not incompatible with 




Hobbes, unlike Pufendorf, finds in this principle an explanation for the "condition of 
Man...which is a condition of War" (64). Hobbes qualifies this "right" of nature by 
discussing laws of nature that bind the individual to others. As people transfer their right 
to preserve their lives by any means necessary to the state, they secure mutual peace and 
security. He states that "the first, and Fundamental Law ofNature [is] to seek Peace, and 
follow if' (64). The second law of nature and social contract is "that a man be willing, 
when others are so too, as far forth as for peace and defence ofhimself he shall think it 
necessary, to lay down this right to all things" (64). For Hobbes, the state protects people 
from the savage rule of "jus naturale." However, Pufendorf's 1672 treatise On the Law of 
Nature and ofNations argues that the state's positive laws cannot prevent or punish many 
"secret villainies" and that only an individual's commitment to the law of nature (as they 
conceive it) can lead to active virtue and prevent injustices. Sarah Chapone taps into this 
conflict as she criticizes English laws: 
For since we seem to be hastening into a State ofNature, in which there can be no 
Appeal but to the Laws ofour Country, and the Authority of Scripture is going 
down, which directs a Man to erect a private Court ofEquity in his own Breast, 
what shall restrain the Strong from oppressing the Weak, if the Laws ofour 
Country do not, they being in such a State the only established Rules of Society? 
(3) 
Chapone sees no redeeming features in the Hobbesian explanation of "nature," which 
results in legal positivism and leaves women with no appeals to a higher law or to 
religion. Sleath, as well, finds positivism troubling. She looks to natural law to justify and 





Laurette's resignation and pious fortitude counters the Marchese's wicked self­
interest. After she rejects him, the Marchese begins to follow Paoli's advice and 
imprisons Laurette in a secluded house. Her inexorable reasoning leads her to eliminate, 
one by one, the possibilities of escape or rescue, so she waits for death: 
A deep and mournful stillness seemed to reign throughout the mansion, and being 
in hourly expectation of her murderer, she betook herself to prayer, that she might 
prepare her mind, as much as possible, for the awful change that awaited her, by 
soliciting the protection in the moments of dissolution [ ... ] then throwing herself 
upon the bed, endeavoured to await, with something like resignation, the doom 
which she considered as inevitable. (257) 
Her plans to flee are thwarted by locked doors and utter solitude. Here, emotional 
fortitude or collapse is the only choice left to her, and she responds with a stoic display of 
courage. Even though Laurette makes attempts-futile though they may be-to escape, 
her situation demonstrates women's physical inability to protect themselves. More 
importantly, her appeals to heaven indicate the failure ofpositive laws to protect her. She 
determines "to wait with humility for the interposition ofProvidence in her behalf' 
because she believes in "an Omnipotent Power who governs the world with wisdom and 
equity" (251). Laurette's helplessness and her complete vulnerability to the villains raise 
the problem ofpassivity. Although the previous depictions ofnatural law emphasize 
active virtue, cognitive abilities, and rational processing of impressions, Laurette now 
seems stripped of agency. Sleath celebrates her heroine's fortitude and faith, but leaves 
her passive role unexamined. Instead, Laurette is rescued through coincidence. Sleath 
• 







For Sleath, natural law provides a discourse ofjustice in which right triumphs 
over might, reason over pure will. While scenes like the above illustrate women's 
paradoxical position in relation to both natural and positive law, Sleath does promote the 
desirable aspects of each to construct a happy, though conventional, resolution. Natural 
law offers an authority based in divinity and human reason that circumvents, at times, the 
authority ofpositive law. In particular, the individual can rely on the law ofnature as a 
means of critiquing society's laws. For example, when Julie is kidnapped, her son Enrico, 
swearing to find the ruffians, boldly exclaims, "There are laws, and if they cannot be 
enforced, I have a sword, never yet drawn but in the exercise ofjustice, but which shall 
be raised against the heart of the oppressor, in the cause of defenceless innocence" (209). 
Enrico uses justice as the guiding principle for his actions, even if they do not correspond 
to the laws of the land. The individual thus can look higher than positive law in certain 
circumstances. In the novel's conclusion, La Roque allows the Marchese's wicked 
henchman to go free after extracting a promise that he will never commit such crimes 
again. The rationale for this action is surprising: 
The punishment for capital offences by the German laws, being so much worse 
than death itself, was held in utter abhorrence by his lenient accuser, the wretch 
who has committed them being doomed to wear that external brand of infamy 
which precludes, through a miserable existence, the possibility of a return to 
virtue; that probably, had he been instigated by no primary consideration, he 
might have been tempted to have declined a prosecution without reflecting that by 





Implicit in this description is the notion that positive law can facilitate a return to virtue-
or it can serve immoral ends. Sleath proposes justice outside the courts when they do not 
correspond to natural law and, instead, deliver unfair punishments. The governing 
positive laws, in conflict with natural justice, can be abandoned at the discretion of the 
individual. The protagonists, like the villains, operate through their own economy of 
justice. It may be in accordance with English principles, yet in this fictional world, such 
justice is simply a part of their nature. According to Weinreb,justice incorporates notions 
of desert (the individual's moral responsibility) and entitlement (the general application 
ofa rule): "Justice is fulfilled when persons get what they deserve and deserve what they 
get; an unqualifiedly just rule entitles those who deserve and no others" (Natural Law 
and Justice 10). Creating a "natural" sense ofjustice in her characters, Sleath authorizes 
their rejection of positive law. 
Both women are rescued through the efforts of the heroes. Enrico searches for 
and finds Laurette in a ruined castle, where Paoli keeps her prisoner for the Marchese. 
Later, Paoli is killed in an attack on La Roque, but he lives long enough to confess his 
crimes. Paoli reveals that Madame Chamont was placed in a prison-like convent. Both 
rescues are facilitated by coincidence and are easily accomplished. Sleath reserves the 
dramatic tension for the lovers' tender reunion and the Marchese's surprising repentance. 
The ways in which Sleath dissolves the threat and creates justice for her heroines are 
crucial to her vision of law. In Orphan, as in Wolfenbach, the feeling heart ultimately 
creates justice. Laurette and Julie offer mercy, while the Marchese suffers under self-






remorse, Laurette and Julie enter the chamber and stand by his bed. Offering forgiveness 
and compassion, the two women relieve some of the Marchese's wildness: 
They, indeed, appeared like two ministering angels come to offer consolation to a 
soul bowed down with the weight of its own irremediable crimes ....Their 
countenances were irradiated by innocence, whilst his was depressed by guilt; and 
now that adversity had brought conviction to his heart, he experienced the 
weakness, the imbecility ofvice when opposed to the innate dignity ofvirtue. 
(329) 
In this scene of guilt and forgiveness, ofpunishment and vindication, Sleath shows 
women participating in legal discourse. As Laurette prays for Heaven to "soften the 
rigour ofthy justice with the effusions ofmercy," Julie attempts "to convince the 
Marchese that she came to offer him her forgiveness" (329). These women need not 
punish or accuse their persecutor because he is dying a "natural" death, and thus fulfilling 
the demands ofjustice. Importantly, however, the Marchese de Montferrat must first feel 
guilty and repentant before he confesses and restores legal order. 
Orphan illustrates that internal conviction is a necessary element of legal 
restitution. With the Marchese's repentance, Sleath demonstrates a deep faith in-or 
desire for-the juridico-moral dimension of social life. She depends on a law ofnature 
that is written on the heart in order to construct a resolution that satisfies the needs of 
positive law. Enrico tells Laurette and his mother, 
"The Marchese has already entered into a full confession ofhis crimes. He 
seemed, on our introduction, to endure much internal affliction; for never did I 




met those of Della Croisse [La Roque]. This self-condemning conduct induced us 
to proceed in the affair with as much gentleness as possible, though we did not 
omit the necessary information relative to the legality of his first marriage, and 
Laurette's providential release from captivity and expected death!" (327) 
Clearly the Marchese suffers for his criminal activity-without the assistance ofpositive 
law. His internal sense of guilt and the internal punishment that accompanies it 
correspond to the principle of natural law that posits certain innate qualities, such as 
reason and moral sense. Because he feels repentant, he desires to restore the fortune he 
has stolen and repair the social identities he has disrupted; thus, he turns to legal 
procedures in order to make restitution. 
There are two ways in which this conclusion functions. First, death appears to be 
the natural and appropriate punishment for crimes, especially the Marchese's, since it 
removes the threat that he represents. Second, the narrative's emphasis on the mind and 
emotions creates a new model of punishment that goes beyond physical force. Real 
punishment is not enacted on the body but through the body, in the mental anguish of 
self-condemnation, which in tum often causes physical pain and illness. For the Marchese, 
death results directly from his recognition of and emotional response to his guilt. His 
body absorbs the cost of his debauchery and his emotional repentance. What is "natural" 
here is the personal experience of remorse, guilt, and repentance. Indeed, the Marchese's 
fortuitous death circumvents the need for legal proceedings altogether. Instead of 
providing a complete escape from juridical discourse, however, such an ending suggests 
the interdependence of positive and natural law. Although positive laws might secure 






individuals must be attuned to the moral-legal dimensions of their nature-a nature that 
cries out for order, reason, and right. In Orphan moral epistemology begins with the 
individual, whose sensitivity, impressions, and reason enable her or him to act and think 
justly. The narrative affIrmS the individual's rational and natural propensity for justice 
and moral living-a propensity, furthermore, that does not stay buried in selfishness, but 
moves outward to others. The conclusion in particular demonstrates that knowledge of 
and commitment to natural law is the only way that true justice can operate. 
Importantly, the law of nature is always universally just, unlike positive law, 
which can 'sometimes be unjust. Pufendorf explains that justice can be either "universal" 
or "particular": "The first is, when every Duty is practiced and all right done to others, 
even that which could not have been extorted by force, or by the rigor of the Law. The 
latter is, when that Justice only is done a man, which in his own right he could have 
demanded" (35). Particular justice, therefore, is enforceable by positive law, whereas 
universal justice cannot be coerced. Sleath's heroines find particular consolation in the 
notion of universal justice because they obey the law of nature rather than only positive 
law. They make individual choices to enact justice in whatever capacity they can. The 
~j internal quality of law becomes the most significant for women, who must depend on 
~~I 
~ 
~ others' conscious guilt as much as they depend on their own conscious worth. In the 
11 
former rests all their hopes for the failings of positive law. Indeed, such representations II 
',~'.",':I1 indicate the necessity offeeling as the primary means of lawfulness since externally 
fl 
jl imposed law can always be manipulated for the use of the powerful. David Hume argues 
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that "it is not any relation of ideas which gives us this concern, but our impressions and 




never in the least affect us. The sense ofjustice, therefore, is not founded on our ideas, 
but on our impressions" (70). 
In bringing about a "just" ending for her heroines, Sleath does not wholly discard 
the necessity ofpositive law. Positive law demands restitution, and the central problem of 
natural law is its inability to impose force on criminals who reject feelings ofguilt and 
repentance. The law ofnature can bring about only personal change, individual 
commitments to justice, internal feelings of guilt and shame. In Orphan, this law works 
very well: since "nature" punishes the Marchese, the court system is unnecessary. Also, 
because he repents his wickedness, he does not need to be forced by society-through 
positive law-to make restitution. Although Sleath does not discuss criminal law, she 
takes care to address property laws in the conclusion. As she creates justice for her 
heroines, she clarifies the legal procedures that will uphold Julie's and Laurette's claims 
to titles and property. Although the law ofnature has a close relationship to ideals of 
justice, positive law can protect property in ways that natural law cannot or does not. 
Thus, in Orphan, the denouement is encapsulated in the packet ofdocuments created by 
the Marchese de Montferrat. These documents include: testimony and proof that Julie 
was his legal wife, deeds that supported Laurette's claims to usurPed estates, a will that 
bestowed upon Julie his considerable personal property ("after a proper arrangement of 
the landed property" 335). Even though justice in relation to personal crimes-abduction, 
murder, theft-has been arranged through the desires and preferences of the "good" 
characters, positive law regulating marriage, legitimacy, and property cannot be 








positive law. Like Parsons, Sleath shows that legal documents are absolutely necessary in 
order to restore fortunes and reputations. 
The moral with which the reader is left is hackneyed: Laurette and Enrico "were 
blessed with a numerous offspring, lovely as themselves, and presented, in the whole of 
their lives to the reflecting mind of the moralist, a striking instance ofthe imbecility of 
vice, and ofthe triumphant power ofvirtue" (360). This fantasy ofjustice, as Sleath and 
her audience surely recognized, can only take place in a narrative that uses the 
proliferation of character, detail, and coincidence to uncover mystery and resolve crime. 
Nearly every person introduced in the story plays a significant role in creating or 
uncovering crime. No character is superfluous; apparent chance meetings abound; no 
event is left unrelated. A tight economy indeed, and one that clearly can exist only in 
fiction. Yet, such strict control over the narrative also reflects a desire for corresponding 
economy in a Providence-guided world. In a world governed by natural law, no 
randomness or injustice can occur. Sleath's desire for natural law indicates a level of 
dissatisfaction with a system that cannot protect women's vulnerable bodies. Natural law 
provides a means of critiquing injustice-including the injustices ofpositive laws. As 
d'Entreves puts it, "A law which lacks authoritative sanction may yet be law" (77). 
Nevertheless, the heroines' dependence on natural law seems, at times, ineffectual and 
problematic. For women, the problem is twofold: there is no unmediated access to natural 
law, and positive law is real and necessary for modem governance. Thus, the advantages 
ofpositive law become an integral part of the novel's conclusion. 
In Wolfenbach and Orphan-novels that have previously been dismissed as vapid 
imitations, blatant transgressions, or faddish entertainment-. there exists an important 
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argument about women's access to justice. The issue ofempowerment and resistance 
becomes a significant one in these Gothic novels. In Foucault's model ofpower, 
resistance always occurs within and against power structures, and it does not always 
subvert those structures. As Wendy Brown notes, theories of empowerment that "locate 
an individual's sense of worth and capacity in the register of individual feelings" 
consequently "risk establishing a wide chasm between the (experience of) empowerment 
and an actual capacity to shape the terms ofpolitical, social, or economic life" (23). 
Because feelings or emotions are significant means to moral knowledge and thus natural 
law, there is a concomitant danger of delusion?8 Parsons and Sleath suppress this danger 
by aligning the heroines' desires with positive law and social custom. The authors also 
lavish unexpected luxuries on the heroines at the conclusion as rewards for their 
resistance to villains and their continued moral faithfulness. 29 Parsons and Sleath elide 
the problems with and critiques of natural law by introducing positive law in the novels' 
conclusions, where it ratifies the inheritances, relationships, and confessions that have 
already been set in motion without legal mechanisms and state intervention. The 
heroines' feelings of empowerment, therefore, are upheld in the conclusion with social 
power: the. women receive estates and titles that solidify their claims to self-determination 
and justice. 
28 That is, one could "feel" it just to kill a person who thwarts one's desires or pleasures. The rationalization 
of action based on feeling might indeed lead to mUltiple injustices. 
29 Women's property ownership was not a complete fantasy, ofcourse. As eighteenth-century law 
illustrates, women often did own estates in their own right. Even if their husbands had access to the fees 
and rents to those estates, they could not sell or transfer the property. Parsons and Sleath therefore propose 





Knowing Looks: The Problem of Perception in Regina Maria Roche's The Children 
ofthe Abbey and Clermont 
In the previous two chapters, I examined the body's role in creating knowledge, 
as articulated within sensationalist psychology. The senses take in impressions, which are 
transmitted through the nervous system to the brain. In turn, the material mind processes 
sensory data, exercising rational faculties in order to produce ideas. As Locke explains, 
impressions, reason, and cognitive processes also establish an individual's relationship to 
the world and sense of self. For Radcliffe, I argue, this medical construction of perception 
shapes her presentation of Emily and Ellena, even though she resists problematic 
implications of such a construction. In Parsons' and Sleath's novels the sensitive body 
serves as the basis of moral epistemology in a less ambivalent way, although each author 
clearly draws on similar concerns regarding the vulnerable body. This chapter extends 
my discussions of sensory impressions in order to address the cultural crisis that 
surrounded the most common, significant means of taking in impressions: vision. 
Whereas the physical act of seeing is a natural phenomenon, perception is a cognitive 
event structured by cultural discourses. Consequently, visual evidence becomes tenuous, 
a philosophical dilemma shaped by aspects ofmedicine and law. As I will demonstrate, 
Regina Maria Roche's novels The Children ofthe Abbey (1796) and Clermont (1 798) 
provide a complex response to this epistemological crisis through themes ofmystery and 
secrecy. I argue that, while they portray the power that visuality exerted over women's 
lives, these novels tap into the uncertainty ofperception that medical and legal discourses 






techniques ofperception that lead to moral judgments regarding women's social 
transparency and that hamper women's ability to turn personal experiences into 
knowledge. 
Since knowledge seems to be the highest value of Enlightenment ideology, which 
seeks to shed light on previously dark, mysterious subjects, the means of establishing 
knowledge is a significant concern for eighteenth-century discourses. In The Historical 
Roots o/Cognitive Perception, Theo Meyering describes the shift in perception from 
Aristotelians to Cartesians. For the former, "whatever was transmitted to the senses ... 
contained the real essence of the objects of perception and not mere images thereof. To 
disregard the evidence of the senses, therefore, or to distrust it systematically, was to 
distrust the essential manifestations of nature which she, nature herself, by some physical 
process delivered at our very doorsteps" (15). The advent ofNewtonian optics and 
Cartesian philosophy created a radical break between vision and knowledge: empirical 
science examined the objective nature of optics, while philosophy concerned itself with 
the subjective qualities ofperception and cognition (6). Because sight and perception 
were considered distinct (though related) processes, one could not depend on vision to 
transmit an objective reality to one's mind. Instead, the brain provided a personal 
understanding of the world that mayor may not correspond to others' knowledge. This 
crisis in epistemology led to "the radical conception of knowledge as something ofour 
own making for which we ourselves may be responsible" (18). In this sketch of vision's 
problematic nature, two issues related to my project emerge. First, although the evidence 
of the senses is described as tenuous, eighteenth-century medical and legal discourses 







while the individual's central role in knowledge-making may lead to self-determination, 
there remains a concomitant danger ofoppression. In particular, women appear 
vulnerable to the imposition of others' "knowledge." The radical notion that Meyering 
describes, therefore, can provide women with a powerful sense of individuality, or it can 
support unjust conditions. 
Roche's novels address these concerns through mystery, imaginatively reflecting 
anxieties about knowledge and the visual means of attaining knowledge. As the female 
characters create mysteries through secrecy or probe others' mysteries, these anxieties 
become gendered, coalescing around medical and juridical versions of the "gaze." While 
visual perception and scopic techniques might not establish certainty, they do generate 
power, which is figured as the social gaze. Visuality, then, provides a powerful metaphor 
and a structural reality for Roche as she creates novels of mystery, crime, and romance. 
Amanda Fitzalan in The Children ofthe Abbey and Madeline Clermont in Clermont are 
mysterious yet open in ways that underscore their self-determining nature. For both 
heroines, however, autonomy comes at a price. Although Amanda and Madeline 
experience multiple moments of self-assertion and resistance, they also suffer from the 
villains' oppressive power. Amanda finds herself alone, ill, and vulnerable; she must be 
rescued, suddenly and fortuitously, by a male friend. Madeline goes temporarily insane 
with anxiety and grief; she also must be rescued at the eleventh hour by her suitor. 
Roche's novels take up the problem of women's transparency in order to illustrate 
the power of the gaze. In Abbey the heroine's secrecy implies illicit sexuality, yet Roche 
undermines the cultural assumption that women's virtue must be on display. She 




that thwarting the gaze of others may protect her from villainous plots. In Clermont, the 
heroine initially discloses her secret thoughts, demonstrating impulses to be transparent to 
others. Once Madeline's internal surveillance turns outward, as she encounters 
mysterious, terrifying events, she struggles with the need to close offher transparent self. 
In both legal and medical discourses, transparency eliminates mystery-from the social 
body and from the physical body. Visual processes, whether literal or symbolic, enable 
these two discourses to operate effectively. Mystery cannot exist in legal relationships, or 
the distribution ofproperty and punishments, for example, becomes unjust. Likewise, the 
mysterious nature of the body must be precisely uncovered, again for good reasons such 
as the prevention and cure of disease. As I will demonstrate, transparent subjects also 
support the moral norms constructed within these discourses. In turn, the novels become 
surprisingly unconventional when Roche depicts her heroines as moral agents who 
embrace secrecy. 
As I will develop in subsequent sections, both medicine and law structure 
perception through discursive practices. In Body Criticism, Barbara Stafford explains that 
eighteenth-century medicine and art "were devoted to a discriminating observation of 
signs and symptoms, to a contextualized pattern recognition, to an informed and refined 
sensory judgment of appearances or looks" (39). Furthermore, she continues, "This 
deeply shared awareness of operating within an empirical field ofexperience­
increasingly dominated by, and subtly attuned to, the evidence of individual sight-was 
demonstrated through a performative interaction between viewer and viewed" (40). In 
the first part of my analysis, I will outline the theoretical and cultural framework that 




portrays a heroine who experiences the painful consequences of dominant techniques of 
observation but who undermines the judgment that such techniques engender. In the 
second section, I will discuss the juridical gaze, another discursive articulation of 
perception. Like medicine, law constructed modes of observing one's self and others, 
which create moral norms. As David Punter puts it, "[T]he law is not absolute, it is a way 
of seeing things" (3). Continuing the work of Foucault's Discipline and Punish, John 
Bender argues that the image of the penitentiary, which structurally allowed "a maximum 
of light and visibility" and "a maximum of inside-outside penetration," influenced the 
cultural imagination in important ways. He notes, "The ideal of transparency is, in other 
words, fully embodied up to the technical limits posed by the need to confine. Structures 
of feeling, as they take material form in different spheres of production, are subject to the 
technical requirements of each sphere" (216). As a result of these technical structures, 
individual citizens functioned within a regime of light and transparency that encouraged 
the surveillance of self and other. In Clermont, Madeline exhibits just such a structure of 
feeling, yet her vulnerability, as well as the novel's complex criminality, create a 
significant dilemma that the juridical gaze can only partially solve. 
In Clermont and in The Children ofthe Abbey, perception and power go hand in 
hand. Medical and legal discourses reinforce the social gaze through techniques that turn 
the individual into a self-diagnosing, self-policing subject. Both discourses emphasize the 
individual's normative behaviors and construct a framework by which to see, interpret, 
and judge others. Insofar as these novels acknowledge these constructions, however, 
there remains a substantial critique ofunjust uses of the gaze. Further, although my 




constructed, indeterminate self, Roche clearly assumes a "true" or authentic self that 
exists against unsuccessful perception. In order to continue Gothic articulations ofnatural 
law, the novel posits a real self that, in turn, may exercise agency. The differences 
between the poststructuralist and the novelistic versions of the self create a productive 
tension in this analysis, which enables me to explore the complexities and consequences 
ofperception, knowledge, and reality. 
Clinical Perception and the Social Gaze in The Children ofthe Abbey 
Promoting a way of seeing based on visual evidence, medical discourse enables 
the perceiver to diagnose external symptoms and signs. Yet what starts as medical 
discourse, which reads the body for signs of disease, ends as moral discourse, which 
reads women's bodies for signs of desire or transgression. In The Children ofthe Abbey, 
clinical perception provides a discursive structure through which various characters 
understand and judge the heroine's actions. In a society that demands transparency, the 
heroine's body should display unequivocal signs of her moral "health." Because the 
heroine's openness exposes rather than protects her, however, secrecy becomes a 
necessary if problematic option. As part of its representation of visual power, Abbey 
demonstrates that transparency and concealment form twin threats in women's lives. l In 
turn, the disparity between others' perception of the heroine and her own understanding 
1 In Disease, Desire, and the Body in Victorian Women's Popular Novels, Pamela K. Gilbert addresses a similar 
theme. Discussing sensational novelists M. E. Braddon, Rhoda Broughton, and Ouida, Gilbert argues that their 
novels "feature women characters whose bodies are defined by degrees of openness and contamination, whose 
identities are defined by mystery and mutation, whose locations, within the logic of the text, are marginal and 
indeterminate" (13). Likewise, the heroines in Roche's novels are in danger of social and moral contamination 






ofher "self' signals a crisis of representation that threatens her integrity. 2 Amanda's 
secrecy generates power, since she retains her personal integrity, and anxiety, since 
women's secrecy typically indicated illicit sexuality. As a consequence, the heroine's 
experiences with the "gaze" position her as an autonomous yet conflicted individual. 
Even though Amanda's secrets threaten her emotionally, physically, and socially, she 
rejects the gaze of society-and consequently, society's validation-as she follows an 
internal, moral order that resembles the natural law of The Castle ofWolfenbach and The 
Orphan ofthe Rhine. Roche repeats a pattern throughout the novel: Amanda's secrecy, 
Mortimer's misinterpretation, and the couple's reconciliation. Through this pattern, I 
argue, the novel critiques the public gaze and modes ofperception fostered by medical 
science, while it celebrates Amanda's unusual choice to hide aspects of herself from that 
gaze. 
The term "clinical perception" provides a way of talking about the semiotics of 
the body, about surface and depth, about symptoms and signs, without necessarily 
referring to literal diseases, cures, or techniques. As Michel Foucault details in The Birth 
ofthe Clinic, eighteenth-century medical discourse introduced a new method of 
perception, which created a "new alliance ... between words and things, enabling one to 
see and to say" (xii). The body's language, its visible signs, needs to be interpreted; its 
surface potentially indicates depth and truth.3 Late-eighteenth century medicine 
2 Roche demonstrates that although secrecy is frequently associated with villainy through metaphorical 
masks and disguises, it can be a legitimate response to threats. Fitzalan willingly exchanges social visibility 
to protect his daughter's sexual purity and to avoid imprisonment. And for Amanda to be open is to be 
exposed to Belgrave's sexual advances. 
3 Eve Sedgwick, in "The Character in the Veil: Imagery of the Surface in the Gothic Novel," argues that 
because character is often displayed on the surface (i.e., character inscribed on the countenance), identity is 




privileged "the marvelous density ofperception," which can determine truth through the 
"careful gaze" and "empirical vigilance" (xiii). This articulation does not acknowledge 
the crisis ofperception but does reflect the authoritative stance ofmedical discourse. , 
Thomas Osborne argues that Foucault's version of the gaze is a "particular, historically 
substantive, style ofperception" (34). The clinical ideal, Osborne explains, is "a mode of 
patient, laborious, qualitative description that is simultaneously a 'way of saying' and a 
'way ofseeing'; a form of discourse and a particular kind of gaze" (34). The body thus 
speaks a language that one can see, making diagnosis a prominent feature of the 
eighteenth-century's scopic regime. In Patients, Power, and the Poor in Eighteenth-
Century Bristol, for example, Mary E. Fissell writes, "Concern with the surface of the 
body continued to be a significant theme in vernacular and professional ideas about 
health. In the eighteenth century, popular health texts and practices reiterated that a 
person's external self, his or her body surface, revealed important inner truths, just as 
plants revealed their healing virtues in their outer forms and colors" (30). 
By emphasizing Amanda's physical signs, Roche evokes medical discourse, 
which demystifies the body in order to control and cure it. I argue that Lord Mortimer, 
Amanda's erstwhile suitor, depends on such perceptual assumptions as he assumes that 
Amanda's body can be decoded visually according to a moral rubric. In Abbey, the 
"diseases" of the heart seem as observable (and diagnosable) as the diseases ofthe" body. 
In his discussion of Foucault's The Birth ofthe Clinic, Rose notes the shift in perception 
that allows such consonance between physical disease and moral corruption: 
...... 
establishing seltbood. I argue that Amanda, as one example of the Gothic heroine, does not fit neatly into 
this model. Indeed, it is the very tension between surface and depth, appearance and reality, that structures 




The underside of disease-illness--comes to light, offers itself to the gaze, to 
language and to the practice of the cure in the same moment as it distributes itself 
in the enclosed but accessible volume of the body. This mutation [of medical 
thought traced in The Birth ofthe Clinic] has epistemological and ethical 
dimensions which are not confined to the territory of illness. (68) 
The techniques of observation generated within medical discourse thus could be exported 
into other fields of perception. Although the term "clinical perception" implies a 
disinterested objectivity, the moral tendencies of the discourse indicate what Foucault 
describes as "a normative posture, which authorizes [medical treatises] not only to 
distribute advice as to the healthy life, but also to dictate the standards for physical and 
moral relations of the individual and of the society in which he lives" (34). Such 
tendencies are evident in many domestic medicine publications, as perception and moral 
judgment blend together.4 The spate of publications directed at women included such 
titles as The Female Physician: or, Every Woman Her Own Doctress; The Female 
Physician; and Every Woman Her Own Physician; or, The Lady's Medical Assistant. 
These treatises, which inform my analysis of perception in the novel, encourage 
individuals to develop a medical gaze in order to police one's own body or others' 
bodies. 
4 The medical gaze is also a policing gaze, sharing similarities with the juridical gaze, which I will explore 
through Clermont. As Foucault explains, clinical perception migrated into social consciousness: "[M]edical 
space can coincide with social space, or, rather, traverse it and wholly penetrate it" (31). Through the 
dissemination of domestic medicine books, the home became another medical sphere. It is important to 
note here that the hospital is the new medical space. Indeed, illnesses and deaths historically were managed 
within the home. However, domestic medicine books published by physicians were a technology that 
bridged the gap between hospital and home. Individuals were encouraged to apply the new modes of 








A. Hume's treatise, Every Woman Her Own Physician; or, The Lady's Medical 
Assistant (1776), offers one example of the ways in which women were encouraged to 
develop such a gaze: 
It may perhaps be said that infants cannot communicate a knowledge of their 
complaints, as they cannot acquaint a Practitioner with their symptoms. But 
though young children do not speak our language, yet they have one which we 
should contrive to understand; nay, every distemper may be said to have a 
language of its own, which an attentive person will easily learn, and which the 
fond mother or nurse should use their utmost endeavours to comprehend, so as to 
avoid and cure the few and simple disorders to which they are subject. (92). 
Hume makes a value judgment as he explains that the loving caregiver will cultivate an 
attentive, interpretive gaze.s The body and illnesses have a language that requires only 
careful comprehension, which is accessible to the layperson. This example brings 
together medicine and morality as a cultural configuration that becomes incorporated into 
such popular works as Abbey. This visual process could be considered a form ofpower in 
that women are authorized to "read" others' bodies. Importantly, the medical regime 
creates new ethical obligations for caretakers, typically women, as it demands accurate 
perception as part of their nurturing role. 
In Abbey the ethical dimensions of clinical perception become clear as Amanda 
serves as the object of others' gaze. As various characters exercise a medicalized 
perception, they underscore the interpretive process that enables them to arrive at what 
.5 Roy Porter explains that the eighteenth-century physician relied primarily on sight rather than touch in his 
physical examination: "[S]ystematic and disciplined use of the senses, apart from the eye, for diagnostic 
purposes had not advanced far. As late as 1800, it was exceptional for a doctor to tap the body with his 






they believe is the "truth" of Amanda's exterior signs.6 Her body is "enclosed but 
accessible" to those who carefully inspect her. Instead of being the object of a nurturing, 
caring gaze, however, the heroine experiences the oppressive power of observation and 
diagnosis, especially because the signs that others read become equivocal as Amanda 
hides the truth of her situation. She participates in the destabilization of sight through her 
secrecy and suffers from misinterpretation. According to Meyering: 
Since phenomenal experience distorts not only occasionally but systematically, it 
is best regarded as a veil which hides reality rather than revealing it. Thus the 
mind, not the eye, has the sole power of discernment: it alone truly discriminates 
between real and merely apparent 'infonnation.' However, this implies that the 
mind in its turn may impose its structures upon reality as perceived. (3) 
That reality can be the product of an individual's mind via perception is especially 
dangerous for Amanda, who cannot remain transparent to others. She understands that 
her concealments promote perceptual misconstructions. Creating a gap between 
appearance and truth, between seeming and being, the heroine participates in the 
epistemological crisis previously described. In tum, she becomes a disruptive force that 
must be contained by the moral nonns of medical discourse. 
6 Similarly, Julie McMaster argues in Reading the Body in the Eighteenth Century Novel, "As the trained 
physician observes the body and interprets its symptoms in order to procure health for the patient, so the 
infonned reader of a novel observes characters in their speech and bodily actions in order to arrive at 
sympathy, understanding, and moral judgement" (24). Although her discussion of diagnosis is a productive 
one, McMaster does not examine Gothic texts. When she does acknowledge the elements of terror and 
threat in her discussion of Camilla, she focuses primarily on the tragic ways in which Camilla's body 
language is silenced yet judged. Amanda undergoes a similar experience; however, I argue that Abbey 





For women, secrecy is the symptom of moral disease. As domestic medicine 
treatises articulate, women's secrecy can indicate guilt or shame. For example, in The 
ladies dispensatory: or, every woman her own physician (1740), masturbation is the illicit 
secret that must be eliminated through the self-surveying medical gaze. The anonymous 
author devotes the first chapter to this subject, inteIjecting moral warnings and social 
commentary into the medical discourse. He asserts that venereal disease, caused by 
"secret Vice," poses the greatest threat to "the Preservation of Human-kind in general" 
because it "strikes at the very Root of Fertility" (3). The illicit sexual activity that leads to 
disease includes, according to the author, masturbation. Among the reasons that women 
might masturbate is its secret nature: "There must be another Party in all other Acts of 
Uncleanness, but in this [ masturbation] there is neither Partaker nor Witness" (4-5). He 
continues, 
When Women, who are apparently of a sanguine and amorous Constitution, shall 
betray no Inclination to Venereal Embraces, and even refuse advantageous 
Matches; to what other Cause can we impute it, but their being capable of 
pleasuring themselves in this private Way, and keeping up a Shew of Chastity, 
while they are abandoned to the most irregular Lusts? (5) 
Because no laws regulate "Self-Abuse," women have another inducement to this solitary 
pleasure. Whereas intercourse might produce a child, "a living Witness of their Crime," 
self-gratification has no "Punishment but Self-Consciousness" (5-6).7 That he intended 
this chapter for a female audience is clear: "Every guilty Female, who has read thus, far, 
7 The author cites a list of cases in which the women suffered an array of symptoms, from itchiness to 
infertility to death, as a result of masturbation. In one noteworthy case, the patient's clitoris lengthened 






and finds in herself any of the dismal Symptoms there enumerated, will not readily forget 
what so sensibly affected her" (13). Thus, women's secrets, even in medical works, are 
linked to dangerous sexuality that the social and internal gaze must contain. 8 
The conflation of immorality and concealment begins early in Abbey. In the first 
scenes, Amanda Fitzalan, at her father's insistence, returns to her childhood home in 
North Wales for recuperation and protection because Colonel Belgrave, a married man, 
had attempted to seduce her. After Amanda rejected his sexual advances and fled from 
him "as if from a m.onster," Belgrave became vicious: "Having thrown off the mask, he 
determined no longer to assume any disguise" (24-25). The narrator notes that Belgrave 
wears the mask of gentility, of morality, of humanity-and that he employs subterfuge to 
hide corruption. Relating secrecy to villainy, Roche acknowledges the need for 
transparency, which should expose dangerous people to the social gaze and, in turn, 
neutralize their threats. During the novel, however, this formulation breaks down. With 
his "mask" now stripped away, Belgrave begins to persecute Amanda and her father 
through Fitzalan' s financial obligations, offering to trade debt for sex. Although she 
escapes his initial threats, Belgrave returns throughout the narrative, "like an evil genius" 
(218). Amanda's response to the villain's presence evokes descriptions of the 
supernatural in other Gothic novels. Like heroines who tremble and faint when they 
experience what appears to be ghostly occurrences, Amanda feels "horror and surprise" 
8 In her treatise The Compleat Midwife, Jane Sharp frequently refers to female genitalia as "the Secrets of 
Women" or simply "the Secrets." For example, she states, "There are three Diseases in this Part of the 
Secrets; either the Mouth is too strait, or too wide, or sometimes there hangs forth the Yard of a Woman" 
(166). Sharp discusses "Warts in the Secrets" (170), "Ulcers in the Secrets of Wombs" (172), and "Secrets 
[that] are full of Pimples, or very rugged" (157). This designation is largely absent from published domestic 
medicine books, such as John Ball's work, but it indicates the ways in which medicine and cultural 




whenever Belgrave appears: "The terror his presence inspired was too powerful for 
reason to conquer, and raised the most gloomy presages in her mind. She believed him 
capable of any villainy" (218, 219). Roche concentrates the Gothic atmosphere in the 
figure of Belgrave, who embodies all the terrors that Gothic heroines experience. 9 In this 
novel, Belgrave also functions as a kind of "pathogen," making Amanda display signs of 
moral "illness" and forcing her to become an object of the attentive gaze because she 
cannot remain transparent. 
The narrative demonstrates that women dare not display their vulnerability to 
sexual advances because it might imply a "weak constitution" or a pre-disposition to 
desire seduction. Amanda struggles with this construction as she meets Lord Mortimer. 
Her obvious concealments and mysterious hints cause Mortimer to doubt her sexual 
purity. From the beginning, Mortimer's suspicions cause tension in a narrative already 
loaded with threats and danger. When Mortimer probes the mysterious circumstances of 
Amanda's life, "Amanda, with blushes, always shrunk from the subject; sickening at the 
idea of his knowing that her father depended on his for future support" (46). Not only 
does her family's financial dependence make her feel "sickened"; she also experiences 
embarrassment over her knowledge of sexuality. Although Belgrave does not seduce her, 
he makes it clear that he wants sex, forcing her to acknowledge her potential sexuality. 
Attempting to manage these problematic experiences, Amanda remains silent when 
Mortimer questions her, which provokes Mortimer's curiosity about the mysteries she 
hides. Roche thus places her heroine in a position to be interpreted. It is my claim, 
however, that Roche rejects the visual construction of the self because it oppres'ses 







women, whether unintentionally (as with Mortimer, his sister, and aunt) or maliciously 
(as with Belgrave and the Roslins). 
Mortimer's doubts about Amanda's sexual purity intensify when a young 
clergyman, who also wishes to court her and who fears that Mortimer will corrupt her, 
delivers a sermon on seduced women. After the church service is over, the narrator notes: 
To see so young, so lovely, so elegant a creature an inmate of a sequestered 
cottage, associating with people (in manners at least) so infinitely beneath her; to 
see her trembling and blushing, if a word was dropped that seemed tending to 
inquire into her motives for retirement; all these circumstances, I say, considered, 
naturally excited a suspicion injurious to her in the mind of Lord Mortimer. (49) 
The suitor's initial suspicions survive throughout the narrative and become the basis of 
much misunderstanding. For Mortimer, Amanda's body displays observable signs of her 
morality (or immorality). In so far as her "delicacy" has been compromised, Amanda 
indeed is symptomatic of moral illness when she is confronted by the gaze of the curious. 
Even as Roche indicates that Mortimer's doubts are natural, she also critiques his 
inability to perceive Amanda properly. 
Such incompetent diagnoses were a significant concern in medical discourse, 
which described the dangers of misperception. Since every feature becomes suffused with 
potential meaning if the body is continually under observation, the "reader" must be able 
to monitor the body correctly. John Ball's The Female Physician teaches women to 
recognize meaningful symptoms of abnormal menstruation, for example. Explaining that 
"excess" of discharge must be measured in comparison with "former periods, accidents, 




(36). In turn, he encourages women to maintain a scientific detachment in their diagnosis. 
The consequences of inaccurate conclusions, misreading normality for pathology, might 
be fatal: "[M]any women of timorous dispositions, have ruined their constitutions by 
stoppinglO what was but a natural quantity, and proper for their health, under a notion of 
its being a dangerous excess" (36-37). Women must therefore interpret without emotion 
as they diagnose physical symptoms. 
As in Ball's example of the timorous women, Mortimer's misinterpretations are 
emotionally conditioned and dangerous. Condemning Amanda, the suitor puts her in a 
vulnerable position. First, when he believes she is "impure," he suggests a sexual affair 
instead ofproposing marriage, inflicting emotional pains on the heroine: "Belgrave had 
insulted her purity and offended her pride, but he had not wounded the softer feelings of 
her soul; it was Mortimer alone had power to work them up to agony" (60). Second, his 
misinterpretations increase her vulnerability to Belgrave, as later events prove. Finally, 
Mortimer insinuates that Amanda is responsible for his conclusions. He chides her, 
"[W]hy... did not prudence teach you to shun a conduct which could create suspicion?" 
(158). When Amanda does not explain herself, Mortimer leaves the country certain of his 
perception: "I witnessed her agitation, her embarrassment, this morning, when I hinted at 
[my doubts],' (167). Mysterious and unexplained, Amanda's actions leave a lingering, 
corrosive doubt in Mortimer's mind for most of the narrative. 
Although the body stands as a privileged set of signs, Mortimer believes that 
Amanda disrupts the correspondence between external signs and internal truths. What 
10 Although Ball does not specify the means by which women might "stop" their menstrual flow, it is clear 




Mortimer and others see is both dependable and unreliable-an epistemological crisis. 
They assume that Amanda cannot be trusted, but they also believe that she displays 
dependable signs of such unreliability. The blush encapsulates this apparent paradox. 
Mary Ann 0' Farrell, in Telling Complexions, argues, "The blush can seem... to partake 
of both body and language-supplementing language with an ephemeral materiality-
and novelistic usage would even suggest that, by means of the blush, body and language 
are identical and simultaneous in function and effect" (3-4). In tum, as O'Farrell explains 
in her reading of Pride and Prejudice, "innocence... is compromised by the knowledge 
that raises the blush" (18). When Amanda blushes, Mortimer reads Amanda's body as 
displaying "the glow of shame and guilt" and becomes convinced that Belgrave "was the 
occasion of all the mystery which had appeared in her conduct" (237). Amanda's blush 
marks her countenance with embarrassment, which in tum suggests guilty knowledge. 11 
Mortimer's belief in Amanda's shame and guilt is supported by a cycle of 
evidence that begins with her verbal evasions and continues with her body's language. 
Although it appears as if Mortimer is merely "reading" the signs ofAmanda's illness, he 
is in fact producing those signs. Without his gaze, there would be no blush for him to 
read. By producing the blush, he reproduces common knowledge about women: all 
women would embrace sexual experiences if they could get away with it. Although 
Amanda recognizes that she should be transparent and that Mortimer should be able to 
view her innocent actions, she consistently refuses to disclose all the circumstances in 
II By contrast, Janet Todd argues in Sensibility: An Introduction, that heroines who are women of feeling, 
"convey their virtue through their meaningful bodies, and the most authentic emotions are signaled not by 
words but by tears, blushes, palpitations, and fainting fits" (120). Abbey demonstrates that this equation is 
by no means universal. As I argue, the inability of people to read Amanda's body language-and the 




which she is involved-a decision that she makes partly in obedience to her father and 
partly according her own moral sense. Caught within an emotional conflict, she blushes 
regularly throughout the novel. Because Amanda appears both innocent and guilty, 
Mortimer's judgment of Amanda's worthiness fluctuates. He frequently changes his mind 
about courting and marrying the heroine, from their earliest encounters to the novel's 
conclusion. 
As he misconstrues Amanda's behavior, Mortimer reflects a deeper problem with 
perception. Although he appears to rely on visuality and the evidence of his senses, 
Mortimer instead relies on cultural asswnptions about women's secrecy: "[H]e had been 
tempted to think she was involved in mystery: and what but impropriety, he thought, 
could occasion mystery" (49). These asswnptions enable him to resolve the conflicting 
signs ofAmanda's body_ Roche critiques Mortimer's dependence on social cues by 
juxtaposing Amanda's moral virtue with his faithless suspicions. Reading the innocent 
heroine as symptomatic ofmoral corruption, Mortimer represents a dominant mode of 
perception. He sees signs that she is virtuous, but he knows that signs can be 
manipulated. Roche hints at the problem: "Lord Mortimer saw Amanda wore (at least) 
the semblance of innocence: but this could not remove his suspicions, so often had he 
seen it asswned to hide the artful stratagems of a depraved heart" (50). As he considers 
her inexplicable actions, the hero dreads "some fatal mystery-some improper 







could avow" (149).12 Even another suitor believes wicked Belgrave's insinuations that 
Amanda has only "a specious appearance of innocence" (221). Their senses are 
unreliable, the novel suggests, because they continue to equate women's secrecy with 
illicit sexuality. 
After he abandons his initial suspicions in the first volume, Mortimer begins to 
hint at a marriage proposal, much to Amanda's delight. However, Fitzalan forbids the 
relationship because Mortimer suggests a clandestine marriage, which Fitzalan believes 
would damage her reputation. Amanda thus struggles to conceal her romantic feelings 
from Mortimer-a simple, rather common, concealment. Yet in the Gothic novel even 
banal interactions become loaded with sinister possibilities. Already under suspicion for 
illicit attachments, Amanda continues to thwart Mortimer's attempts at visual penetration. 
The implications of her secrecy become clear when the two meet at a ball after their 
separation: 
She looked up, and the first eyes she met were those of Lord Mortimer...fastened 
on her face with a scrutinizing earnestness, as if he wished to penetrate the 
recesses ofher heart, and discover whether he yet retained a place in it. She 
blushed, and looking from him perceived she was an object ofcritical attention to 
the marchioness and Lady Euphrasia. (148) 
Their reciprocal gaze has important implications. This scene is, first, a continuation of 
Mortimer's misreading. The tropes ofvision used by Roche here indicate the cognitive 
activity that characterizes perception-Mortimer's eyes fasten, scrutinize, penetrate, and 
12 Interestingly, Mortimer gothicizes Amanda's secrecy. While not used literally, the term "fatal" raises the 
horror of impropriety instead ofdeath, which in Clermont, a more conventional Gothic novel, is a real 
possibility for the heroine. 
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discover. Furthermore, the highly sexualized nature of his gaze correlates to his 
suspicions about her sexuality and to the ways in which he produces the visible signs of 
her guilt. The scene also incorporates the gaze of Amanda's villainous maternal relatives, 
the marchioness and Lady Euphrasia, who wish to discover whether there is an 
attachment between Amanda and Mortimer that would thwart their plans. 13 
Amanda's status as an object of others' gazes reflects the tension between 
objectification and subjectivization within medical discourse. I assert that the ball 
represents a public arena of power in which Amanda operates with notable agency. 
Foucault explains in The Birth ofthe Clinic that the patient, imbedded in a field of visual 
interpretation and power, is subjected to the doctor's articulation of the ill body's 
meaning and his curative abilities. As Roy Porter argues, however, eighteenth-century 
English medicine encompassed a far more fluid set ofpower relations than Foucault's 
model suggests. The practitioner and patient together established a relationship that 
demanded a mutual effort to reach a cure or relief (Patient's Progress 72-95).14 Further, 
as Fissell explains, "For medical practitioners, one of the most significant aspects of [the] 
attention to body surface was the power that it gave to the patient. ... Ifillness' meaning 
were to be read from the body's surface, anyone [including the patient] could be the 
reader" (Fissell 31). Putting Amanda in this framework, we see that she also rejects the 
13 Amanda's maternal relatives, desiring a match between Lady Eupbrasia and Mortimer, suspect his 
attachment to Amanda and determine to discover her feelings. Acting as a spy for the Roslins, Lady 
Greystock carefully observes Amanda: "Delicacy sealed the lips ofAmanda and guarded her secret. ... But 
though she could command her words, she could not her feelings, and they were visibly expressed in her 
countenance" (171). Roche describes the limits of Amanda's concealments in order to show the reader that 
Amanda is not guilty of utter duplicity. 
14 For example, patients could argue with the doctor's diagnosis, disobey his instructions, and refuse to pay 
for unsatisfactory service. More benignly, the patient also controlled the information with which the doctor 
worked by giving him a history of her condition. 
~ 
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objectifying gaze of others. She never remains passively observed and diagnosed, but 
continually works to regulate her appearance, which others read. By hiding her emotion 
from penetrating eyes, whether friend or foe, Amanda exercises the power ofvisuality, 
much like the power a patient exercised in the clinical experience. Relying on her moral 
understanding to resist pressures to reveal her secrets, the heroine also participates in the 
sense of agency that heroines such as Matilda and Laurette demonstrate. There are, 
however, limits to her power, which appear later in the narrative when the villains 
deliberately manipulate appearances against her. 
Because secrecy is such a problem for women, Roche cautiously distinguishes its 
appropriate use. Mortimer, pressing Amanda for a clandestine marriage because his 
father insists on a financially advantageous match with Lady Euphrasia, argues, "The 
peculiar circumstances I have just mentioned will, I trust, induce my Amanda to excuse a 
temporary concealment of it, till beyond the power of mortals to separate us-a private 
and immediate union ... The eye of suspicion has long rested upon us" (211). 
Transferring the suspicious, oppressive gaze to others, Mortimer proposes further 
secrecy. Such concealment, however, repels Amanda. Obeying the "dictates of reason," 
she recognizes that it would be "guilt and misery" to marry clandestinely (212). In this 
instance, Amanda rejects concealment through her rational understanding, providing in 
turn a connection to my previous analysis of moral knowledge. Like the heroines of The 
Castle ofWolfenbach and The Orphan ofthe Rhine, Amanda distinguishes between 
social proprieties and moral duties. Here, the two types of obligation coincide; thus, it 
may be tempting to view Amanda as a figure of the "proper lady." This heroine, however, 
follows a moral order that mayor may not overlap social demands, particularly those of 
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transparency. As Roche once more links concealment to immorality, she clarifies the 
motives that would enable Amanda to embrace secrecy without self-condemnation, the 
true peril for the moral woman. Paradoxically, even Amanda's desire for openness comes 
under suspicion because Mortimer cannot differentiate between the secrecy of a 
clandestine marriage and that of a mysterious past. He believes thatbecause Amanda 
embraces secrecy in the latter instance, she will accept his proposal. Thus her refusal 
generates more misperceptions, leading Mortimer to judge her guilty in the next 
ambiguous situation. 
When Amanda's relatives and Belgrave carefully orchestrate circumstances in 
order to destroy her chances with Mortimer, the narrative shows that Amanda cannot 
control others' perception or interpretation, has no defense against invasion by the 
pathogenic man, and is thus always vulnerable to the suggestion that she is always 
already defiled in some way. First, Amanda unwittingly participates in their plans by 
equivocating in order to conceal an act ofcharity, which she believes would appear 
"ostentatious." Mortimer, who knows she is not telling the complete story, gazes at her 
"with the most scrutinizing earnestness," which causes her to blush and look away (236). 
In concealing her charity, Amanda also hides her reason for staying home from the ball, 
although she promises to tell Mortimer the following day. Far from being comforted, 
Mortimer only believes that she will reveal her guilty association with Belgrave: "He 
began to think her reluctance to a clandestine and immediate marriage might have 
proceeded from some secret attachment" (223). The juxtaposition ofAmanda's charitable 
actions with Mortimer's suspicions creates an even more powerful gap between truth and 






produce knowledge through perception, the novel demonstrates that conflicts between 
different "knowledges" frequently place women at a disadvantage. The devastating 
consequences of visual misinterpretation and differences in understanding, especially for 
women, become increasingly clear in this episode. 
When Amanda is left alone in the house, Belgrave enters unobserved. In a scene 
ofnear-violence and imminent threat, Amanda, feeling "horror and surprise," tries to run 
for the door, but he catches her, and "forcing her back to the sofa, rudely stop [ s] her 
mouth" (240). Her resistance heightens the atmosphere of terror and danger: '''Monster!' 
exclaimed Amanda, beholding him with horror ... 'Cease to torment me,' she continued, 
'lest, in my own defense, I call upon those who have power, as well as inclination, to 
chastise your insolence'" (241). Her attempts to escape only emphasize Belgrave's 
dominance, and she finally begs him to desist, promising to "pardon and conceal what is 
past" (242). The struggle here has physical dimensions-running, touching, grasping, 
seizing-that shows the female body at its most vulnerable. Although he does not rape 
her, Belgrave physically and emotionally torments her. As he invades the physical spaces 
that the heroine occupies, the villain contaminates her, first by assaulting her body and 
second by rendering secrecy her only bargaining tool. Transparency, the social openness 
that should protect her, poses a particularly gendered threat when Amanda offers her 
silence for safety, which she values more than potential misinterpretation of conduct. 15 
15 When Amanda demands an "immediate inquiry" so that a "full discovery" might be made, the marquis 
refuses: "Had not Colonel Belgrave been voluntarily admitted he never would have been concealed; no, 
madam, you would have rejoiced at the opportunity our presence gave you of punishing his temerity" 





The danger changes when Amanda's scheming relatives and Mortimer arrive 
home early. The threat of physical violence dissipates, while the threat to Amanda's 
reputation intensifies. Having contaminated the heroine with the possibility of moral 
"disease," Belgrave now imperils her relationship with Mortimer. Although openness 
should make Amanda less susceptible to Belgrave's infectious presence, instead it makes 
her more so. She instantly recognizes that all the circumstances leading to that moment 
would confirm in everyone's mind her guilt and complicity. Although the consequences 
of Belgrave's presence in the house might have been the same in either case, Amanda's 
decision to hide Belgrave in a closet becomes damning evidence against her. The moment 
of revelation contains all the emotional extravagance of any supernatural Gothic scene: 
At the mention of the closet, the blood ran cold through the veins of Amanda; but 
when she saw Lady Euphrasia rise to enter it, had death, in its most frightful form, 
stared in her in the face, she could not have betrayed more horror. She looked 
toward it with a countenance as expressive of wild affright as Macbeth's when 
viewing the chair on which the specter of the murdered Banquo sat. (244) 
At once theatrical and physical, the heroine's reaction corresponds to the model of 
emotionality that I explored through The Mysteries ofUdolpho. Amanda feels the 
affective, bodily effects of danger as Roche takes the ghostly aspects of the Gothic and 
turns them, as well as the emotional response, into realistic threats. Drawing on the horror 
and terror of the supernatural, Roche makes the consequences of Belgrave's intrusion and 
Amanda's secrecy all the more significant. In this particularly Gothi'cized moment, 
destroyed reputations and death are conflated in ways that rape and death are not. That is, 




consequence, the villain's association with the deadly "illness" that Mortimer believes 
marks Amanda's body becomes even more pronounced. 
Amanda's "symptoms" are equivocal rather than clear. When Belgrave kidnaps 
the much-tormented heroine on her way to rejoin her father, Mortimer observes Amanda 
in the carriage, "reclining on the bosom of Belgrave" (256). The devastated Mortimer 
resigns all hopes of reconciliation. What Mortimer sees, however, is Amanda in a faint. 
Mortimer reads what he needs to read in order to reduce Amanda to his image of 
women's sexuality and secrecy. The equivocal nature of signs becomes an important part 
ofAm'Ulda's argument against Mortimer's problematic perception. When the plucky 
heroine escapes from Belgrave, she returns to her father only in time to witness his death. 
Alone and violently ill, Amanda finds refuge in a convent, where Mortimer offers 
Amanda financial assistance but not marriage. 
Their encounter at this point enables Amanda to defend herself more fully. 
Amanda first tells Mortimer, "You shake your head, as much as to say you cannot think 
me [innocent], after the proofs you have seen to the contrary." She declares that his 
experience of the situation had been manipulated: "[T]he proofs were contrived by malice 
and treachery, to ruin me in the estimation ofmy friends, and by perfidy to force me into 
a crime of which I already bear the appearance and the stigma" (288). The evidence of 
Mortimer's senses is ultimately unreliable because Amanda's enemies have constructed 
false appearances and also because he is unable to control his passionate responses. His 
perception, conditioned by her "appearance," is flawed. The novel demonstrates that 
there is a truth to be grasped, perceived, and known, but constructions of perception 




others through a sense of morality, individual integrity. Her "semblance of innocence" is, 
in fact, no semblance at all, since she attempts to display her virtue with utmost 
transparency and honesty. Nevertheless, she often conceals various experiences and, at 
times, even her social identity. 
As Amanda insists on her innocence, Mortimer exclaims, "[Y]ou would almost 
convince me against the evidence of my own senses." This statement signals the crucial 
problem for others who see the virtuous woman incorrectly, as well as the conflict that 
"interested" parties might experience. First, Mortimer identifies his own senses as 
uniquely individualized: they belong to him as property, and they provide a unique locus 
ofknowledge. The basis of knowledge is the particular individual through the physical 
senses, and then through cognitive perception. Also, he separates himself ("me") from his 
senses, as ifhis consciousness or self were unattached to his sensuous experiences. 
Finally, Mortimer also indicates a kind of disinterested objectivity. He depends on his 
own senses as deeply reliable, scientifically verifiable, and objectively true. 
Amanda, however, challenges this self-conception. She replies to his comment, "I 
see, my lord, you are determined to disbelieve me. But why, since so prejudiced against 
me, have you come hither?" (288). The novel's most important critique comes through 
this pointed question. Significantly, Mortimer's inability to "read" Amanda properly 
stems in part from his previous experiences, described by the narrator as "prejudice." The 
problem is that Mortimer's experience has shown him how little the body is to be trusted; 
however, he still depends on Amanda's body to reveal truth. Attempting to deploy a 
disinterested, almost scientific, gaze in his encounter with Amanda, Mortimer 
corresponds with medical discourse's objective aims. Nevertheless, the heroine 
.II 
161 
recognizes that Mortimer works from an assumption of guilt based on her secrecy and 
from manipulated appearance. Furthermore, she asserts that prejudices have no place in 
his "objective" inquiry into her guilt. His powerful position undermined, Mortimer finally 
concedes: "I do not, 1 cannot believe you would deceive me. There is an irresistible 
eloquence in your words that convinces me you have been the victim of treachery, and 1 
its dupe." Mortimer is finally "convinced" only through an act of his own will rather than 
through his senses, which have told him that the object of his affection is not purely his. 
Amanda acknowledges that he only acts from love: ''Notwithstanding appearances were 
so much against her, he was willing to rely solely on her own asseveration of innocence," 
and she tells him, "I can scarcely wonder at your entertaining [suspicions] when 1 reflect 
on the different situations in which 1 was found" (289). She then proceeds to tell him her 
entire story, which supports his act of will-albeit on most tenuous grounds as 
subsequent events later prove. 
Mortimer continues to attempt to generate certainty through external proofs. With 
new-found conviction, Mortimer searches out all the servants and lower-class people 
involved in the plot against Amanda. He questions each and puts their confessions in 
writing. Having assembled evidence that proves Amanda's innocence, he returns to her 
and insists that her reputation is cleared through incontrovertible proofs. At this point, 
corroborating evidence allows him to believe her without hesitation. Mortimer's efforts 
should create verifiable truth, but Roche complicates such activity. As Fissell notes, 
"[D]irect experience, often tainted by superstition, had to be replaced by controlled and 
progressive experience characterized by rationality" (184). Manipulated once before, the 
hero knows that evidence can be fabricated; thus, his conclusions only weakly convince 
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. him. In this manner, he can depend on his own senses, yet abandon the evidence when it 
no longer suits his notion of Amanda's sexual purity. 
The narrative trajectory parallels a scientific mode of inquiry: hypothesis, 
evidence, and conclusions. But Roche continues the novel for another volume by 
introducing a fresh threat. As Amanda and Mortimer make wedding plans with Lord 
Cherbury's blessing, Belgrave's threats seem entirely dissipated. This also seems to be 
the end of the narrative trajectory: the happy couple prepares to live happily ever after. 
Mortimer, having gathered proof of his beloved's innocence, enjoys the certainty that 
Amanda's mysteries are solved. However, the night before the wedding, Cherbury 
privately reveals to Amanda his sordid tale of greed, self-indulgence, and deception. 
Cherbury explains to Amanda that he had embezzled an inheritance entrusted to him and 
that, should his crime become public, he would have no choice but suicide. Since 
Cherbury's only hope is his son's marrying an heiress, he entreats Amanda to leave 
Mortimer immediately and secretly. Horrified at his unsolicited disclosure and the threat 
ofsuicide, Amanda most unwillingly agrees to relinquish Mortimer and to keep 
Cherbury's secret. Attributing the situation in part to fate, Amanda also observes, "I am 
completely the victim of Lord Cherbury-the cruel, perfidious Cherbury." She considers 
ways in which she can "clear herself of an imaginary crime," but concludes that she 
would only "commit a real one-since to save her own character Lord Cherbury's must 
be stigmatized." Ultimately, Amanda chooses to "save" Cherbury because "not only by 







Amanda's response is intriguing. Here, Amanda's moral sense, her desire to 
follow her conscience, and her reliance on principles of natural law become most clear. 
Roche indicates that, for the heroine, following her conscience is more important than the 
transparency demanded by others. This is a kind of self-determination, yet it also 
involves sacrifice and suffering. Thus, Roche writes a scathing indictment of Cherbury' s 
manipulation and blackmail. Roche further demonstrates that Amanda's secrecy will 
again lead her betrothed to judge her actions morally criminal. Later, when Cherbury 
writes to thank her, Amanda remarks on his unworthiness of her sacrifice. She calls him 
an "[u]nfeeling man," whose "ostentatious gratitude" disgusts her and "whose treachery 
and vile deceit have ruined [her] happiness" (357). By obeying her conscience, Roche's 
heroine exhibits self-determination and autonomy. Conscience is shorthand for the 
system ofvalues, beliefs, and convictions that Amanda perceives to be her "self." And 
she will not violate her conscience-her "self"-for anyone, even the much-beloved 
Mortimer, who does not trust her motives. Amanda instead follows the law of nature 
mapped out in Gothic novels such as Wolfonbach and Orphan, refusing to preserve her 
romantic relationship at the expense ofhuman life, even a human as worthless as 
Cherbury. Such considerations place Amanda above any social dictates that would cost 
her moral self-approbation. This complication forces Mortimer to reevaluate his 
conclusions in an endless spiral ofevidence and interpretation. What else can he believe 
but that she is criminally unfaithful? Based on earlier experience, he could conclude that 
appearances have been contrived, that the same outside force has compelled Amanda to 
behave so mysteriously. Yet her fiance asserts that she is "the slave, the prey of vice" and 




Months later, when Amanda again encounters her beloved, she experiences a new 
crisis. First, Roche suggests that the conflation of seeming and being is a real danger for 
women. When Mortimer and his party enter the room, she worries about her expressive 
countenance: "Oh! Let me not by my confusion look as if I really was the guilty thing I 
am supposed to be" (403). Nevertheless, she is noticeably timid, trembling, and agitated. 
Amanda responds emotionally to this epistemological problem. Before, when Belgrave 
appears from the closet, the heroine also experiences a sense ofcomplicity, but here she 
appro~ches the problem in a different way. 
Second, Roche complicates Amanda's perception of herself as she sees herself 
through others' eyes, which "she most dreaded to encounter" (403): "She now, for the 
first time, considered the strange appearance she must make among the company, if she 
did not collect and compose her spirits" (404). Amanda understands that others' 
perception ofher appearance has the force of reality. Her manner and expressions reflect 
her worry that she will appear guilty, which in tum confirms the suspicions that she fears. 
Introduced by her assumed name, Amanda hears "how sad a confirmation did it 
convey-that every suspicion would now be strengthened" (403). She upbraids herself, 
"Ah! why, why ... was I tempted to take this hated name? Why did I not prefer incurring 
any danger to which my own might have exposed me, rather than assume anything like 
deceit?" (403). Danger, the reason for her secrecy, at last fails to justify it. Instead, 
Amanda begins to doubt her actions. She fears that appearances rather than motives or 
beliefs can create reality, that she is indeed guilty because she appears so. In this moment 
of doubt Roche makes Amanda a complex character, replacing the simple pattern of 






perception of her-and who comes out with a renewed commitment to her own 
conscIence. 
Nevertheless, as Roche illustrates, the consequences are difficult to bear. Amanda 
is "anxious to do anything which could keep her from encountering the eyes that she 
dreaded" (406). Repeating this phrase, Roche emphasizes the invasive, shaming function 
of the gaze. Although in other passages she celebrates Amanda's valiant martyrdom, 
Roche also acknowledges that rejecting social approbation is a painful experience. The 
narrator notes, "Oh! how forcibly was Amanda ... convinced, if indeed her pure soul 
wanted such conviction, of the pain, the shame of deception, let the motive be what it 
may which prompts it" (405). The heroine, however, does not divulge her secrets and 
returns to London to claim her inheritance, which exposes her to Belgrave for the fmal 
time. Belgrave discovers her identity and turns her acquaintances against her. She is in 
the most perilous and vulnerable state at the end. Then all is resolved-quickly and 
'~ 
I easily. Once turned out of her lodgings, Amanda wanders in the streets, where a friend 
tl~I 
.~ finds and rescues her. She awakens from a fever to find Mortimer, sorrowful and 
j:1 
~ 
~: apologetic, at her side. The resolution to her dilemmas occurs in a narrative flashback. 
Mortimer learns of Amanda's sacrifice from his repentant father, and several of the 
I villains die through accident and illness. Restored to inheritance along with her brother, Amanda confidently marries Mortimer. 
Ii 
.~ The romantic ending, however, seems oddly unstable because Mortimer never 
develops unwavering trust in Amanda's innocence and virtue. He remains trapped in a 
mode of perception that always assumes women's unruliness. In tum, Amanda's rejection 




values. Thwarting the gaze of others, Amanda relies on a sense of personal justice that 
validates her secrecy. As the reader knows, Amanda is virtuous, innocent, and brave. 
Roche creates a sympathetic bond between the reader and heroine, which in turn, 
generates a new problem. The reader, typically represented as a young, middle class 
woman,16 shares Amanda's secrets and her innocence. However, Mortimer's suspicions 
of "guilty knowledge" also become a part of the reader's experience. The reader's 
sympathy for Amanda places her (or him) in a precarious position of identification-and 
encourages a similar subversion of social transparency. As Roche subverts Mortimer's 
gaze, perception, and interpretation, she also critiques the cultural gaze that demands 
virtue on display. Although the power deployed by perception is significant, Roche 
destabilizes the certainty and thus the power of the external gaze. Since women's secrecy 
is often associated with sexuality, Roche illustrates the potential dangers and 
complications of Amanda's choices. Ultimately, however, Roche neutralizes the romantic 
and sexual dangers, supplying instead a self-assured, vindicated heroine who is rewarded 
with marriage and inheritance. 
Legal Perception and the Juridical Gaze in Clermont 
In my analysis of Clermont I continue to examine the cultural concern with 
perception, turning to legal discourse in order to map out a separate, though related, set of-
problems. Like The Children ofthe Abbey, this novel demonstrates the dangerous 
potential of secrecy. Although Madeline Clermont also decides to keep secrets for others, 
16 See Jacqueline Pearson's Women's Reading in Britain, 1750-1835: A Dangerous Recreation. Pearson 
documents cultural anxieties over women's reading, although men also read romance novels (cf. 






however, Roche focuses more on the discoveries of this intently curious, perceptive 
heroine rather than on her concealments. This change in focus has two effects. First, 
Madeline serves as the subject rather than the object of observation in most scenes. In 
consequence, she does not experience the same struggle to resist the oppressive gaze of 
others. Second, Madeline's discoveries draw attention to the problem of crime that 
structures the Gothic genre. Addressing legal crimes more than moral transgressions, 
Clermont shifts the problem (and power) of perception to the juridical gaze. Surrounded 
by mystery, Madeline continually interprets potentially meaningful signs in order to 
understand her own place in the world, yet her perceptual assumptions are not 
conditioned, as are Mortimer's, by the physical evidence of her senses. Instead, she 
processes what she sees through a sense ofjustice, obligation, and rationality. 
In Clermont the juridical gaze structures the heroine's first articulations of guilt 
and innocence. A self-policing subject, Madeline Clermont also appears to be a docile 
body, ready to recognize and condemn her own illicit desires. I argue that this 
internalized gaze has a surprising corollary. Because Madeline has a "natural" ability to 
judge her own behavior, she has the authority to judge others. The internal gaze moves 
outward as Madeline experiences the mysteries and terrors that others' secrets have 
created. She finds herself involved in a number of threatening, mysterious events and 
becomes an instinctive if reluctant detective. Her intelligence and curiosity, however 
disciplined and docile, enable her to penetrate such mysteries. Uncovering others' secrets, 
sometimes purposely and sometimes inadvertently, Madeline must make the choice 
whether or not to keep those secrets. Her decisions ultimately reflect her complex 




The novel begins with a typical pastoral scene. Madeline lives in a rustic 
mountain cottage with her father, whose mysterious and painful past piques Madeline's 
curiosity and her compassion. The narrative tension, for the first several chapters, comes 
from Clermont's secrets, which generate Madeline's internal conflict. Initially, she 
demonstrates curiosity about her father's sadness and reluctance to discuss his past. As 
the plot develops, the heroine realizes that Clermont's history includes violent crimes. 
Finally, she learns that her father murdered his half-brother. 17 Throughout the novel, 
however, paternal authority inhibits Madeline's perception, adding another layer of 
power to the already problematic nature of the female gaze. In Abbey, the exchange of 
looks and glances occurrs mainly among lovers and enemies. In Clermont, Roche uses 
the father-daughter relationship to work through the implications of the female gaze. To 
begin with, Madeline suffers guilt when she considers spying on Clermont. Also, she 
listens to his stories with a mixture of skepticism and belief. Futhermore, she is 
blackmailed with the "truth" of his past. Finally, she chooses to hide his crimes, even 
fearing the "agents ofjustice" that the wicked d'Alemberts call on to punish Clermont. 
Early in the novel, Madeline attempts to suppress her desire to discover 
Clermont's past, yet she contemplates actions that provoke guilt and self-punishment. 
When an old acquaintance of Clermont's, Countess Merville, accidentally comes across 
their cottage, Madeline's curiosity leads her nearly to eavesdrop on her father's (rather 
17ln a [mal twist, the reader learns that Clennont did not kill his brother, although he did attempt murder. 
After Clennont stabbed Phillipe, the villainous D'Alembert finished the crime. Thus, Clennont believes 
(until the last scene of the novel) that he is a murderer, and this is the secret he attempts to hide from his 
daughter. Clennont's self-identification as a criminal is a crucial difference between Clermont and 
Udolpho, in which Emily also suspects her father ofa "crime" (adultery). In Clermont Madeline's 
suspicions coincide with her father's (false) beliefs about his past. Further, although she too polices her 







suspicious) pre-dawn rendezvous with Merville. After momentarily considering this 
possibility, Madeline thinks, "Fie, fie, Madeline, what a wretch art thou! how unworthy 
ofhis goodness! [ ...] I am resolved I will punish myself for it; henceforward I'll never 
express the smallest curiosity to be acquainted with his affairs" (30). The narrator 
comments, "Oh, Innocence! first of blessings! how tasteless without thee would all the 
pleasures of life appear to a heart of sensibility!" (30-31). Although guilt and innocence 
are not exclusively juridical, these feelings have a clear link to natural law, which 
emphasizes moral sensitivity, as well as to postmodern constructions ofjuridical 
subj ectivity. Roche creates a heroine who has no need for an external judge because she 
is a self-regulating, self-punishing subject. In this moment, Madeline splits herself in two: 
the guilty self that has transgressed moral boundaries and the lawful self that functions as 
the "internal spectator." 
As Adam Smith explains in The Theory ofMoral Sentiments (1759), self-
approbation can come only through viewing one's actions as an "impartial spectator": 
The man who has broke thro' all those measures of conduct, which can alone 
render him agreeable to mankind, tho' he should have the most perfect assurance 
that what he had done was forever to be concealed from human eye, it is all to no 
purpose. When he looks back upon it, and views it in the light in which the 
impartial spectator would view it. .. [he] is abashed and confounded ... and 
necessarily feels a very high degree of that shame which he would be exposed to, 
if his actions should ever come to be generally known. (251) 
By imagining an external viewer, Smith explains, the moral individual can guide his own 




completely into another's emotional or physical state, to make his claims about the nature 
of human morality. In his discussion of Smith, John Bender states, "The breath of 
sympathy animates the whole system, which always remains, fundamentally, a matter of 
self-judgment and self-inflicted punishment" (223). Bender argues that the penitentiary 
operated along similar lines, yet more effectively and with a wider scope: 
Citizens at large function, in imagination, as the beholders of penitentiary 
punishment, picturing themselves at once as the objects of supervision and as 
impartial spectators enforcing refonnation of character on the isolated other. The 
essence of the Panopticon lies, as with Smith's impartial spectator, in its 
construction of an impersonal beholder .... [I]nspection is not so much a physical 
condition as a way of living in a transparent world. (228) 
Focusing on legal technologies of discipline, Bender argues that the reciprocal gaze 
within the penitentiary spread into the cultural imagination and provided a powerful 
incentive to regulate one's own behavior. 
Although Foucault and Bender identify the juridical gaze with penitentiary 
structures, eighteenth-century laws regulating evidence also suggest a way of seeing and 
explaining others' actions. In The Law ofEvidence (1795-96), Sir Geoffrey Gilbert 
explains that evidence must be judged according to a scale of probability. Careful and 
impartial perception can generate "legal certainty." The "degrees of evidence" range from 
"perfect Certainty and Demonstration, quite down to Improbability and unlikeliness; even 
to the Confines of impossibility" (56). Gilbert also asserts, "All Certainty is a clear and 
distinct Perception: and all clear and distinct Perceptions depend upon a Man's own 




events that jurists can evaluate: "[W]hen we cannot see or hear any thing ourselves, and 
yet are obliged to make a judgment of it, we must see and hear by Report from others: 
which is one step farther from Demonstration, which is founded upon the View of our 
own Senses" (58). Testimony concentrated on first-hand, eyewitness accounts and 
illustrated that every person could be a potential witness. Gazing, observing, and 
perceiving, witnesses provided important evidence in law. Although Gilbert asserts that 
the best witness is not materially involved, he does state, "[T]he [injured] Party may be a 
Witness, where there is a Fine to the King, and no private Advantage arising to himself, 
'immediately or consequentially,' from the Prosecution," but not if the party would 
receive "private Benefit" from the case (215). Thus, criminal cases allowed injured 
parties to testify for themselves. 
Gilbert raises significant issues in this passage. First, his explanation that the ideal 
witness is impartial sets up a dichotomy between private interestedness and public 
disinterestedness, which supplements the impartial spectator theory articulated by Smith 
and referred to by Bender. Not swayed by self-interest, the private citizen can support 
civil society, as well as the legal system. Although a crucial part of the judicial system, 
however, the witness also becomes an unstable aspect because the nature ofperception­
always biased, always interpretive-renders the gaze imprecise. Gilbert notes, "The first 
and lowest Proof, is the Oath of one Witness only ... Now that which sets aside his 
Credit, and overthrows his Testimony, is the Incredibility of the Fact, and this 
Repugnancy ofhis Evidence: for if the Fact be contrary to all manner of experience and 
observation, it is too much to receive it upon the Oath of one Witness" (257). Legal 




uncertain--even while it must be definitive, believable, reliable. One way out of this 
conundrum is the presence of others, of corroborating evidence: "The Second Degree of 
Credibility, is from the Oaths of two several Witnesses" (258). Because credible, 
impartial witnesses enable the legal system to operate within degrees of certainty, 
surveillance of others becomes a social, legal, and moral imperative. Indeed, as Henry 
Tilney states in Northanger Abbey "every man is surrounded by a neighbourhood of 
voluntary spies" in England (156). 
This policing gaze, however, is more problematic for women, as the novel 
demonstrates. Madeline is the perfect juridical subject, one who can imagine the 
guiltiness ofher future actions and who feels remorse before she even commits 
transgressions. Seeing herself through the eyes of the other, she responds properly to 
private, illicit temptations with an open display of repentance. After confessing to 
Clermont her momentary weakness, Madeline receives a stern warning not to attempt to 
penetrate the mysteries ofhis life. He intones, 
"[J]udge of the horrors which ever attend misconduct, and strive to avoid them by 
ever resisting inclinations that side not with your duties: to oppose our passions, is 
finally to conquer them [ ...] and no victory can be so glorious as one obtained 
over them; 'tis applauded by our reason, sanctioned by our conscience, and 






For Clermont, the internal gaze is reason and conscience, which will enable Madeline to 
behave properly. The external gaze is God, who will reward Madeline's virtue. 18 Roche 
also introduces Gothic emotion, horror, into what seems a fairly tame incident. 
Significantly, Clermont warns his daughter about the dangers of seeking 
forbidden knowledge-not, as one would expect, about the dangers of emotional excess 
that supposedly accompanies sensibility. Her "passions" and "inclinations" are simply 
curiosity, intelligence, and desire for information about her father's past. In Anthony 
MandaI's analysis, however, sensibility and emotion continue to dominate the heroine's 
characterization: "The essential difference between Udolpho and Clermont is that the 
sentimental preponderances of the Rochean heroine are not perceived to be dangerous or 
excessive in any way.,,19 MandaI's observation, while somewhat useful, ignores the 
difference in the heroines' fathers, which in turn differentiates the dangers that their 
daughters face. For Madeline, intelligence is potentially far more dangerous than 
sentimentality because her discovery of her father's criminal past, as I will explore, 
initiates a nearly unbearable conflict between familial interests and juridical obligation. 
Emily, on the other hand, cannot find her father guilty of any crime and thus can remain 
the obedient daughter. Because Roche shifts the source of danger from emotion to 
intellect, we get a novel that explores the conflict between sentiment and reason in its 
juridical dimensions. Although Madeline's early perfections appear to leave no room for 
18 Bender writes, "Formal institutions merely enforce and regulate the juridical construction of self as the 
focal point of inspection by a potentially infinite number of imagined spectators" (223). Interestingly, 
Clermont's pastoral beginning, similar to that of many Gothic novels, eliminates the "formal institutions" 
and numerous spectators. Roche then replaces social inspection with a divine witness. 
19 Anthony MandaI. "Revising the Radcliffean Model: Regina Maria Roche's Clermont and Jane Austen's 
Northanger Abbey", CardiffCorvey: Reading the Romantic Text 3 (September 1999). Online: Internet 




growth, Roche changes the implications of Madeline's self-discipline by introducing 
Gothic horrors. What becomes increasingly clear is that the second aspect of the gaze­
policing others-has a crucial but complicated place in Madeline's experience. 
Through her experiences with de Sevignie, the sensitive young man with whom 
she falls in love, Madeline learns that she should uncover certain mysteries, and 
subsequently, she learns to deploy the external gaze, to act as a judging spectator. Briefly 
introduced at the beginning, the secretive suitor provides a counterpart to Clermont's 
reticence. When Clermont makes inquiries about his background and family, de Sevignie 
departs abruptly from their home, leaving Madeline sad and wan. After Clermont sends 
her to live with the wealthy Countess Merville, whom she comes to regard as a mother, 
de Sevignie returns to the narrative. To Madeline's dismay, their reunion is marred by his 
strange reserve and by his inexplicable responses. In one encounter impassioned and 
adoring, in another cold and formal; de Sevignie provides yet another mystery to unravel. 
Madeline surmises that her beloved might have financial embarrassments that prevent the 
match, a supposition she mentions to the Countess. Recognizing that poverty can be a 
barrier to marriage, Countess Merville explains her intention to leave Madeline a 
settlement generous enough for a comfortable living. De Sevignie's odd behavior, 
however, demands an explanation. She counsels Madeline: 
"Inform him then [ ...] that you have made me your confidant, also what I said 
concerning him, and my intentions; if he can give the required explanation; but 
remember Madeline, you tell·him, that it must be an explanation so clear,--so full, 






mysterious is fully elucidated, Madeline Clennont and he, must in future be 
strangers to each other" (104). 
Encouraging Madeline's curiosity and reasoning, Merville authorizes, even insists upon, 
Madeline's active attempts to uncover de Sevignie's secrets. Unable to bear her scrutiny, 
de Sevignie leaves without explanation once more?O Madeline, confused and unhappy, 
agrees with the Countess that full disclosure alone would have enabled their romance to 
continue. 
As in Abbey, mystery implies guilt or impropriety and creates a barrier to 
romance. In Clermont the hero rather than the heroine must remain open to the gaze of 
society (even a society as small as an intimate family circle), yet this gender inversion 
does not disrupt the need for social transparency, which enables romantic relationships to 
flourish. What does change is the nature of the heroine's gaze. Although Madeline 
observes, speculates, and reasons in order to understand de Sevignie, she does not read 
her beloved's body for signs of truth. She notices a shift in behavior, but his body does 
not come within her probing looks. In turn, the assumption of sexual secrets simply does 
not exist in Madeline's inquisitive gaze. The novel carves out a powerful space for the 
heroine who, instead of replicating social assumptions, deploys visual perception to 
uphold her understanding of moral obligations. 
The inversion of gender matters much less than the positioning of authority within 
the mysterious relationship. For Madeline, her father's opacity is inviolable because of 
parental authority-a lesson she seems to know from the beginning of the narrative. The 
20 Ultimately Madeline's conclusions prove correct: her suitor was ashamed of his relative poverty. As the 




mysteries of her beloved, however, command no such compliance. This easy dichotomy 
between parent and suitor becomes complicated as Madeline is exposed to crimes. When 
Merville is murdered, Roche instigates a crisis in Madeline's understanding of 
transparency, which she continues when Madeline hears about her grandmother's 
experiences. Madeline learns that victimized women experience intense conflict when 
faced with the contradictions between public demands and private interests. Countess 
Merville and Madeline's grandmother provide Madeline with models offeminine 
responses to personal violations that enable her to develop her own stance regarding her 
father's crime, which eventually becomes a central struggle for Madeline. 
In an explicitly violent scene, Madeline and the servant Agatha find the 
Countess, already suffering from a terminal illness, stabbed in a nearby monastery. 
While bleeding on the floor of the chapel, the Countess swears Madeline and Agatha to 
silence about the crime and the perpetrator. 
"Dearly shall he, who raised that hand against you, rue his crime," exclaimed 
Agatha; "I know the villain-I discovered his accursed confidant near the chapel, 
and 1 will bring him to punishment, though my own life should be forfeited by 
doing so." 
"Mistaken woman," said the Countess in a hollow voice, "how would you avenge 
me? is it by exposing to infamy and death those more precious to me than life­
by giving to my heart a deeper wound than my body has sustained?" 
"This spot 1 will not quit!-no aid will 1 receive-on this cold marble will 1 die­
except you promise to give up such an intention--except you swear, solemnly 
.... 





Taken back to her home, the Countess slowly declines and eventually dies on a wildly 
stormy night. It is my claim that the juridical gaze should work well here. According to 
Gilbert's Laws ofEvidence, Agatha's eyewitness account would provide substantial 
evidence to convict the criminal, even if her testimony would not offer the highest degree 
of certainty. In addition, the dead victim's testimony, to which both Agatha and Madeline 
could attest, would provide significant proofs. Positive law also demands, as a civic duty, 
the exposure of homicides. Blackstone argues that crimes such as murder are not 
"confined to individuals only," but are instead "of much more extensive consequence" 
(4.176). They violate not only the law ofnature but also "the public peace"; furthermore, 
"by their example and evil tendency they threaten and endanger the subversion of all civil 
society" (4.176). By abandoning realistic legal obligations, Roche's fantastic plot twist 
exposes the vexed relationship betweenjustice and family in women's lives, a tension 
that Madeline acutely experiences at the novel's conclusion. 
At first glance, Countess Merville denies her family and herself the justice that 
crime demands. She creates a mystery where apparently none need exist. Although she 
earlier indicates that transparency is desirable, here Countess Merville demands secrecy. 
Indeed, she describes the exposure necessary for legal punishments as deeply harmful. 
For Merville, then, private interests take precedence over public law. The Gothic impulse 
to privacy and isolation, so often represented in the remote, exotic settings, is especially 
powerful in this scene. The Countess refers to a personal economy ofjustice as she 
rejects the transparency of law and its mechanisms (such as arrest, trial, and execution). 
Later in the narrative, the reader discovers that the Countess's son-in-law murdered her. 




daughter. Knowing that her son-in-law is motivated by inheritance, the Countess 
correctly assumes that her daughter's life would be endangered by D'Alembert ifhe were 
exposed as a murderer. Until this revelation occurs, however, Madeline (as well as the 
reader) only knows that secrecy, even for capital crimes, can be necessary or desirable. 
She learns that secrecy is a choice, even if the motives for it remain unclear. Now a 
witness to an actual crime, though ignorant ofthe perpetrator, Madeline chooses to hide it 
at the request of Merville, taking an oath that she holds more sacred than the obligations 
ofpositive law. 
Roche creates a trangressive fantasy: justice, or at least the relationship of women 
to positive law, can be determined by women's individual choices. Here the Countess 
insists that her murder is her own to conceal or disclose as she sees fit. She exercises 
power over her property in herself by choosing how violations of that property will be 
handled. Rejecting the openness that will endanger her daughter, the Countess relies on 
her own values and on a sense ofjustice to her family. Merville's decision indicates a 
moment ofpower and choice, which is fascinating since it is also a moment of intense 
"violent vulnerability" (Bruhm 1). At the very moment that her daughter's husband 
violates her body by piercing it with a dagger (a sexualized image that emphasizes 
masculine forms of domination), she also exercises much power over the way in which 
that violation will be handled. Although Diane Hoeveler argues that Gothic writers 
depended on a kind of victim feminism, this scene does not show a woman who acquires 
a special sense of self through her victim status. Instead, Merville demonstrates female 
power in the face of, or in spite of, victimization. Although women's choices are 






affective relations, Roche nevertheless creates a female character that is not defined by 
vulnerability or violation: Merville remains in control of herself and her family 
relationships. 
The sense that women must control family, and thus legal, relationships continues 
in the tale of Madeline's grandmother. From Clermont, Madeline learns of a family 
history marred by deceit, crime, and passion, which provides the heroine with another 
important example of feminine response to moral and legal crimes. In particular, she 
learns how legal transparency protects women and how certain private demands might 
hamper or compel such transparency. The grandmother, Madeline St. Foix, had agreed to 
marry her beloved in secret to protect his future inheritance, yet after the birth of 
Clermont, St. Julian coldly informed his wife that he intended to abandon her and deny 
their marriage. He warned, "Madeline ...be wise, nor mar my good intentions towards 
you by useless endeavours to support claims, which I am determined to deny; 'tis 
impossible, you know, for you to prove your marriage; there were, you may recollect, no 
witnesses to it, and with the name of the priest who performed the ceremony you are 
unacquainted" (226, my italics). 
Through this tale, Roche invokes the gaze of society and law. In particular, she 
alludes to the Marriage Act of 1753, which was designed to protect women, particularly 
heiresses, from seduction and inappropriate marriages.21 In a significant move towards 
social transparency, The Act for the Better Preventing of Clandestine Marriages, 
commonly referred to as the Marriage Act, stipulated that banns must be "published in an 
21 As I will explore more fully in the next chapter, this purpose was highly contested by many critics, who 




audible manner" in a church or chapel for three Sundays precedin'g the marriage (469). A 
week before the ceremony the minister must have written notice of the names and 
residence of the parties. Marriages in which either party is under twenty-one years old 
were considered void, unless the parent or guardian publicly agreed to the union. 
Licenses were also restricted: only persons who resided in a parish for four weeks or 
more could be granted a marriage license. The Act significantly curtailed the authority of 
ecclesiastical courts in marriage matter~; they could no longer "compel a Celebration of 
any Marriage ... by reason ofany Contract of Marriage whatsoever" (476) Yet the 
marriages had to be performed in a church, which was required to maintain public parish 
books of all unions. Most importantly, the Act required two witnesses besides the 
minister, "in order to preserve the Evidence of Marriage, and to make the Proof thereof 
more certain and easy" (477). While the Act simply enforced rules that had been on the 
law books for centuries, it was an important move toward putting marriage on display as 
a public transaction, under the scrutiny ofpublic gaze. 
The problem raised by Gilbert in his Law ofEvidence finds dramatic expression 
in this scene. Although Madeline St. Foix can generate "clear and distinct perception" for 
herself, she cannot provide a verifiable report that will satisfy others' need for certainty. 
Furthermore, Madeline appears to seek "private benefit," another condition that, 
according to Gilbert, renders a witness less reliable. Thwarted by evidentiary assumptions 
and her faithless husband's insinuations, Madeline's attempts to claim her rightful 
position as his wife fail miserably. As others unjustly assume her mercenary motives, this 
wronged woman experiences an internal conflict. In the letter, Madeline tells her son, 








Julian, beloved, though perjured from every mortal eye, I would have concealed those 
crimes, had not justice to your child compelled me to disclose them" (231). The conflict 
that Madeline experiences initially appears to be between justice and family. Madeline 
would have perjured herself, making herself into an unlawful subject by admitting that 
her marriage was void, in order to conceal his crime. Yet the obligations of natural law-
that is, providing for one's child-undennine Madeline's romantic desire to conceal her 
husband's crimes toward herself. As Madeline St. Foix follows the law ofnature, she 
collapses the divide between public and private spheres: justice, a supposedly public 
virtue, becomes intensely personal with the introduction of a beloved infant. For these 
Gothic women, justice is always relational, linking self and other in a moral framework. 
TIrrough the story of her grandmother, Madeline learns that women can demand 
restitution or conceal crime, according to a personal measure ofjustice. These women 
conceal crimes or neglect to punish their oppressors when it serves the needs of a 
precious "other." 
In both Abbey and Clermont Roche gestures to the Marriage Act to limit her 
authorization of secrecy, yet the narratives always threaten to break down the cultural 
gaze as they depict women's ability to maintain moral integrity while keeping secrets. 
Because secrecy implies illicit or dangerous knowledge, however, the narrative must 
address this issue. When Clennont explains, "I carefully concealed my story from you, 
well knowing from your sensibility the pain you would feel if acquainted with my 
injuries" (242), he presents a paternalistic view of women's knowledge, in which women 
are too fragile, too emotional, to handle disturbing truths. Clennont's reference to 




renders women particularly susceptible to tales ofwoe (Bruhm 88). Furthermore, his 
excuses for concealment emphasize the physical nature of women's emotions, an almost 
tactile sense of the embodied mind's response. 
Yet Roche substitutes Clermont's view with a more complex response formed 
through pressures of loyalty, obedience, and love rather than just emotional delicacy. 
Madeline does feel saddened by her father's story, but she also experiences doubts about 
his openness, remaining unsatisfied after their conversation: "[H]e ceased without 
gratifying the curiosity of Madeline: much ofhis story, she was convinced, remained 
untold, and she shuddered as she thought it was concealed merely because it was too 
dreadful to be known" (243). Roche creates a conflict here: on the one hand, Madeline 
does respond with tears, as Clermont supposes; on the other hand, her ungratified 
curiosity indicates that she desires even "dreadful" knowledge. Unable to be simply the 
obedient and sympathetic daughter, Madeline becomes an intellectual thus somewhat 
autonomous agent as she evaluates her father's tale-and subsequently experiences 
Gothic emotions of fear and dread. Although she received but a hint from. Countess 
Merville of a much more violent and horrific past, Madeline begins to piece together the 
information she has received: 
"She told me," cried Madeline, "and her lips knew not falsehood, that the 
calamities ofhis life were unprecedented; that its characters were marked by 
horror, and stained with blood; --but in the view he gave me of it, no such 
calamities, no such characters met my eye; 'tis therefore too evident, that much of 




Processing information and reconciling conflicting accounts, Madeline becomes an 
emblem of self-determination, an individual structured primarily by visual perception 
rather than by sensation. 
Visuality poses a significant problem in Abbey but becomes desirable in Clermont 
because it enables women to resist constructions of "sensibility," defined by touch rather 
than by sight, which however denigrated, still remains the master sense. Here the gender 
inversion within Clermont, from Mortimer's gaze to Madeline's, becomes pertinent. 
Referring to Madeline's "eye," Roche draws attention to women's cognitive ability to 
piece together the evidence of their senses. What is evident to Madeline, what she cannot 
fail to perceive, is oddly enough a lacuna in the "view" Clermont gives her. This is a new 
response on Madeline's part, which sterns from her earlier decision to keep Merville's 
murder a secret. She continually expresses curiosity about her father's past; here, she 
doubts his complete honesty. Madeline's perception and reason lead her to question her 
,1 
~.~ 	 father's story, linking her ability to judge the information she receives to her sense of 
~: 
'i individualism. Unable to trust Clermont, Madeline looks to multiple sources of 
.~ 
'j information to decide what the truth must be. As she breaks away from parental wisdom, 
1 
'I 
as she attempts to reason privately beyond,her father's story, as she trusts the evidence of 
j 
her own senses, the heroine experiences self-determination. I 
Roche's argument about women's ability to perceive, reason, and judge becomes i
j 
j 	 most clear as Madeline's suspicions become agonizing. Although Madeline consciously 
refuses to probe the mystery further out of a sense of respect and duty to Clermont, she 
continues to suspect that her father might be a murderer: '''Oh, God!' she cried to herself, 
while every nerve was strained with agony at the idea, 'should the suspicions that now 
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rack my breast be just!-This torture of suspense is more than I can bear,' continued she; 
'I will throw myself at the feet of my father, I will disclose to him my suspicions'" (253). 
Interestingly, the pain that Madeline describes here is not the pain of sympathy that her 
father fears will result from his tale, but it is the pain of doubt and possibilities. As in the 
beginning of the narrative, Madeline's impulse to remain transparent occurs when she 
attempts to police her father. Here again she feels the need to discipline her disloyal 
thoughts through confession and display. Unlike the earlier incident, however, this one is 
not easily resolved because her ideas are too close to the truth. Corroborated by multiple 
avenues of evidence, Clermont's guilt separates Madeline from her duties as a daughter. 
Instead of confessing her thoughts, she contemplates the effects that such a disclosure 
might have on their relationship. The "interested" nature of their secrets differentiates 
Clermont and Madeline. Whereas Clermont conceals his own criminal past, Madeline 
conceals crime at the victim's insistence. In consequence, Madeline affirms personal 
justice over public obligation, an affirmation she continues to uphold when confronted 
with her father's crime. 
Before Madeline knows the extent of Clermont's transgressions, the tension 
between her need to know the truth and her desire to protect her father impels her to 
repress thought and judgment: '''I must not think,' said she, 'since thought is so 
dreadful'" (254). Roche first presents the expected response of a proper lady: filial 
obedience and propriety to the point ofmindlessness. Too dreadful to be known, truth 
must be suppressed when it threatens to undo the parent-child relationship. Madeline's 
desperate attempt to secure the parental bonds contradicts all the intelligent perception 





constitutes another fonn of sacrificing self for other. Roche, however, does not sacrifice 
her heroine completely. Instead, she counteracts the effects of Madeline's resolution with 
the narrator's commentary: "Saddened beyond expression by obtrusive ideas, she strove 
to banish that sadness by banishing thought-but, ah! how vain the effort! the 'vital spark 
ofheavenly flame' within us must be extinguished, ere we can cease to think" (255). 
Roche creates an authorial message about women's ability to think, even in the face of 
improper conclusions. If Madeline trusts her own perceptions, then she opposes her 
father's authority and his attempts to impose his "view" on her "eye." In a bold turn, 
Roche argues that Madeline's thoughts are appropriate because they are natural. Turning 
the issue of natural ability into autonomy, the narrator's comments indicate that thinking 
is irresistible and that Madeline should continue to participate in intellectual activity, 
which will in turn enable her to be a lawful subject. Yet such thoughts do have 
consequences, creating tensions that eventually lead to a temporary suspension of self 
and thought. 
Before Madeline experiences that brief insanity, Roche draws further attention to 
the split between Madeline's will to knowledge and her physical limitations. During 
Clennont's conversation with his father, Madeline is shocked to hear Clennont change 
the story he told her and becomes certain ofher earlier suspicions. Wishing vengeance on 
the murderer ofPhillipe St. Julian (his son and Clennont's half brother), the Marquis 
rages, "[S]till then will I trust, 0 God! that some heaven-directed hand shall point out the 
murderer of my son" (261). In a ghoulish and supernatural turn, a hand pokes out from 
behind a tapestry and gestures toward Clennont, a hand that only Madeline observes. 




resolution, was flying to the wall in order to examine it, when her strength and senses 
suddenly receded, and she fell fainting on the floor" (262). While her fainting and 
shrieking are expected, her resolve to uncover the mystery is not. Intriguingly, her first 
impulse is to "examine" the source of the mystery. If suspicions are so dreadful, then 
Madeline's attempt to examine the next mystery she encounters has important 
implications. One implication is that she has reinstated her earlier intellectual curiosity 
and no longer strives to "banish thought." Another consideration is that her conscious 
efforts are undermined by her physical responses. Her body-strength and senses-shuts 
down at the crucial point of discovery. Fainting represents a lack of perception, of 
consciousness, of control. 22 Here, it also illustrates the heroine's lack of resources. What 
indeed would she do with the information she would discover by pulling back the 
tapestry? Would she bring this ghostly event in to the prosaic world of realism, and thus 
into the realm ofjuridical power? If her father were proved a murderer, what 
responsibility would Madeline bear as the one who exposed the truth to the Marquis? 
Perception, Roche indicates, is not always a solution for women governed by love and 
loyalty. However, these questions arise once more when Madeline leamsjust what her 
father's past holds. 
Depicted as a visual process, Madeline's desire for knowledge ceases somewhat 
after she learns from the villainous d'Alembert the secret her father has hidden. 
Supplying a blood-encrusted dagger as physical proof, d'Alembert explains that 
Clermont actually murdered his brother after overhearing servants discussing Phillipe's 
22 This aspect has been explored in part by Bruhm in Gothic Bodies. As he argues, Emily's fainting 






treachery. Clermont learned that, before he met Geraldine (his wife), Phillipe and 
Geraldine were engaged in a sexual affair that resulted in her pregnancy. The servants 
talked about how the couple hid the affair from Phillipe's wife by arranging Geraldine's 
marriage to Clermont. After he finished listening to the story, Clermont, in a passionate 
rage, stabbed his brother and left him bleeding on the ground. Madeline hears the story 
with horror, but after her father corroborates the tale, she is satisfied with the facts and 
must then act upon that knowledge, which always implies an obligation. 
Like Countess Merville and her grandmother, she must make a decision about the 
crime she discovers. From the choices of those two women, Madeline leans that she can 
choose to conceal or expose family crime. The transparency demanded by positive law, 
therefore, becomes less a public duty than a private choice. In some ways, this is a rather 
disturbing conclusion. While it puts a great deal ofpower in women's hands by making 
them responsible for legal justice, it is also a burden for women, as it forces them to 
navigate an already perilous divide between private and public domains. The pressure of 
domestic loyalties can lead to further victimization. Roche does not provide an easy 
solution-in fact, there appears to be no solution at all to this dilemma. Instead, there are 
just consequences for the heroine's SUbjectivity. In Madeline's case, the consequence is 
Gothic terror and madness, following a much more powerful position of resistance and 
fortitude. 
Madeline demonstrates a strong sense of familial obligation when D'Alembert 
attempts to coerce her into marrying his son by threatening to expose her father's crimes 
to legal authorities. Faced with blackmail, Madeline, sensing that the young D'Alembert 




Marquis de Montmorenci's fortune. She eagerly offers the vast estates she will inherit 
from her paternal grandfather in exchange for her father's security. For the heroine who 
owns estates, maintaining property never takes precedence over affective, familial 
relationships. In this, Roche again places legality at the service of moral obligations. 
When D'Alembert refuses her offer, however, Madeline's choice to conceal her father's 
crime by caving to blackmail results in an unbearable position of sexual vulnerability. 
Transparency seems to be the only safe option for Madeline, but transparency would 
expose her father to legal punishment. The social gaze that proves such a problem in 
Abbey appears once more as ineffectual. Roche's clear warnings about clandestine 
marriages only partially address the nature of the gaze; the novel continues to explore 
how transparency might fail to secure personal safety. 
Madeline dramatically experiences these tensions in the novel's final scenes. 
After learning that the young d'Alembert has imprisoned his wife and lied about her 
death, Madeline escapes by hiding in an empty mansion. Suspicious of the housekeeper 
and her nephew who help her hide, the intrepid heroine attempts to temper fear and 
imagination with fortitude and reason: "I will then exert myself .... I will combat my 
fears, nor to the pressure of real evils add those of imaginary ones" (335). In an assertion 
that recalls the imaginary terrors of Emily st. Aubert, Madeline affirms her ability to 
exert control over her cognitive processes. She soon recognizes, however, that she is in 
real danger: Dupont is indeed the young D'Alembert. As he attempts to force the 
marriage, Madeline is fiery, articulate, angry, and proud: 




looked upon him with scorn. "And what punishment does the villain merit who 
forced me to such actions?" she exclaimed. "What punishment does he merit who 
assumes a name but for the purpose of deceiving, who spreads his snares for the 
friendless and unhappy?" (341) 
Depending on moral references that go beyond positive law, Madeline refuses to yield to 
emotional weaknesses. Yet her refusal is complex and conflicted. At one moment, she 
repels D'Alembert with spirited anger; at another, she weeps and pleads for her father. 
In her anger, Madeline is the very picture of rebellion against injustice. Roche 
grants Madeline the authority developed through her juridical gaze: able to police and 
discipline her own behavior, she turns that same judgmental look on d'Alembert's 
criminal behavior. There is power in Madeline's gaze. Earlier, she easily recognizes 
d'Alembert as a threat: "[S]he conceived a prejudice against him; --his gentleness seemed 
assumed, and there was a fierceness, a boldness in his eyes, which at once alarmed and 
confused her" (333). Madeline sees that d'Alembert, then disguised as Dupont, exposes 
his character through his eyes, and his boldness is an invasive glance that penetrates and 
objectifies. As Madeline repels d'Alembert in her imprisonment, she returns the gaze; 
this time with anger and pride. 
Notwithstanding her powerful resistance, Madeline's position is an unstable one. 
Solidifying the heroine's contradictory role, Roche articulates the maddening tension in 
the dramatic final chapters. The heroine vacillates in her response because she must take 
her father's needs into consideration. Like Merville' s ties to her daughter and Madeline 
st. Foix's ties to her son, Madeline's bond with her father has a restraining effect on her 




finalizes her decision. Roche does not sacrifice her heroine, but uses another option to 
extricate Madeline from the situation. Fluctuating between extremes, Madeline becomes 
temporarily deranged: 
The agony and disappointment she experienced were too much for her; her brain 
maddened; and wild as the waves which destroy the hopes of the mariners, she 
raved about the room, till, utterly exhausted by the violence ofher emotions, she 
dropped upon the floor, where her shrieks sunk into groans, which by degrees 
died away in hollow murmurs, and a total insensibility came over her. (345) 
This option, while unattractive, is certainly significant. The threat ofmadness is a 
common one in the female Gothic. Emily, for example, is frequently in danger of 
madness.23 For Roche, madness is directly related to specific aspects of Madeline's 
character and experiences. First, Madeline is as unlike herself in this scene as Roche can 
manage. Before, the heroine could not help but think; here she is functionally 
unconscious. Earlier, she attempted to analyze her situations; now she abandons herself to 
violent emotions. Instead of controlling her mind, she raves until insensible. The contrast 
echoes and intensifies the earlier fainting scene. 
This scene also represents a crisis for Madeline. Her wildness is the result of 
imprisonment, threats, and conflict. Tom between self and parental loyalties, Madeline 
must choose between a sexual relationship with d'Alembert and her father's 
imprisonment and punishment. She could sacrifice herself for her father, but she refuses. 
Then she yields and refuses once more. Finally, she goes mad with grief, despair, fury. 








The conflict here reflects the split in the gaze. The relationship between self and other 
that has been structured by the gaze comes up in another form at the end. Madeline, even 
though she is a product of the juridical gaze, cannot resolve the dialectic between self and 
other because as a woman, she is always split-and can exercise power only over her 
inviolable self. Now, she must abandon self for other and cannot do it. In this scene, 
Madeline exhibits power and debility at the same time. Throughout the novel, Madeline 
easily appropriates the internal gaze, which impels her to police herself. When she 
becomes the spectator or external gaze, problems appear. 
With the villain, she initially uses a judging gaze, but cannot sustain it because it 
gives her no power to save her father. Instead, saving Clermont entails degradation so 
horrific that she would not be able to escape the internal gaze that would condemn her. In 
other words, she is subjected to the juridical gaze, even if it only comes from herself. On 
the other hand, the motivations of love and loyalty with which she has struggled again 
clash with the juridical dimensions of her subjectivity. Madness-an absence of the 
subject or self that comes when meaning is emptied out-represents Madeline's crisis. 
Roche creates a messy, shocking dilemma between self and other that she elides rather 
than solves. Madeline's insanity quickly dissipates, leaving no lasting stigma or lingering 
traces. Its very impermanence suggests that madness provides Roche with an 
uncomplicated option for her heroine's emotional range. When Madeline revives, she is 
back to her resourceful, active self. 
The final chapter retraces and explains the remaining mysteries. Clermont and 
Madeline learn that d'Alembert staged the conversation that implicated Clermont's wife 




wounded in his attack. De Sevignie, the reader discovers, is actually Phillipe's son-and 
Madeline's cousin.24 All the relationships clarified and inheritances restored, Clermont 
liberally bestows forgiveness in a God-like manner. The most hardened villain, young 
D'Alembert, kills himself amidst confessions and repentance. The clarity of this chapter 
rivals Radcliffe's denouements. As neatly as Roche finishes the novel, however, the 
conclusion leaves some critics unsatisfied. Natalie Schroeder argues that in order to 
create a happy ending, Roche "rewards. and punishes some of her characters without 
respect to their deserts" (137). This quality means that "Rochean characters are never 
fully in control of their own destiny, unlike their Radcliffean counterparts" (137). 
Schroeder's assessment is faulty in several respects. First, Radcliffe's heroines do not 
fully control their destiny. Instead, they attempt to maintain control over what they can, 
such as property, emotions, and judgments, within arbitrary, threatening situations. Roche 
shares a similar concern over women's control, putting her in conversation with, rather 
than opposition to, Radcliffe's novels. Also, because Roche's heroines are actively 
involved in creating and concealing mysteries, they often seem quite independent. 
Finally, and most importantly, Roche's treatment of rewards and punishments does not 
distort free will but instead reflects a system in which individual choices can serve 
justice. 
The tropes of visuality in both The Children ofthe Abbey and Clermont signify a 
conflict for the heroines. In Abbey the gaze is depicted as an objectifying force that 
24 De Sevignie is Phillipe's legitimate son by his wife, not by Clermont's wife Geraldine, whose innocence 
and faithfulness is upheld by D'Alembert's confession. D'Alembert (the elder) explains that he arranged 
for Clermont to overhear the servants' scripted conversation regarding Phillipe and Geraldine's affair-but 
that it was indeed a lie. The relationship between de Sevignie and Madeline, who do get married, is a close 






depends on cultural assumptions. Presented in medical terms, the social gaze both 
produces and interprets the symptoms that Amanda exhibits. Amanda finds that others' 
perception is often structured by techniques that encourage prejudice. In turn, she resists 
the probing looks of friend and foe and establishes her own response to social demands of 
transparency. The gaze in Clermont has two effects: it restrains and authorizes impulses 
as it polices self and other. Madeline's perception enables her to examine her own 
thoughts, motives, and suppositions within a moral framework. Judging others, however, 
is problematic because it implies authority and autonomy, especially when she attempts 
to "police" her father. In consequence, the heroine experiences a vexed relationship to 
scopic power, which offers her moments of self-determination as well as painful tension. 
Although their sense of moral obligation preserves their relationships to others, for 
Amanda and Madeline, perception and the power that comes with it offers transgressive 







Diseased Spaces: Confmement in Secresy and The Wrongs ofWoman 
Eliza Fenwick's Secresy; or, the Ruin on the Rock (1796) and Mary 
Wollstonecraft's The Wrongs ofWoman: Maria, a Fragment (1798) revise the female 
Gothic in significant ways. 1 Both refuse the fairy-tale resolutions ofmarital bliss; both 
depict suffering heroines who experience no relief within the plot; and both make explicit 
references to women's equality, rights, and sexuality. Although they change the content 
ofthe female Gothic, Fenwick and Wollstonecraft retain the threatening environments 
and masculine persecution that more conventional Gothic novels depict and then sweep 
away. Secresy begins with the heroine's confinement. Secluded in Valmont Castle, 
Sibella initially appears independent and healthy. As she transgresses boundaries 
established by positive law, especially those circumscribing marriage, and as her faithless 
lover takes refuge in those boundaries, Sibella becomes increasingly ill. Although the 
heroine asserts her freedom and individual will, she cannot impose marriage laws on her 
lover once he rejects their secret vows. Throughout the novel, spatial references mark the 
heroine's progression from health to illness. 
Mary Wollstonecraft, too, presents space as a register ofthe heroine's physical 
and emotional experiences, particularly the tragedy ofwomen's encounters with positive 
law. Maria first appears in a private madhouse rather than simply a gloomy castle that 
would be just as imprisoning, as novels like The Castle ofWolfenbach and The Children 
ofthe Abbey make clear. Indeed, such settings create a powerful image of the domestic 
I Isobel Grundy praises Secresy, while noting its resistance to classification: "None of the available 
labels--epistolary, gothic, sentimental, radical, novel ofmanners, or novel ofsocial conscience--can 




sphere as confinement.2 Significantly, the asylum, unlike the confining castle, casts 
doubts on Maria's ability to reason, as others indicate that her independent actions are 
beyond comprehension. As she creates Maria's experience within the madhouse, 
W ollstonecraft shows that men define what is rational, reasonable, and appropriate. At 
the extreme end of this definitional power, they can physically enforce a view of reality 
that enables the power structures to remain intact. This, indeed, is the horror of the 
madhouse. However, the final scene, in which Maria makes her most reasoned appeal to 
humanity and justice, takes place in juridical spaces. I argue that for W ollstonecraft, both 
spaces are diseased, even if the courtroom can potentially enforce justice for the wronged 
woman. Although she appeals to the court with reason and passion, Maria is ultimately 
deemed insane by the judge, who colludes with medical power to strip Maria of agency. 
In both Secresy and The Wrongs ofWoman, the heroines' bodies are inscribed by medical 
and legal discourses within the various spaces within the novel. Unlike the Gothic novels 
I have previously examined, these texts do not end by placing the heroines in utopian 
spaces of freedom, justice, and empowerment. Ultimately, both authors settle for a 
realism in which men use positive law to enforce their version of reality. 
In Secresy and The Wrongs ofWoman, spaces function as concrete and symbolic 
representations of confinement. Space does not exist as a neutral geography but is always 
structured within legal discourse, as Foucault asserts and as scholars such as Henri 
Lefebvre and Nicholas Blomley elaborate. Lefebvre, for example, argues, "Space is not a 
scientific object removed from ideology or politics; it has always been political and 
2 Kate Ellis's The Contested Castle and Eugenia Delamotte's Perils ofthe Night offer comprehensive 
discussions ofdomestic confmement in the Gothic novel. These early feminist readings, however, do not 
examine the specific constructions of space, law, and disease in Secresy or The Wrongs ofWoman. My 




strategic" (31). Blomley explains that a conception of"legal geography" enables us to 
examine critically the physical, local sites ofpower upon which (and through which) the 
law operates (24-26). As the heroines experience the determining effects of space, they 
become increasingly powerless until they are silenced by literal or symbolic death. For 
Sibella, Valmont Castle initially presents little threat, but her attempt to redefine legal 
relationships within that space changes her relationship to her environment. Moving from 
the ancient castle, where she had developed a "natural" sense of moral obligation, to 
London, where she experiences the definitional power of positive law, Sibella 
deteriorates. Maria Venables, on the other hand, endures spatial domination within the 
madhouse and the courtroom without breaking down. Nevertheless, when she is defined 
as insane by the judge, Maria, too, experiences the oppressive power of corrupted spaces. 
The two heroines' experiences with positive law are marked by disease and illness: 
Sibella's death is literal, while Maria undergoes a symbolic death in law through 
coverture and "insanity." 
In distinctive ways, Secresy and The Wrongs ofWoman represent the legal 
geographies that the heroines inhabit as diseased and infectious. In Romanticism and 
Colonial Disease Alan Bewell provides a conception ofdiseased spaces that is 
particularly useful for mapping out the problems Sibella and Maria face. Bewell explains, 
"[T]hinking about disease and health had [by the late eighteenth century] become 
inseparable from the medicalized representation ofplace" (32).3 As Bewell examines the 
ways in which disease, as lived experience and as literary metaphor, shaped British 
3 The "geographical dimensions ofdisease" are most important to Bewell as he "examines the role played 
in the making and unmaking of national and cultural identities by ideas about the geographical distribution 
ofdiseases and what kind of people were susceptible to them" (17). In his study, Bewell describes the ways 




identity, he also notes that the communicability of disease "established a profound link 
with those being defined as other" (17). According to Sander Gilman, disease represents 
all that we cannot control; thus, we project disease on to the Other in order to insulate 
ourselves from the chaos, degeneration, and death that result from illness: '''Disease' is 
the social construct that always provides the frame for an understanding of 'illness'... 
'Disease' is thus never a mere label; it always relates to the social construction of 
'illness'" (Health and Illness 12). Arguing that disease is socially constructed, Gilman 
explains, "How we see the diseased, the mad, the polluting is a reflex of our own sense of 
control and the limits inherent in that sense of control" (Disease and Representation 3). 
We draw boundaries around the diseased, separating the healthy and the ill, in an attempt 
to control the disorder and to distance ourselves from inevitable death (4). Spatial 
references here provide a conceptual link to the legal geographies that Lefebvre and 
Blomley discuss, and indicate the significant influence that medical and legal discourses 
exert over notions of space. Secresy and The Wrongs ofWoman depict the spatial 
problems of control and boundaries as the heroines attempt to establish agency and 
autonomy. 
Secresy; or, the Ruin on the Rock 
In Secresy Sibella Valmont is a radical figure that conceives of her moral agency 
in startling new ways. Unlike the heroines of the other Gothic novels I have discussed, 
such as Matilda and Laurette, who obey the law ofnature but never transgress positive 
laws, Sibella follows her natural reason and cultivated knowledge into a sexual 




healthy and free in a place where she seems confined and oppressed, Sibella appears to 
others as a "phenomenon." She does not see herself as confined because she chooses to 
submit to her tyrannical uncle, Valmont. Her body reflects this freedom: she is healthy, 
strong, robust. Further, as she chooses. transparency over secrecy, personal openness, like 
the physical openness ofhealthy spaces, enables her to maintain the sense that she 
follows natural law. Sibella's "marriage" thus becomes an occasion to show her 
allegiance to the dictates of nature. As Fenwick warns her audience about the dangers of 
secret passion and secret marriage, the novel presents a conflict between female 
knowledge and institutional definitions, which is mapped onto the heroine's body. As 
Sibella becomes confined by marriage laws, she becomes distraught and ill. Ultimately, 
the novel removes the transgressive heroine from social spaces through her death . 
.Secresy begins with the correspondence of Caroline Ashburn and Sibella. 
Caroline, the reader learns, visited Valmont Castle with her mother, who was a childhood 
friend of Mrs. Valmont. Slightly older than Sibella, Caroline is clearly a model of rational 
womanhood. Fenwick presents her as generous, intelligent, independent, and virtuous-
characteristics that Caroline developed through personal experience and reflection, since 
her vapid mother had no part in her education. During their visit, Caroline becomes 
intrigued by Sibella and requests permission to write to her. In a rare show of generosity, 
Mr. Valmont allows and indeed commands this correspondence, although Sibella's first 
letter reveals a determined, independent person who would have defied her guardian's 
commands to the contrary. Through these two women, Fenwick puts forth radical ideas 
about women's intellectual equality to men and argues against oppressive systems of 
education and law. While Sibella and Caroline's correspondence shows empowering 
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ways of responding to their world, however, the secret, sexual relationship between 
Sibella and Clement will prove malignant and deadly. 
Fenwick fIrst describes the heroine's upbringing in order to clarify her intellectual 
and physical abilities. Caroline tells Sibella that she sensed Sibella's ties to nature when 
they initially met: "There was something wild in your air; your language was simple and 
concise, yet delivered with an impressive eloquence; and 1 thought you altogether a 
-phenomenon" (54). Yet Caroline recognizes that Valmont has attempted to construct 
-Sibella as a "natural" creature through education. Caroline probes this paradox: 
But how comes it to pass, my dearest Sibella, that when your uncle had the means 
of gratifying his darling wish [to educate a female] to whom according to his 
creed, nothing should be granted beyond what the instinct of appetite demands, 
how comes it, I say, that you possess the comprehensive powers of intellect? from 
what sources did you derive that eager desire ofknowledge of which 1 find you 
possessed? (65) 
As Caroline suggests, Valmont assumes that his educational program will cultivate 
Sibella's submissiveness, not her intellectual abilities. In one conversation, Valmont tells 
Sibella, "[Y]ou are not the docile and grateful creature 1 expected to find you" (42). 
Further, he attempts to keep Sibella within the bonds of"instinct," which he believes will 
exclude her from reason. He argues, "I tell you, child, you shall not reason. Repine in 
secret as much as you please, but no reasonings .... Child, you are not born to think; you 
were not made to think" (43). Valmont makes an argument about women's nature, yet he 
needs to educate Sibella in order to make her "natural." In this, the tyrannical uncle 




Fenwick relies in part on Jean Jacques Rousseau's vision of women's education 
as she depicts Valmont's attempts to make Sibella a compliant, feeling person. In Emile 
(1762), Rousseau writes, "The man should be strong and active; the woman should be 
weak and passive; the one must have both the power and the will; it is enough that the 
other should offer little resistance" (322). Rousseau argues that the more women 
resemble men, the more power men will have over women; thus, women's power lies in 
their difference (327).4 He believes that "nature means [women] to think, to will, to love, 
to cultivate their minds as well as their persons," although he explains that women's 
"special purpose" should guide educational methods: "To be pleasing in [man's] sight, to 
win his respect and love, to train him in childhood, to tend him in manhood, to counsel 
and console, to make his life pleasant and happy, these are the duties of woman for all 
time, and this is what she should be taught while she is young" (327, 328). The "natural 
woman" in Rousseau's theory is not a mindless slave or a sickly creature, but rather a 
sensitive administrator of the household. Indeed, Rousseau asserts that women's docility 
will enable them to bear the injustices and wrongs that "often vicious and always faulty" 
men will perpetrate (333). Female education thus teaches women to survive in a 
patriarchal society. 
In her introduction to Secresy, Isobel Grundy notes that Fenwick challenges 
Rousseau's subordination of women (26). Grundy also observes Mary Wollstonecraft's 
influence on Fenwick: "From both children, though especially from Sibella, Valmont 
exacts a blind obedience which reflects the governing habits of his class, and which 
Wollstonecraft attacks" (26). In her famous rebuttal to Rousseau, A Vindication ofthe 
4 WoUstonecraft replies, "This is the very point I aim at. I do not wish them to have power over men; but 





Rights o/Women, Wollstonecraft writes, "I finnly believe, that all the writers who have 
written on the subject of female education and manners, from Rousseau to Dr. Gregory, 
have contributed to render women more artificial, weak characters, than they would 
otherwise have been; and, consequently, more useless members of society" (90). In 
Vindication Wollstonecraft argues, 
[T]he woman who strengthens her body and exercises her mind will, by managing 
her family and practising various virtues, become the friend, and not the humble 
dependent of her husband, and if she deserves his regard by possessing such 
substantial qualities, she will not find it necessary to conceal her affection, nor to 
pretend to an unnatural coldness ofconstitution to excite her husband's passions. 
(96) 
This radical feminist argues that Rousseau's female education will result in infantine 
women who cannot take on any intellectual tasks, even instructing their own children. 
While Fenwick incorporates the Rousseau-Wollstonecraft debate in her 
presentation of Sibella's upbringing, she offers new possibilities for women's natural and 
cultivated abilities. Sibella is never a "weak, artificial creature." She knows that 
Valmont's education should make her "a timid, docile slave, whose thoughts, will, 
passions, wishes, should have no standard of their own, but rise, change or die as the will 
of a master should require!" (156). Although Valmont's education fails to influence 
Sibella's sense of obedience, the heroine attributes her specific notions of equality to the 
instruction of Clement's tutor, Bonneville: "[He] taught me that I make an unimpaired 
one of the vast brotherhood of mankind" (74).5 In her physical health, intellectual 
S Grundy notes that this is "the revolutionary ideal offratemity" (74, n. 1). 
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independence, and impassioned love for Clement, Sibella seems to represent 
W ollstonecraft' s ideal woman, but her conflicting educational experiences complicate 
this ideal. For Sibella, intellectual powers are as natural as breathing: 
Shall my uncle tell me that my actions are confined to the mechanical 
operations of the body, that I am an imbecile creature, but a reptile of more 
graceful form, the half-finished work of nature, and destitute of the noblest 
ornament of humanity? Blind to conviction, grown old in error, he would degrade 
me to the subordinate station he describes. He daringly asserts that 1 am born to 
the exercise ofno will; to the exercise ofno duties but submission; that wisdom 
owns me now, could not fmd in me a resting place. 
Tis false, Caroline! I feel within the vivifying principle of intellectual life. 
My expanding faculties are nurtured by the passing hours! and want but the 
beams of instruction, to ripen into power and energy that would steep my present 
inactive life in forgetfulness. (74) 
Furthermore, Sibella claims innate rational power: "I know, and he knows too if he would 
but own it, that I do think; that I was born to think; and I will think" (43). Caroline often 
remarks on Sibella's surprising abilities: "Always mentally alive, she has the glow of 
animation on her cheeks, the fITe of vivacity in her eye" (94). Fenwick celebrates 
Sibella's intelligence and disrupts Valmont's assumption about the "natural" woman by 
having her correspondent reject blind obedience to patriarchal desires. Sibella presents a 
paradox here: she is both tutored Englishwoman and ''Nature's child." In turn, both 




Despite her connections with nature and her awareness ofher rational instincts, 
Sibella can never achieve the status of a true "natural" woman. She has been raised 
among the civilized English, and thus has been molded by her experiences and education. 
Indeed, she does not enter Valmont Castle until she is six years old, well past the 
acquisition of language and reason, in early modem psychological (and natural law) 
theories. One might argue that Sibella's isolation from the mores of eighteenth-century 
British society makes her simply one more Gothic heroine growing up in pastoral 
solitude. Her upbringing, stripped of its most oppressive elements, closely resembles that 
of most Gothic heroines. Yet Sibella opposes patriarchal, positive law by asserting 
natural rights. She transgresses moral and social codes of conduct because she is ignorant 
ofpositive law, customs, and manners. In the place of social custom she follows natural 
law, which enables her to discover more "natural" ways of defining her identity as a 
woman and to develop her own understanding of the ties between individuals. This 
understanding culminates in her conception ofmarriage as a private exchange ofvows. 6 
As a result ofher unintended education and her relationship to the law of nature, 
Sibella does not view space in the same ways that others do. Although Sibella chafes at 
her confinement and wishes to move beyond ''the narrow boundary of this castle and its 
parks" (73), that same confinement nurtures the young heroine. Sibella often walks 
through the expansive grounds, and in consequence, Clement tells Murden, "Oh, she is 
Nature's genuine child! more lovely than painting can trace: yet robust as the peasant 
6 According to Sue Chaplin, Sibella "cannot retain her 'selfand behave properly in the eyes of the law" 
(115). Although she also notes that Sibella's innate rationality becomes revolutionary as she resists 
Valmont's authority, Chaplin concentrates primarily on the relationship ofSecresy to Burke's notions of 






who climbs yon hill ... No trembling nerves has she!" (155). Thriving in seclusion, she 
enjoys a degree of self-detennination and physical health. Her mind, if not her body, is 
able to transcend the limits that Valmont sets on her. Indeed, she remarks to Caroline, "I 
am held in the bondage of slavery. And still may Mr. Valmont's power constrain the 
forces of this body. But where, Miss Ashburn, is the tyrant that could ever chain thought, 
or put fetters on the fancy?" (73). Instead of fleeing the castle and its oppressive owner, 
Sibella maintains her freedom because she creates her own sense of boundaries through 
the law of nature. 
Although the heroine struggles with intellectual confinement, she only begins to 
feel the effects of diseased spaces after she transgresses sexual boundaries. The novel's 
representation of space is thus medicalized in ways discussed by Bewell. A cultural 
example of "diseased spaces" appears in William Buchan's Domestic Medicine (1792). 
Buchan sees the roots of contagion and epidemic in the cramped, crowded, diseased 
spaces of the home and city. Even confining children in swaddling clothes, he explains, 
renders their bodies defonned and susceptible to disease. Noting that stifling spaces breed 
and spread disease, Buchan recommends fresh air for prevention and cure, replacing an 
older model of evacuation-bleeding, purging, and sweating-with a regimen ofnatural 
openness. Such medical metaphors find expression in Secresy. First, Valmont sees his 
castle as a hygienic space that protects him from social infection. He returns to the estate 
after his disappointing experiences in society: "Shocked at the contaminating mixture, he 
had fled back with precipitancy to his castle" (62). Furthennore, the novel idealizes 
nature and outdoor spaces, privileging a pastoral ideal of natural growth and positing the 




between positive law (and its association with society/cities) and natural law (which is 
associated with the free spaces of nature). 
Like the inhabitants of "uncivilized nations" that Buchan describes in his medical 
treatise, Sibella is strong and vigorous. Notably, Buchan explains that native cultures rear 
"strong and hearty" children because they follow the "dictates ofNature" (10-11). 
Further, Buchan mentions that "savage nations" who do not practice infant-dressing 
(binding them tightly) have hardier children who become independent much more 
quickly than English children. Indeed, he continues, using stays deforms the body so 
much so that "there are ten defonned wo~en for one man"; thus, the delicacy of the 
female body is frequently the result of unnatural and damaging social fashions (14). Not 
bound by social custom and fashion, Sibella does not feel effects of social restrictions. 
Although such openness contributes to Sibella's health, the novel also suggests that her 
sturdiness is exotic and strange, much in the way that Buchan distinguishes uncivilized 
peoples as hearty. The heroine thus demonstrates a series ofconflicting qualities. English 
and exotic, confined and free, educated and natural, Sibella becomes a paradoxical figure. 
Sibella's vigorous body becomes especially notable because the castle is often 
presented as a symbol of disease--toxic, contaminated, and even deadly. This 
pathological environment affects a number of characters. Valmont' s wife, for example, 
feels "buried" in "obscurity and horror at Valmont castle" (64). A sickly and 
hypochondriacal woman, Mrs~ Valmont resents the seclusion of the estate. When she 
becomes distraught after learning that her husband has built a family tomb on the 
property, Valmont sneers, "Contemptible folly! ...The vicinity of a tomb becomes a 




explains, "He was enervated with disease. The chill damps of evening pierced him. The 
wintry blast shook his feeble frame" (75). Even sensible, rational Caroline Ashburn 
states, "What a freezing sensation crept in my veins, as we waited for your uncle's draw­
bridges" (52) and remarks, "[T]he damp and darkness affected me" (54). Another v.isitor 
comments, "[I] feel the benumbing effects of this cold gloomy dwelling, too. -These old 
buildings are admirably contrived to fix odd impressions on the mind. [ ...] I should not 
exist six months in this castle" (223, 228). Those characters that are affected negatively 
by Valmont's estate have a relationship to society and positive law that Sibella does not. 
Described as "nature's child," she resists the castle's effects by envisioning her mind and 
will as free, self-determined, and autonomous. 
Sibella, then, is distinguished as unusually suited to survive in her environment, in 
part because she redefines the space she inhabits. Others find Sibella's ability to thrive in 
her environment mysterious and even disturbing. On a visit to the castle, Lord Filmar 
remarks on Sibella's imperviousness to the creaking, trembling edifice, and notes, "She 
must indeed be a strange unformed being." Upon hearing that Sibella walks in storms, he 
calls her "[a] little too hardy of nerve for a Countess" (207). While Filmar describes 
Sibella as physically hearty and strong, he also imagines her as a barbaric Amazon: 
"Robust health, no doubt; strong limbs; hanging arms; a gigantic stride; and the open-
mouthed stare of a savage! -Dh, dear!" (228). In turn, he doubts her intellectual abilities. 
After meeting her, Filmar writes, "this frightful place has deranged her intellects!" (229). 
Caroline's mother, Mrs. Ashburn, tells her friends that Sibella is "a little handsome, a 
little proud, a little ignorant, and half insane," to which one woman exclaims "I dearly 




believe that Sibella shares in the rationality of civilized nations. Sibella, always imagined 
outside the boundaries of society's expectations and laws, appears removed from 
ordinary experiences; however, Fenwick flatly refuses to use the most fantastic aspects of 
the Gothic genre in this tragic novel. Introducing a mysterious, secretive hermit thus 
allows Fenwick to demonstrate Sibella's rationality and to develop the self-proclaimed 
focus ofthe novel. 7 
When she meets the strange figure (Murden in disguise), the heroine exhibits no 
tremulous wonder or frightened surprise. Sibella states, "I do not deem you worth of 
enquiry... for you came with pretences of falsehood and guile, and those are coverings 
that virtue ever scorns" (103). Fenwick continues to use spatial metaphors as she 
explicitly raises the problem of secrecy_ In contrast to secrets, coverings, and pretense, 
Sibella demands openness in her relationships and her communication-in ways that 
correspond to the images of healthy spaces discussed earlier. Sibella angrily tells the 
hermit that he is interrupting her remembrances of her beloved. The mysterious figure 
questions her, "Is then your heart so narrowed by love, that it can admit neither friendship 
nor benevolence?" She replies, "To my friendship, you have no claim; for, we are not 
equal. You wear a mask. Esteem and unreserved confidence are the only foundations of 
friendship" (104). Sibella's reply indicates that healthy relationships are possible only 
when people are completely open and honest. Influenced by her sense of virtue, which 
demands openness, the heroine also asserts her need for equality. As explored in chapter 
7 When Murden claims to be a ghost, Sibella argues: "I know... that the sleep ofdeath is eternal. That the 
grave never gives back, to form and substance, the mouldering body; and it indeed matters little to me who 
or what you are, since I well know you cannot be what you would seem" (102). His claim to be a guardian 
angel is met with equal skepticism. She tells him, "I do not fear you, though I know ofno guardian angels 
but my innocence and fortitude" (102). Like Matilda in Wolfenbach, Fenwick's heroine approaches strange 
phenomena with courage, yet Sibella's arguments supplement her courage with a rational rejection of 







three, women's secrecy typically indicates sexuality. Intriguingly, more conventional 
novels such as Abbey undermine this construction. Secresy, however, maintains a clear 
parallel between Sibella's virtue and her attitude toward secrecy. As long as Sibella 
displays open resistance, she remains an autonomous moral agent. Once she embraces 
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concealment, she can no longer preserve her belief that she acts within moral boundaries. 
Sibella's faith in the power of transparency encompasses her relationship with 
Valmont as well. When Murden asks why Sibella submits to Valmont, she replies, "I am 
not yet convinced that the time is arrived when my submission ought to cease." 
Surprisingly, this independent woman reveals that she chooses to submit to Valmont's 
authority. While this initially appears to be a docile response, Fenwick turns it into a 
radical statement about the nature ofpower, which continues in Sibella's letter: 
"Ah rather confess," he replied, "that you shun a stem contention with that power 
which here detains you. But there are other means. A secret escape. If you resolve 
to exert yourself for that purpose-" 
''No,'' I said, "I am not weak enough to descend to artifice. Did I think it 
right to go, 1 should go openly. Then might Mr. Valmont try his opposing 
strength. But he would find, 1 could leap, swim, or dive; and that moats and walls 
are feeble barriers to a determined will." (104) 
Her reply illustrates that Sibella rejects secrecy in part because it connotes weakness. She 
contrasts her physical and mental strength with the ineffectual barriers that Valmont has 
constructed, refusing to define her relationship to Valmont in any other terms but 
personal choice. Asserting the power ofher' individual will, the heroine argues that 




writes, "1 told him, 1 despised concealments; that 1 had ever scorned to separate my 
wishes from my acts, or my actions from my words" (106). Sibella desires a 
correspondence between interior and exterior that is ultimately-and fatally-abandoned 
when she marries her beloved. 
The marriage between Sibella and Clement is the turning point of the novel. 
Returning home from London, Clement reveals that he enjoyed the worldly pleasures he 
encountered, subverting Valmont's desire that his son would despise them. Angry and 
disappointed, Valmont decides to give Clement a small yearly stipend with which 
Clement might learn a trade. Clement quails at the thought that he might live in relative 
poverty: "After four hours of this cruel interview's duration, he permitted me to stagger, 
sick, oppressed, drooping, dying, to my chamber" (126). He continues, "1 have not told 
Sibella, yet she sees misery in my looks. She hears it in my sighs, and the contagion has 
reached her" (126). Clement attributes his drooping feebleness to his burning jealousy, 
rather than the true source--fear ofpoverty.8 Clement's contagious emotions equate his 
unworthy feelings with disease. This scene clearly reworks gendered expressions of 
emotion, yet more subtly, it indicates that Clement infects Sibella, that the healthy 
heroine can catch the "contagion" of her unworthy beloved.9 
8 Grundy compares him to Lovelace, but Clement seems a more likely counterpart to Valancourt. As 
Fenwick rewrites Gothic elements, she extends and transforms the heroine's suitor from awayward but 
ultimately innocent youth (Valancourt) to a faithless and increasingly corrupt seducer. Like Valancourt, 
Clement grows up sheltered from the pleasures and corruption of fashionable cities. Also like Emily's 
lover, Clement feels genuine passion and love for Sibella before encountering society. Finally, Clement 
retains some feeling forhis early beloved even while enjoying fashionable life. However, as Emily 
discovers, Valancourt never fully immersed himself in fashionable pursuits. His apparent corruption turns 
out to be a desperate act ofbenevolence, and most importantly, he remains sexually faithful to Emily. 
Clement, on the other hand, has none of these redeeming features. 
9 Chaplin, for example, notes the gender reversal but does not examine the medical constructions upon 






In order to "cure" her beloved, Sibella decides to propose marriage. She writes to 
Clement: "Come to my apartments. With pure hearts and hands, we will plight our 
fervent unspotted faith. Say I am your's, and you are mine, and sorrow and jealousy will 
vanish as a mist. You shall go the transported confiding husband" (131). Unlike Clement, 
Sibella exhibits strength and power in the face ofVal mont's authority. In turn, her 
"vigour," "perseverance and courage" must sustain him (155). The narrative takes a 
radical position: Sibella's self-determination turns deadly only when her sexuality is 
defined as illegitimate by the state's marriage laws. Before the union, Fenwick depicts 
Sibella's strength and independence; after, Sibella begins to deteriorate mentally and 
physically. 
The marriage that takes place is, according to English law, no marriage at all. 
In her "natural" approach to marriage, Sibella believes in the bonds of the heart-that is, 
the obligation of the law of nature. 10 Rejecting Valmont's prohibitions and unwittingly 
abandoning legal and social custom, she asserts, "'tis our hearts alone that can bind the 
vow." (129). Later, Sibella writes to Caroline, 

I heard Clement speak one day of some ceremonials which would be deemed 

necessary to the ratification of this covenant, when we should enter the world. 
Methinks I shall be loath to submit to them. The vow of the heart is of sacred 
dignity. Forms and ceremonies seem too trifling for its nature. But of the customs 
ofyour world, Caroline, I am ignorant. (250) 
10 Although the novel presents her views as a result ofher natural understanding, Sibella's views also draw 
on an older form ofmarriage. Bannet explains that in contracts per verba de praesenti, "words ofthe 
present tense," "the couple's promises to live together as man and wife created a binding marriage, even 
when unconsummated, and even without any witness." In contracts per verba de futuro "words of the 
future tense," "the marriage became binding as soon as consummation occurred" (234). After the 





Her proposal to Clement reveals her belief that a private exchange of vows creates 
marriage and sanctions sexuality, and she describes the exchange as "the sacred union 
plighted by our willing hearts in the sight ofheaven" (250). Isobel Grundy briefly states, 
"Sibella believes, with natural law, that the individual's solemn promise is binding" (129, 
n. 2).11 Yet the implications of such a belief form the central dilemma of the novel. While 
Sibella's choice appears reasonable, natural, and innocent-according to her personal 
moral code-the novel demonstrates that such choices lead to tragedy. 12 
Caroline's responses to Sibella reveal an ambivalence toward marriage laws. 
Sibella first writes somewhat frantically to Caroline, "Why in that moment should I turn 
coward, and rush from my purposes? Why did imagination cast an unusual gloom around 
me? Why did I sigh and tremble? Such alone ought to be the emotions of a guilty mind, 
and surely I am blameless" (128). In reply, Caroline writes, "[H]ad you ... enquired 
narrowly into the cause ofyour sensations, you must have discovered that error was 
creeping in upon you, and that your native frankness and stedfast sincerity were making a 
vigorous effort to repel secrecy, that canker-worm ofvirtue" (139). Indeed, Ca,roline 
seems to be more concerned with Sibella's concealments than with her sexual affair. As 
clearly as Caroline condemns Sibella's secrecy, however, her feelings toward the 
II Grundy also explains that Fenwick was "influenced by"her knowledge ofWollstonecraft's relationship 
with Gilbert Imlay" (129, n. 2). 
12 William Alexander's The History o/Women makes two points relevant to the novel's themes. First, he 
discusses "primitive" marriages, such as those on the "island ofOtaheite," in which the birth ofa child 
seals the permanent union ofa man and woman (187). Complex social arrangements, however, make 
"methods ofa more public and solemn nature" necessary (188). Sibella, in her exotic descriptions 
(''Nature's child") and in her rational sociability, appears on both registers. The clash here becomes deadly 
when she leaves the enclosed space of the castle, with its ties to a more primitive order, and enters the 
complex social world ofLondon. 
Second, Alexander notes that freedom of marriage directly corresponds to women's natural rights. He 
argues, "Wherever the rights ofnature remain unviolated by oppression, women have a power of disposing 
ofthemselves in matrimony; where these rights are a little infringed, the consent ofparents, relations, or 
guardians is necessary; where they are totally obliterated, they are disposed ofhy their kindred ...to the 








marriage itself are more conflicted. The voice of reason and propriety, Caroline does not 
see the failure to follow legal procedures as the central problem. Instead, Caroline notes 
that Clement's "feebleness of character" makes it difficult for her to rejoice in their 
union: "Had he been your equal, and had there been no secrecy in the case, I would have 
hailed your marriage . ...Motives the most chaste and holy guided you. No forms or 
ceremonies could add an atom to your purity, or make your's in the sight of heaven more 
a marriage" (141). Caroline believes, with Sibella, that their vows constituted a marriage; 
however, she rejects the logic of the Marriage Act, whereas Sibella had little (or no) 
knowledge of it to begin with. 13 
Fenwick taps into the cultural debate surrounding the Marriage Act through 
Caroline's discussion. Henry Stebbing in his 1755 Review argues that marriage "is simply 
and solely the Mutual Consent of the Parties: which is in its own Nature binding upon 
Conscience. The Intervention of Society neither adds to this Obligation, nor can diminish 
from it; but directs the Form and Manner ofmaking the Contract, so as to draw it under 
civil Cognisance [sic]" (Stebbing 36). Following the social and legal forms, however, is 
the only way "by which the Marriage lays Claim to civil Protection" (36).14 In his 
treatise A Vindication o/the Power o/States to Prohibit Clandestine Marriages (1755), 
James Tunstall argues, "A Limitation then of the natural Power ofcontracting Marriage, 
in every Subject of a Civil State, to the Solemnities and Circumstances of Marriage... 
[is] implied in the original Contract of Civil Society." In turn, a marriage that does not 
13 As I discussed in chapter three, the Marriage Act stipulated that the couple was required to post banns for 
three Sundays preceding the marriage. Also, marriages in which either party is under twenty-one years old 

were considered void, unless the parent or guardian publicly agreed to th,e union. Further, all the marriages 

had to be perfonned in a church, which was required to maintain public parish books of all unions. Finally, 

the Act required two witnesses besides the minister. 

14 In this treatise, Stebbing reestablishes the arguments he made in Enquiry concerning the Operations of 





fulfill the obligations of the state "in Reality is no Marriage" (23). Tunstall concludes: "A 
Marriage then between the Subjects of Civil Society, however complete in the 
Qualifications required by the Law ofNature, but deficient in Qualifications appointed, 
as necessary, by the Law of the State; does not carry with it the Force ofa Marriage in 
any Respect whatsoever" (24). In The History ofWomen, William Alexander explains 
that whether the oath of marriage be civil or religious, it derives force "from our ideas of 
moral rectitude and fidelity, and [the oath's] obligation upon us would be as strong, and a 
breach of it as immoral and dishonourable, ifwe made it in our closet, as if before 
witnesses" (260). Nevertheless, he continues, a person may not enter into marriage 
"according to his own whim and caprice, but according to all the forms and ceremonies 
prescribed by the laws ofhis country" (260). As it brings the full force of these 
arguments to bear on the description of Sibella's secret marriage and its consequences, 
the novel presents the tension between the private individual and the public state. IS 
Clement writes, "[T]he moon and stars shone sole witnesses ofour contract" 
(130). Using natural imagery in conjunction with "contract," Fenwick evokes both the 
law of nature and the marriage laws of eighteenth-century British society. Stebbing 
writes, "[A] Person's Right to the Use of the Marriage-bed neither is, nor can be vested in 
the State" (12). He recognizes that the issue is state power: 
15 In her article "The Marriage Act of 1753: 'A most cruel law for the Fair Sex,'" Eve Taylor Bannet notes 
that women writers generally responded in one oftwo ways. "Enlightenment Democrats," Bannet explains, 
privileged "conscience and morality" over legality: "What really counted was still the truth and troth of the 
union, not observance of the legal procedural forms" (242). On the other hand "Matriarchs" believed that 
following legal procedures would ensure women's virtue and protection, and "tried to get other women to 
understand that, after the Marriage Act, a legally solemnized contract ofmarriage was the only way to 
transfer the 'Property ofone's Person' to the 'Possession' ofanother which assured ladies a financial 
'Maintenance' in return" (242). Although she places Fenwick in the latter category, I argue that Fenwick's 







If the Power of States flowed from an inherent, underived Right within 
themselves, there would have been no Occasion to have gone to the natural Law. 
But if Society breaks out from the natural State, and has no more Power than what 
every Man yielded up to it by Consent or Compact; it will be impossible to settle 
the Power of States without shewing what are "natural Rights, and how, and how 
far, such Rights were, by the original Compact, transferred from Individuals and 
vested in the Body politick: beyond which if the Laws of Society go, they are 
contradictory to the natural Law. (14) 
In Observations on the Actfor Preventing Clandestine Marriages (1753), Alexander 
Keith notes that British law should not hinder marriage, a "divine privilege, which the 




~ 	 Act's stipulation that the man and the woman must be over twenty-one in order to marry 
against their parents' wishes, arguing that the "power here given by the Act to parents 
and guardians is altogether unscriptural" and "unreasonable" (9).16 The transfer ofpower 
not only occupies the attention ofStebbing and Keith; it also forms part ofFenwick's 
argument. 
The problems of the Marriage Act are only problems when Clement rejects the 
binding- nature of his and Sibella's private marriage. Clement initially appears to agree 
with Sibella's view of their marriage, as he calls their union a "contract" and writes to 
Murden, "I am her husband. She never heard of ties more holy, more binding, than those 
of the heart. Custom has not placed its sordid restraints 'on her feelings" (154). When 
Clement says "I am her husband," it is unclear whether he considers himself so, or 
16 He does note that the couple can petition the Lord Charicellor, Lord Keeper, or the Lords Commissioners 




Sibella believes this is the case. Significantly, he emphasizes that Sibella-"she"--does 
not see the bond of the state as prior and superior to her own heart. He, however, does 
understand the implications of her "natural" understanding. Further, Clement touches on 
a complicated issue when he says that Sibella relies on "the heart" for binding contracts. 
On the one hand, he is correct: Sibella considers her love for him pure and binding. 
Sacred and holy in Sibella's mind, their union partakes ofnatural law in its divine sense; 
that is, religious terminology connects this "marriage" to a divine source ofnatural law. 
While she states that her feelings for him impel her to pledge her permanent ties, Sibella 
also argues that her reason leads her to consummate their relationship. Writing to 
Caroline immediately before she proposes to Clement, Sibella asserts, "I am about to do 
nothing rash, 1 obey no impulse ofpassion, 1 have not separated duty and pleasure. 1 have 
examined the value of the object 1 would obtain with calmness; and whatever view 1 take 
of the means, still duty points to the part 1 have chosen (128). Against cultural notions of 
irrational passion, she does not dichotomize reason and feeling. Although Sibella's 
arguments seem persuasive, it is nevertheless significant that Clement would draw 
attention to Sibella's "heart"--doing so enables him to reject easily her claims on him. I7 
For someone who recognizes the claims ofpositive law rather than the law of nature, 
emotional ties can be loosed with impunity. 
Sibella argues that her reason, and concomitantly her duty, insists that she 
contract marriage with Clement. She tells Caroline that her "love and reason have 
become one" (128). By equating the heroine's love with her reason, Fenwick sets up the 
deadly conclusion: when Sibella's love and consequently her "natural" rational 
17 Although Fenwick does not indicate that Clement initially intends to reject Sibella, she does foreshadow 








understanding are rejected, she becomes mad with grief, and dies. This problematic 
conflation of heart and mind appears to contradict the claim that natural law is based on 
reason, which I examined through other Gothic novels. Although Sibella clings to the 
notion that rational thought processes led her to follow her duty and her pleasure, there 
remains a sense that Sibella might be in danger of self-delusion, a danger against which 
Gothic heroines from Emily to Madeline continually struggle. The consequences of 
Sibella's rejection ofpositive law are inscribed on her body, yet Fenwick delves into the 
complexities of such consequences rather than making Sibella's death a simple, logical 
result. 18 
One way in which Fenwick presents the problem of disease and "otherness" 
comes through an incident that seems to be an isolated subplot, but is in fact one of the 
keys to understanding the metaphors (and reality) of disease in the novel. In an early 
letter to Sibella, Caroline relates her strange encounter with a foreign woman. While 
Caroline dines at the country manor ofa wealthy acquaintance, a woman bursts into the 
room, flinging herself in front of Caroline's mother. As Caroline explains, this East 
Indian woman was searching for her son, who served as secretary to Sir Thomas Barlow, 
the owner of the country estate. Arriving in London, the mother "had languished in the 
extreme of misery and disease" (85), before traveling to Sir Thomas's home. Sir Thomas, 
Caroline's mother, and the rest ofthe wealthy guests recoil in disgust from the clearly ill 





18 Intriguingly, Henry Gaily, in his treatise Some considerations upon clandestine marriages (1750) notes 
that clandestine marriages have dangerous consequences, and that "the Provisions made to prevent them 
are, by no Means, adequate to the Disease" (2). His metaphorical reference to the "disease" of secret unions 
exemplifies the dangers that Fenwick's heroine faces. Attempting to redefme marriage, Sibella unwittingly 





however, the Indian woman dies from a fever shortly afterwards. 
Functioning as an uncivilized character, as well as a bearer of passion and 
illness,19 this colonized subject demonstrates the significant ways in which disease works 
in the novel. As Gilman explains, illness serves as a boundary that demarcates the 
"other," yet the contagious quality of disease renders that boundary permeable and 
frightening. First, the East Indian woman threatens others' physical health. Sir Thomas 
frets that her contagion will overtake his body: "The nabob recollected she had spoken of 
her fever in London; and already, he saw himself in the utmost danger, and half his 
family dead or dying of the mortal disease" (87). Additionally, she continues the novel's 
medicalized representation of place. Caroline tells Sibella that the frantic, raving mother 
cursed Britain as "a climate that would kill a dog" (86). In Bewell' s terms, such an 
indictment of climate also serves as a criticism of culture. Portraying the East Indian 
woman as pitiable, the narrative critiques the damaging effects of the English 
environment and patriarchal culture. Furthermore, this ill mother upsets constructions of 
value atpong British identities. Forced to respond to the disruption, the guests expose 
their true natures. The nabob is selfish instead of paternalistic, and the noblewomen are 
uncompassionate rather than beneficent. On the other hand, Murden, a supposed libertine, 
acts with generosity and tenderness, and Caroline, an independent, rational woman, 
displays sympathy and charity?O 
19 As Malinda Snow points out, this foreign woman also represents the exploitation that supports Britain's 
wealth. Although she argues that Sibella and the unnamed mother are parallel characters, Snow neglects to 
examine how disease might figure in to the representations of the two women. 
20 As the reader learns, Murden had been a devoted libertine who initially encouraged Clement to pursue 
sexual and fashionable pleasures. Once he learns of Sib ella's singular intelligence and unique nature, 
however, he gives up his libertine lifestyle and turns to charitable pursuits. Caroline, however, learns 
through the gossipy conversation of another guest at the estate that Murden only wears a "mask" of 




Likewise, Sibella acts as a disruptive force, particularly once she "marries" 
Clement and becomes pregnant. Moving from the contained spaces of the castle to the 
public spaces of London, she threatens the health of others: her child dies as she raves, 
and Murden dies of passionate disappointment. Furthermore, with her emotional demands 
and illegitimate pregnancy, she threatens the "health" of Clement's legal marriage to 
another woman and the health of the body politic by exposing marriage laws as a tool for 
corrupt men. Finally, Sibella as well as the Indian woman overturns British identity and 
values. Indeed, as I will argue, Fenwick critiques British culture and law, describing the 
various ways in which these forces destroy women's "natural" spirit. Specifically, disease 
functions in the novel as a signifier of the (generally invisible) progress of the damage 
these forces can do to the viotim. There ultimately appears to be no social space for the 
"other," exotic woman in this novel. 
The spatial references that Fenwick employs are both external and internal, which 
becomes especially clear once Sibella embraces secrecy. Fenwick indicates that the 
heroine's concealment results in an internal confinement that creates illness. The early 
emphasis on Sibella's robust health and intelligent thoughts makes her subsequent 
disintegration especially startling. Once she is "confined" by illegitimate pregnancy, she 
can no longer escape her body, which in turn is represented as a diseased space. Before 
her pregnancy, in a letter to Caroline, Sibella writes, "Is the mind so much fettered by its 
earthly clog the body, that it cannot long sustain these lofty flights, soaring as it were into 
divinity, but must ever sink back to its portion of pains and penalties?" (101). Her mental 





experiences are divine, lofty, soaring. Even before her pregnancy, Sibella identifies her 
body as a confining space that she longs to escape. 
After her sexual experiences with Clement, however, Sibella's body becomes 
even more entrapping. Moving from a confined yet self-determined subject position into 
her new identity as Clement's lover, Sibella no longer controls her body in the same way. 
The specter of disease begins to enter into Fenwick's descriptions of the heroine when 
Clement describes their sexual consummation as "those transports which wrap my senses 
in delirium" (130). Like his earlier, contagious misery, Clement's sexual delirium 
continues Fenwick's metaphorical link: of emotion with illness. Her use of the word 
"delirium" here echoes medical discussions ofdisease. For example, William Buchan's 
treatise makes multiple references to delirium as a symptom ofvarious diseases (such as 
smallpox, measles, or malignant quinsy) and fevers (such as nervous, scarlet, or putrid). 
Clement's indulgence of his feverish passion results in Sibella's pregnancy. Indeed, 
Clement regrets that he "stooped to gross allurements, and obeyed the calls of appetite," 
which "pollute[d]" him and made him unworthy of her "angelic purity" (154).21 Their 
secret sex does not result in venereal disease--even if the narrative slyly hints at such a 
connection-but pregnancy clearly marks Sibella's body with the consequences of their 
illegal passion. After their consummation, we begin to see more references to illness as 
Sibella's body begins to break down. For example, she suffers as she waits to hear from 
Clement: "Broken sleep and appalling visions create debility of mind and body for the 
21 Intriguingly, Clement's lover, Janetta, is a French emigre. Clement's "pollution" thus appears to have at 
least a possible connection to the French pox, the common term for syphilis. Toward the end ofthe novel, 
Caroline speaks to an acquaintance who tells her that Clement was seeking a physician and was "very bad, 
dreadfully bad, too bad to be seen." Caroline replies, "That he is bad, my Lord ... I can very well credit. 




ensuing dawn!" (249). Later, her pregnancy is marked by waves of "giddiness" and "an 
appearance of ill health" (251). 
The horrors of the illicitly pregnant body fmd expression in Clement's letter to 
Murden. Remarking on Sibella's desire to tell Valmont of their marriage, he writes "Was 
ever any thing so violent, so absurd, so pregnant with evil as this scheme?" (200). 
Rhetorically linking violent and evil results to "pregnant" schemes, Clement reveals the 
dangers that await Sibella. In that same letter, Clement first distinguishes between 
Sibella's and positive law's definition ofmarriage: "Her charms cannot pall in 
possession. Ever a source ofnew desire, of fresh delight, adoration must ever be her 
lover's tributer-Arthur, I will make her my wife" (200). Here, for the first time, Clement 
repudiates the contract that earlier he said made him Sibella's husband. While he initially 
calls their vows a contract, Clement knows that such a union has no legal force and that 
he is able to redefme their relationship when expedient. The status of their marriage and· 
the illegitimacy of Sibella's pregnancy only become "evil" after Clement positively 
denies the marriage. When Valmont discovers that his niece is pregnant and hears her 
claim that she and Clement are married, he demands that Clement explain. The faithless 
lover replies, "Miss Valmont's mode of expression is strong and vehement. She may call 
the early union of our affections a marriage, for I know o/none other . ... I flatter myself 
that you will rely on this assurance, and consider the assertions of your lovely niece as 
romantic as they really are" (283). In this moment, Clement sets in motion the events that 
will lead to Sibella's and their child's deaths. 
The legal geographies that Sibella must traverse prove deadly. Shocked by 




which Sibella exercises some territorial authority-that is, she asserts her independence 
even while confined-becomes a literal prison as Valmont prevents her from going to 
Clement. The spaces she inhabits thus undergo a significant change. While Sibella retains 
her virginal purity, she does not feel the boundaries ofpositive law. Once she "marries" 
Clement, however, she enters a new legal space and a new relationship to her body. Now 
confined by marriage laws, her pregnant body, and Valmont Castle, Sibella experiences 
illness and disease. In keeping with her independent character, she makes a very 
impressive attempt to escape by leaping in the moat, and does escape fmally, albeit with 
the help ofMurden. However, as Murden explains, she "panted for freer, respiration" and 
"is much worse for the journey" (323). Frantic and ill, Sibella proceeds to the fashionable 
London parlor of her worthless lover. As Sibella moves outward, beyond the confining 
castle, she becomes more ill and perhaps more dangerous. Cloistered and hidden, she can 
potentially be redeemed. Caroline, in fact, urges her to forget Clement and to marry 
Murden, even though Sibella carries Clement's child. But when she moves into the social 
circles that Clement inhabits, Sibella exposes her pregnancy and thus her sexual activity 
to the view of others. 
The devastating effects of Sibella's illegitimate pregnancy are first seen when 
Murden comes to rescue her from Valmont Castle. When she leaves his care to find 
Clement, he believes she has been kidnapped and goes insane. The scene in which 
Clement finally and irreparably rejects Sibella completes her descent into fatal illness. 
Her body and her feelings are so intertwined at this point in the narrative that each 
threatens to undo the other. Taking her to Clement's residence, Filmar describes Sibella's 
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intense emotion, "I was on the point of grasping her in my arms, lest her very form 
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should dissolve into feeling" (343). Physically and emotionally, Sibella verges on 
dissolution. No longer able to define her boundaries, the heroine is nearly a non-entity. 
Yet when she bursts into the London drawing room, Sibella fills the room with her 
powerful emotion. She rushes into Clement's arms, with Mrs. Ashburn (now Mrs. 
Montgomery) and Caroline watching. Wordlessly, Clement first retreats from Sibella's 
embrace, then he declares, "Madam, I am married," to which Sibella replies, "Are we not 
both married?" (345). She cries to Clement, "Lover! Husband! All!" before she collapses 
at his feet. Shrinking from her, Clement leaves his wretched lover on the floor. Clement's 
new wife promptly asserts the legality of her and Clement's marriage, and turns Sibella 
out of the house. 
This scene illustrates the ultimate clash of truths. The answer to Sibella's poignant 
question seems painfully obvious: Clement is indeed married to Caroline's mother, the 
former Mrs. Ashburn, whereas Sibella remains unmarried. Indeed, even critics can hardly 
refer to Clement and Sibella's marriage without qualification. The narrative demonstrates 
that when natura1law conflicts with positive law, the final definition ofmarriage belongs 
to positive law-and ultimately to Clement since he can enforce that definition if he 
chooses. Indeed, the novel indicates that the power of defming legal and even moral 
relationships rests with the state. Whatever Sibella's knowledge of their contract, 
whatever her belief in their union, the "truth" resides outside of her natural understanding 
and within the legal system that has the power to enforce truth and consequences. In 
Secresy, no providential intervention, no emotional commitment to natural law, will save 
Sibella from the consequences of Clement's perfidy when he takes shelter in positive law. 




Sibella, on the other hand, sees nothing coercive except the abstract qualities of virtue, 
justice, honor, truth, and faith, which appear in Gothic depictions of natural law. Because 
she does not concede society's "truths"-that is, bonds created by individuals and the 
state-she has no authority in the final scene. 
After Clement's rejection, the novel quickly draws to a close. Caroline attends 
Sibella as she gives birth to a stillborn child (347). The rejected suitor, Murden, dies 
beside her bed, the "Fatal end of an ungoverned passion" (357). Valmont repents: "sick, 
sick at heart" (357). Unrelieved by tears, Sibella raves as she holds her dead daughter and 
tells Caroline: "[I]t was mine own secrets destroyed me-Oh that fatal contract!" (358). 
The heroine's fmal statement invokes both medical and legal discourses. The contract is 
fatal because it is secret and non-legal-laws that specify the procedures of marriage 
contracts confme the heroine. Disease, then, forms a boundary around the "other," as the 
heroine's mind and body are corrupted by her passion and sexual experience, which are 
defmed as illicit through marriage laws. Positive law, in Fenwick's view, can potentially 
be a prophylaxis against such disease, since Clement could not have abandoned Sibella 
with impunity had they been "legally" married. Further, the legal geographies that trap 
Sibella could be protected spaces, in which she might freely express her ardent passion 
and sexual desire for her beloved. Because she rejects those boundaries, the heroine 
experiences the oppressive power ofpositive law in the poignant conclusion. 
Cultural pressure for Secresy's tragic ending comes from many sources, including 
medical discourse. In Domestic Medicine Buchan argues: "It is [woman's] province, not 
only to form the [child's] body, but also to give the mind its most early bias. They have it 






of society" (5). Sibella, with her monomania for Clement, seems incapable of 
perpetuating a strong, healthy British race. As Buchan describes the ways in which 
"diseased parents" spread their own illnesses and weaknesses through their children, he 
asserts, "The man who marries a woman of a sickly constitution, and descended of 
unhealthy parents, whatever his views may be, cannot be said to act a prudent part" (8). 
Sibella's removal from the narrative, as well as the death of her child, enables the novel 
to reestablish the healthy spaces of the British nation. Intriguingly, Buchan encourages 
such a connection by linking the castle, or family estate, with family health. He states, 
"Family constitutions are as capable of improvements as family estates; and the libertine, 
who impairs the one, does greater injury to his posterity, than the prodigal who squanders 
away the other" (9). Confiating space and health, Buchan also recognizes that legal 
inheritances depend on robust constitutions. 
Death, however, does not appear to be the only option for Fenwick's heroine. As 
previously mentioned, Caroline suggests an oddly optimistic vision for Sibella's future 
happiness. Fenwick presents the rather shocking possibility that Murden and Sibella 
might fall in love and marry, even after Sibella's sexual experiences with Clement-a 
possibility that the reader is encouraged to desire, against the social conventions that 
condemned illicitly sexual women. In a letter to Henry Crabbe Robinson, Fenwick 
expresses similarly unconventional (or at least unspoken) notions. She tells Robinson that 
her daughter's husband is en route from the West Indies to England: "[My daughter] has 
drawn an unhappy lot. Company and the prevalent vice of the West Indies (drinking) has 
detached Mr. Rutherford from his family and his duties. He had become not merely a 




England, where I trust he will remain.,,22 Seeing their separation as desirable, Fenwick 
suggests that women's happiness should not be sacrificed to bad marriages. Sibella's 
death, therefore, is a source of grief, not merely authorial punishment. Yet Sibella does 
seem contained at the end. In death, she no longer threatens Clement's "real" marriage or 
the social system. Her radicalism dies with her and her child; the disturbing elements are 
no longer present. The robust woman and innocent child are sacrificed to the dictates of 
social order that has no space for the exotic, the diseased, the "other." The reader is thus 
left with a sense of relief-and of tragedy. 
The Wrongs of Woman: or, Maria, a Fragment 
Mary Wollstonecraft's The Wrongs ofWoman: or, Maria, a Fragment (1798) 
recounts the suffering of several wronged women, with Maria Venables at the center. The 
novel begins as Maria awakens in a madhouse. Incarcerated by her wicked husband, 
Maria observes the insane people around her with horror and dismay. However, she 
meets and falls in love with a fellow inmate, Darnford, who has also been unjustly 
imprisoned in the asylum. He pledges his love to Maria, and she considers him her 
husband. Maria also cultivates a friendship with her warden, Jemima. Part of the novel is 
devoted to an account of Jemima's traumas. At the heart of the novel is Maria's own 
memoir to her infant daughter, which she writes in the madhouse. She recounts her 
childhood, early womanhood, and her wretched marriage to George Venables. The 
personal violations that she suffers while married to a brutish husband are offered as an 
example to her child and as an explanation for Maria's behavior. She attempts to leave 




Venables, but is captured, drugged, and imprisoned in the asylum, an experience which 
she vividly describes as being "buried alive." After Maria's memoirs end, the novel 
continues, if in incomplete form ("imperfect and mutilated," according to Godwin). For a 
brief chapt~r, Maria and Darnford live together in London, but the setting swiftly changes 
to the courtroom, where Darnford is accused of adultery and seduction. Maria writes an 
essay for the defense, in which she defends Damford and ultimately herself. Yet the 
judge, dismissing her argument, states that Maria's conduct "did not appear to be that of a 
person of sane mind." The final fragments offer little comfort or hope for Maria's 
ultimate happiness. 
I argue that Wollstonecraft's novel, like Fenwick's Secresy, also develops a 
connection between space, disease, and power. In Secresy Sibella is diseased because she 
is unlawful. In The Wrongs o/Woman, Maria is unlawful because she is "diseased." As 
she moves through institutions that corrupt her credibility and undermine her knowledge, 
Maria becomes progressively disempowered. What becomes increasingly clear is that 
men have the power of defining truth through medicine and through law. Although Maria 
proposes an alternative truth based on her sensibility, this alternative disappears in the 
face of institutional power. Women, Wollstonecraft suggests, cannot rely on their own 
understanding because it offers them no power. I will demonstrate that because Maria is 
incarcerated in the madhouse her claims are aligned with insanity when she makes her 
most elaborate and sustained polemic within juridical spaces. I assert that the novel 
makes concrete the inequities Maria experiences through the two institutions, rhetorically 
equating the diseased space of the madhouse with the corrupt space of the courtroom. The 




madness and rationality. Finally, I will explain that the novel illustrates how truth itself 
can become no more than ill-disguised power. 
Wollstonecraft's vision is a Gothic one.23 Maria is the "other" woman of the 
female Gothic. Instead of the virtuous, victorious heroine, she is the suffering, oppressed 
woman that such heroines ~ght encounter in their travels. Maria's story could be that of 
Laurentini, Olivia, or Victoria (Countess Wolfenbach). Just as Madeline Clermont's 
wronged grandmother writes to her son, Maria also writes her memoirs to her daughter. 
Maria is "other" in suffering, as she does not receive vindication; in sexuality, as she is 
not the virginal maid; and in mind, as she is burdened with the stigma ofmadness. 
Nevertheless, Wollstonecraft takes pains to distance herself from such Gothic romances. 
The very first paragraph both invokes and critiques the Gothic novel: 
Abodes of horror have frequently been described, and castles, filled with specters 
and chimeras, conjured up by the magic spell of genius to harrow the soul, and 
absorb the wondering mind. But. .. what were they to the mansion of despair, in 
one comer of which Maria sat, endeavouring to recall her scattered thoughts! (75). 
Wollstonecraft suggests that Gothic novels inadequately represent the horror of reality; 
instead, they fancifully play with emotio~s, leaving the reader with no knowledge of true 
horror. Although The Wrongs ofWoman is also fiction, Wollstonecraft claims a special 
status for her novel, placing it within the realm of reality. She writes, "[M]y sketches are 
not the abortion of a distempered fancy, or the strong delineations of a wounded heart. In 
23 Ferguson and Todd argue that Wollstonecraft "deftly employs gothic elements" as well as "the central 
theme of the persecuted virtuous woman who flees the aggressive 'sadist,'" even though she denies using 
such literary elements (116). Claudia Johnson notes that the novel "bring[s] the conventions of gothic 
fictions to bear on present-day England" and that the beginning "is an extended, one-upping allusion to 




writing this novel, I have rather endeavoured to pourtray passions than manners" (73).24 
Many critics point out that Mary W ollstonecraft intended The Wrongs ofWoman to serve 
as the fictional counterpart to, or second volume of, her Vindication ofthe Rights of 
Women, in much the same way that William Godwin's Caleb Williams fictionalized his 
Enquiry Concerning Political Justice. 
Omitting many of the supernatural elements, Wollstonecraft concentrates on the 
Gothic conventions that have real meaning for women in their oppressed condition. We 
see this especially in Maria's persecutions and in the institutions that confme women. 
Wollestonecraft also uses such Gothic elements as atmosphere, oppression, victimization, 
villain, pursuits, and ruins. Curiously, however, critical attention to The Wrongs of 
Woman has avoided discussion of the madhouse. The most common interpretation is that 
the madhouse parallels Maria's marriage: both imprison Maria. Indeed, some critics use 
the term "prison" interchangeably with "madhouse" as they analyze the nove1.25 The 
prison imagery is clear in the heroine's description ofthe asylum: "The gates opened 
heavily, and the sullen sound ofmany locks and bolts drawn back, grated on my very 
soul, before I was appalled by the creeking [sic] of the dismal hinges, as they closed after 
me. The gloomy pile was before me, half in ruins" (184). Taken up a staircase and down 
a long gallery, the drugged and confused Maria hears unearthly shrieks and sees twisted 
faces. The following day, she awakens: "[G]radually recovering the use of reason, I 
24 Wollstonecraft's attempt to dissociate her work from "distempered fancy" and "strong delineations" in 
her prologue, according to Gary Kelly, "refers to the way transgressive work by women writers was 
dismissed as madness or merely individual discontent" (207). See also Sandra Gilbert and Susan Gubar's 
classic analysis The Madwoman in the Attic (1984). 
25 Gary Kelly, for example, argues that Maria's "prison turns out to be a site ofliberatio~f'mind' ifnot 
bodt' (212). Because he overlooks the medical function of the asylum, however, Kelly fails to recognize 





began, starting affrighted from the conviction, to discover where I was confined-I 
insisted on seeing the master of the mansion-I saw him-and perceived that I was 
buried alive" (185). Although both are confining, it is significant that W ollstonecraft uses 
a mental asylum rather than a real prison. Because she is in a madhouse, Maria's claims 
are disregarded. This significance often escapes critical attention. Claudia Johnson is 
among the rare exceptions, as she writes, 
Maria's prison is also an insane asylum, and as such calls our attention to the 
complex issue ofmadness and delusion in the novel. Maria, after all, is a prisoner 
to her marriage but is also in a larger sense a prisoner to the delusoriness of love 
that chained her to Venables in marriage to begin with, a love that enchains her to 
Darnford as well. (Johnson 200-201) 
Johnson's analysis is persuasive, yet her focus on romantic delusions fails to account for 
the relationship between the asylum and the courtroom in the final scene. I argue that the 
two institutions work together to strip Maria of by redefining her arguments as madness. 
Symbolically and historically, the asylum constitutes a Gothic space that enables 
Wollstonecraft to demonstrate unjust institutional power. She writes in the introduction: 
"[M]y main object [is] the desire of exhibiting the misery and oppression, peculiar to 
women, that arise out of the partial laws and customs of society" (73). Both the asylum 
and the court are gendered spaces that subordinate women, yet positive law is supposed 
to be impartial. Drawing attention to the paradoxical quality of law, Wollstonecraft then 
turns to the madhouse to dramatize the wrongs of women. The eighteenth-century asylum 
occupies a liminal place between law and custom. Although not precisely a legal space, it 






it was possible for individuals to be incarcerated indefinitely, the asylwn generated 
cultural fears about secret abuses. As it physically removed and separated the mad person 
from society, the madhouse also exerted an imaginative power over social perception. 
The most spectacular and public example of the asylwn was Bethlem Hospital, or 
Bedlam. In Customers and Patrons ofthe Mad-Trade, Jonathan Andrews and Andrew 
Scull note that "Bedlam," Bethlem Hospital's epithet, "became identified in the English-
speaking world with chaos, tumult, danger, and disorder" (6). The hospital itselfwas an 
eighteenth-century tourist attraction: "[T]hrongs ofvisitors might inspect the product 
(and price) of immorality, the wreck of the human intellect, the dolor of the downcast, 
and the rages of the raving" (6-7). 26 Wollstonecraft took her realistic aims seriously; in 
February 1797, she and Godwin visited Bethlem to witness the treatment and conditions 
ofthe inmates (Kelly 211). Bedlam exemplifies the public asylwns; however, madness, 
in its many incarnations, was also managed privately. Indeed, Maria appears to be an 
inmate of a private asylwn. Medical historians record the nature and problems of such 
madhouses. Unlike larger institutions, private asylwns were often family ..owned; their 
therapies and cures were "family secrets" and "craft-skill[s]" (porter, Mind Forg'd 137). 
These asylwns were typically small since the owners often housed the inmates in a wing 
oftheir private home. Wardens also preserved the anonymity of their inmates at the 
request ofembarrassed families, a practice which was clearly open to abuse (137-38). 
The profit-making aspect ofprivate madhouses aroused fears ofcorruption. In 
Observations on the General and Improper Treatment ofInsanity (1790), Benjamin 
26 Although these examples are quoted in several sources, they are not universally accepted. In her article 
"Bedlam: fact or fantasy?" Patricia Allderidge argues that specific, commonly cited ideas about Bethlem 
simply were untrue-such as the use ofWhipping, the number ofvisitors, the typically lifelong 




Faulkner, keeper of a private madhouse, criticizes the dual role of the private asylum 
owner. As both physician and innkeeper, the madhouse manager has conflicting 
interests--curing and profiting. Faulkner proposes that physicians "whose knowledge 
cannot be surpassed, whose integrity is unimpeachable, and who can derive no advantage 
from the local situation of the afflicted" come into the madhouse at the request of the 
~ 
patient, while the asylum owner simply charges for accommodations (qtd. in Porter, Mind 
Forg'd 145). Wollstonecraft commented on Faulkner's work in the Analytical Review: 
"This pamphlet. .. may be reckoned a kind of advertisement. .. yet the useful hints and 
cautions, which it contains, deserve particular attention." Quoting Faulkner, she writes, 
"[T]o run into extremes, and to treat the patient as a confinned lunatic, locking him up 
from society, and debarring him the attentions of his friends, is a practice which no 
skilful and humane physician will adopt or countenance." 27 Wollstonecraft mentions ''the 
importance of this subject," which "renders any apology for the length of this extract 
[from the pamphlet] unnecessary." Clearly, this subject captured her attention and 
imagination as she wrote The Wrongs ofWoman. 
The historical realities of and the social fears regarding confmement shape 
W ollstonecraft's nightmare vision of the power that the asylum exerts over Maria. 
Proponents of refonn, for example, noted that the asylum could be used to incarcerate 
heirs and wives who did not confonn to their families' expectations. According to 
William Parry-Jones, opposition to private madhouses was common. Daniel Defoe, for 
example, argued that women were ''unjustly confin'd, while their husbands kept 
mistresses, etc., and many widows are lock'd up for the sake of their jointure" (qtd. in 




Parry-Jones 223). In one sensational case, a woman, confined in Turlington's madhouse 
at her husband's request, had to be rescued by her relatives through the courts. When the 
physician examined her and found her sane, the wife was released (225). This 1761 case 
paved the way for the Act of 1774, which limited the power and scope ofprivate asylums 
by issuing licenses and requiring inspections. However, the Act had only a marginal 
effect on the actual practices within the houses (288). Notwithstanding such stunning 
examples of injustice, Parry-Jones argues that the general impression that late eighteenth-
century, private madhouses were rampantly abusive and filled with illegally incarcerated 
women is untrue. While abuses did occur, he continues, to judge the treatment without 
examining cultural attitudes leads to unfounded claims about its cruelties (290). 
Such ambiguities surrounding the private asylum have resulted in critical 
confusion. Ferguson and Todd, for example, claim that Maria's husband "legally 
incarcerate[s]" her in the madhouse (106). Kathryn Temple, on the other hand, identifies 
Venables' act as illegal (72). The problem, however, is that the definitional power of 
insanity shifts between medical and legal discourse. In the above example, the courts may 
have set the unjustly confmed woman free, but a medical expert was' called to testify on 
her behalf. Furthermore, confmement itself was sometimes seen as the cause of insanity. 
In 1763, Gentleman's Magazine published an anonymous essay on private madhouses. 
"What must a rational mind suffer that is treated in this irrational manner?" the author 
asks, describing such a person as "Weakened by physic, emaciated by torture, diseased 
by confmement" (qtd. in Porter, Mind Forg'd 151). The author illustrates that 
confmement and disease are inextricably linked. In A Treatise on the Real Cause and 




consigning the unfortunate victims of Insanity to the cells of Bedlam, or the dreary 
mansions of some private confinement is certainly big with ignorance and absurdity" 
(59). Furthermore, he notes that confinement "destroys all the obligations of humanity, 
robs the sufferer ofevery advantage, and deprives him ofall the favourable 
circumstances which might tend to his recovery .... I am equally convinced that 
confinement never fails to aggravate the disease" (59-60). The primary reason for putting 
away mad people, he explains, is convenience. Harper concludes, "Confinement thwarts 
every salutary purpose, and defeats every effort which nature makes" (61). The Wrongs 
ofWoman engages with this cultural conversation, indicating that Maria's predicament is 
realistic. Further, by showing the reader that Maria is sane, Wollstonecraft indicates that 
confmement threatens Maria's sense of self and of reality. This intersection of medicine 
and law illustrates that certain bodily "realities" can be produced. 
In her confinement, Maria notices the other inmates, whom she can see from her 
window, and "contemplate [ s] the most terrific of ruins-that of a human soul," which she 
calls a "living memento of the fragility, the instability, of reason, and the wild luxuriancy 
ofnoxious passions" (83). As a "ruin," the mad person embodies the decaying buildings 
of the Gothic novel. The geography of the soul is subject to natural forces that may be out 
of an individual's control: "[A] mental convulsion, which, like the devastation of an 
earthquake, throws all the elements of thought and imagination into confusion, makes 
contemplation giddy, and we fearfully ask on what ground we ourselves stand" (84). 
Wollstonecraft plays with the relationship ofmadness to reason. She does not argue that 
madness does not exist except in the oppressive definitions of men. Instead, she examines 
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the significance ofmadness, probing what it might mean to lose one's "self': 
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Thinking it selfish to dwell on her own sufferings, when in the midst ofwretches, 
who had not only lost all that endears life, but their very selves, her imagination 
was occupied with melancholy earnestness to trace the mazes ofmisery... Often 
at midnight was she waked by dismal shrieks of demoniac rage, or of excruciating 
despair, uttered in such wild tones of indescribable anguish as proved the total 
absence of reason, and roused phantoms ofhorror in her mind, far more terrific 
than all that dreaming superstition ever drew. (92) 
In this Gothic moment, W ollstonecraft notes that absence of the "self' is the ultimate 
horror. Madness tears apart emotion and reason, passion and will, leaving a miserable 
being full of rage, despair, anguish. Such wretches experience emotional suffering 
without the "self' that can govern the feelings and transform them into knowledge. 
Instead of collapsing in terror or grief, Maria retains her ability to reflect on her 
situation. She thinks about the madness that surrounds her in order to conjecture its cause 
and to think of solutions. The narrator notes, 
Maria, accustomed to generalize her observations, was led to conclude from all 
she heard, that it was a vulgar error to suppose that people of abilities were the 
most apt to lose the command of reason. On the contrary, from most of the 
instances she could investigate, she thought it resulted, that the passions only 
appeared strong and disproportioned, because the judgment was weak and 
unexercised; and that they gained strength by the decay of reason (92-93). 
Maria thinks like a scientist or even like a physician. She theorizes, investigates, 
generalizes, and concludes. In every situation she encounters, Maria attempts to reason as 






demonstrates sensitivity toward others and grief for her daughter. While in the asylum, 
she resists her environment, which exerts a pervasive hold over her emotions and mind. 
She finds the madhouse horrifying, and often expresses her fears that she will not escape. 
Wollstonecraft' s attention to her heroine's mind and body reflects her 
commitment to exploring the knowledge that the material mind generates. W ollstonecraft 
recognizes that perception, reason, emotion, and will are connected. Maria's intellectual 
and emotional development before her incarceration plays an important role in her 
ultimate experiences within the madhouse. For example, she decides to leave England, 
hoping that a change of scenery will cheer her mind Maria explains that this is the 
"natural" result of travel "unless we carry the barbed arrow with us, and only see what we 
feel" (182). Later, the narrator notes, "We see what we wish, and make a world of our 
own-and, though reality may sometimes open a door to misery, yet the moments of 
happiness procured by the imagination, may, without a paradox, be reckoned among the 
solid comforts of life" (189). These two comments are psychologically influenced 
articulations of the subjective construction of the individual's perception. Imagination 
becomes reality; reality is the result of the individual's subjectivity. Susan Khin Zaw 
argues that Wollstonecraft intended "to show that reason and feeling, public and private, 
culture and nature are inextricably intertwined; she was struggling to reconceive them so 
that instead ofconflicting, they strengthen each other" (92). Although Zaw primarily 
examines Vindication o/the Rights o/Women and Original Stories, this struggle 
manifests itself in The Wrongs o/Woman. According to Alan Richardson, 
Wollstonecraft's views on education reflected Lockean principles ofpsychology, 




rational abilities. Although Wollstonecraft generally subscribes to Locke's associationist 
principles, she also attributes "a fonnative role ... to 'innate' principles of truth and to 
'feelings which nature has implanted in us as instinctive guards to virtue'" (27).28 
Through Jemima, Maria's warden in the asylum, Wollstonecraft explores the 
relationship among reason, feeling, sensibility, and justice. Earlier in Jemima's life, she 
demonstrates "perversions of the understanding." Growing up without affection or 
wannth, physically and emotionally abused, and treated as a servant, Jemima exemplifies 
the oppressed, lower-class woman. The novel's portrayal of Jemima is unusual in several 
respects, not the least of which is Jemima's intelligent, articulate discussion ofher 
oppression. The narrator explains that when Jemima decides to act compassionately 
toward Maria, she enters a new sphere of understanding: "A sense ofright seems to result 
from the simplest act of reason, and to preside over the faculties of the mind, like the 
master sense of feeling, to rectify the rest; but. .. how often is the exquisite sensibility of 
both weakened or destroyed by the vulgar occupations, and ignoble pleasures of life?" 
(80). Although she exhibits a will to knowledge, Jemima's story demonstrates how social 
and class experience "educate" her to be the person she becomes. 
Intriguingly, there remains a discourse ofnature running through Jemima's story. 
She tells Maria and Darnford that her stepmother blamed Jemima's misconduct on "the 
wicked disposition which I had brought into the world with me, inherited from my 
mother" (104). The idea that moral corruption is genetic, natural, passed from mother to 
28 The Cambridge Companion to Mary Wollstonecraft. See also Saba Bahar in Mary Wollstonecraft's 
Social and Aesthetic Philosophy, (New York: Palgrave, 2002), who argues that Wollstonecraft was 
influenced by sensationalist psychology (97-111). Reason, for Wollstonecraft, was innate, whereas 
knowledge was acquired through a struggle with the passions: "Modesty, defined as the acquisition of 
virtue and knowledge through the exercise of reason, and come only with experience ofthe. world" (85). 
L 
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daughter is particularly noteworthy. W ollstonecraft recognizes that such notions 
contribute to the continued oppression ofwomen, even though her depiction of Jemima 
illustrates her belief that miseducation is responsible for women's corruption. Indeed, the 
possibility of inherited insanity belongs within such a discourse, as later events prove. 
W011stone craft ultimately argues that physical conditions, especially the body's 
condition, affect moral and intellectual development: "The mind is necessarily 
imprisoned in its own little tenement; and, fully occupied by keeping it in repair, has not 
time to rove abroad for improvement. The book ofknowledge is closely clasped, against 
those who must fulfil [sic] their daily task of severe manual labor or die; and curiosity, 
rarely excited by thought or information, seldom moves on the stagnate [sic] lake of 
ignorance" (114). Confined by the body, the mind is doubly imprisoned when freedom is 
stripped away, as in Maria's situation. 
In her memoirs, Maria describes her delusions, especially the most dangerous 
one--believing that Venables was a suitable companion. As mentioned above, Johnson 
connects Maria's self-imposed, romantic delusions to her confinement in the asylum. 
Wollstonecraft, however, carefully explains that Maria's fantasies are corrected over the 
course of the novel as she gains more experience. Wollstonecraft insists that even 
mistaken impressions can be rectified. The narrator excuses Maria's romantic mistakes, 
caused in part by her "ardent imagination," because of her inexperience and immaturity. 
In fact, Maria's youthful errors "prove the strength of her mind," although those same 
errors committed in her maturity "would demonstrate [the mind's] weakness, its 
incapacity to acquire a sane judgment" (99). Degeneration of mind causes women to 





to "act from the impulse of a nerved mind, able to choose its own pursuit" (99).29 
However, the asylum and the courtroom close off the circuit of error and enlightenment, 
leaving only the stigma of irrationality and criminality. 
When her husband sues Darnford for seduction and adultery, Maria argues at her 
lover's defense. Her history of confinement in the madhouse, however, renders her voice 
powerless. Indeed, one of the earliest statements made within the court rhetorically places 
Maria back in the madhouse. The prosecution asserts: "After the birth of her child, her 
conduct was so strange, and a melancholy malady having afflicted one of the family, 
which delicacy forbade the dwelling on, it was necessary to confine her" (194).30 The 
lawyer combines vague hints at a family history of insanity with sentimental appeal in 
order to avoid naming Maria's disease. Like Jemima, Maria is tainted with genealogy. 
This assertion of "fact" (that is, no witnesses or doctors are necessary to support the 
claim) circumscribes Maria's essay. The judge finally uses the stigma of insanity to reject 
her appeals. As Maria's rationality appears illusory, she is unable to insert her voice into 
the legal discourse that joins with medical discourse to render her ineffectual.31 
29 According to Zaw, Wollstonecraft believed moral education could break: down gender hierarchies. The 
dichotomy Zaw explores between male and female versions of moral reasoning is resolved in 
Wollstonecraft's careful program ofmoral education. Zaw asserts, "Wollstonecraft ... thought justice was 
a fonn ofcare" (85). Wollstonecraft has a clear vision of female psychology, which enables her to make 
claims about women's moral knowledge. Catherine Parke notes that Wollstonecraft attempted to "redefme 
sensibility... toward a new definition that would combine the qualities of self-defmition with justice" 
(104). 
30 In his medical treatise, Harper rejects the notion that insanity is hereditary. He also notes: "Perturbations 
ofmind that proceed from bodily causes are merely circumstantial and temporary, and being only a 
symptomatic affection, and not an original disease, the derangement, which is the symptom, will cease 
when the first cause is removed" (vii). The insane person, interestingly, exhibits anatomical deviations, or 
"a material difference in the confonnation and appearances of the brain of [insane] individuals" (3-4). 
31 Interestingly, critics also misidentify Maria as insane. Roy Porter argues that Wollstonecraft "places her 
eponymous heroine in the madhouse as a 'slave' ofher villainous husband, conceiving ofher as a superior 
being by virtue ofthat persecution which drives her out ofher senses" (107). Although a "slave" in 
marriage, Maria does not go mad; she is not driven out ofher senses. Porter's mistake indicates an easy 






Being in a madhouse thus becomes conflated with being mad, as the courtroom 
scene illustrates. The lingering sense that Maria's voice is too passionate and 
emotional--qualities aligned with at least some fonns ofmadness--comes through in 
analyses of the courtroom scene. Kathryn Temple, in "Imagining Justice: Gender and 
Juridical Space in the Gothic Novel," argues that Maria inappropriately uses "the 
discourse of sensibility" in the courtroom, which "results in [her] expulsion from juridical 
culture" (71). Temple believes that, "at the very moment when she had been given the 
opportunity to demonstrate a 'manly' reliance on reason, Maria's 'paper' selfrelies on 
sentimentality and insists on the importance of women's subjective experience over that 
of black-letter law" (73). According to Temple, Maria's rejection of legal language 
(Temple gives precedence and generalization as two such possibilities) "allows the judge 
to classify her not as 'Woman' but as one particularly difficult, possibly mad woman" 
(74). There is a clash, Temple explains, between two linguistic registers-the 
particularized, emotional language of sensibility and the generalized, objective language 
oflaw.32 Gary Kelly, on the other hand, explains that Maria's appeal to justice and 
humanity was a common rhetorical strategy (230, n. 2). Maria's phrase "man to man," 
according to Kelly, "suggests that the relation of woman to man is only a particular case 
of the general principles of 'right' and 'justice' that should apply to all relationships and 
be embodied in law" (220) Kelly calls Maria's style "brisk, clear, detached but frrm," 
illustrating "Maria's capacity to reason from personal experience, and thereby make her 
own choices in life" (221). 
32 Syndy MicMillen Conger makes a similar claim: "Wollstonecraft's innovative metaphoric use ofa 
madhouse in her last novel lends some credence to the claim that her language of sensibility can imprison 




There does indeed appear to be a conflict of discourses in the courtroom scene. 
However, this conflict arises not from sensibility's clash with legal language. Instead, it 
comes from two sources: the taint of irrationality that Maria brings with her from the 
madhouse and the register of natural law that inflects legal discourse with revolutionary 
individualism.33 Early in the courtroom scene, Wollstonecraft alludes to more 
conventional expressions of Gothic heroinism: 
A strong sense of injustice had silenced every emotion, which a mixture of true 
and false delicacy might otherwise have excited in Maria's bosom. She only felt 
in earnest to insist on the privilege of her nature. The sarcasms of society, and the 
condemnation of a mistaken world, were nothing to her compared with acting 
contrary to those feelings which were the foundation of her principles. (195) 
Maria's nature and feelings are foundational to her moral sense. In this, she sounds much 
like the Gothic heroines of The Castle ofWolfenbach and The Orphan ofthe Rhine. Like 
Matilda and Laurette, Maria depends on her internal self to supply her moral dictates. 
Maria accepts Darnford's argument against oppressive marriage laws: "Ties ofthis nature 
could not bind minds governed by superior principles; and such beings were privileged to 
act above the dictates of laws they had no voice in framing, if they had sufficient strength 
of mind to endure the natural consequence" (187). Firmly asserting her own moral sense 
and mental strength, Wollstonecraft's heroine attempts to redefine the boundaries that 
law places on her actions. Furthermore, Maria rejects the intruding, judgmental gaze of 
others-their "sarcasms" and "condemnations"-in ways that resemble Amanda in The 
33 Wollstonecraft directly refers to the French Revolution at the end of the novel. The judge announces, 
"We did not want French principles in public or private life--and, ifwomen were allowed to plead their 






Children ofthe Abbey. Nevertheless, her "nature," "sense," and "feelings" are codified 
and regulated within medical and juridical discourse. Because Maria, like Sibella, 
participates in unlawful sexuality, she cannot survive in the social spaces Wollstonecraft 
depicts. 
Maria's essay, read aloud by the defense, provides a polemic against oppression 
and a justification ofher sexuality. She mentions her early, blind submission "to the rigid 
laws which enslave women" and her obedience to "the man whom I could no longer 
love" (195). She lists Venables' infidelities and describes his attempted prostitution of 
her. He squandered her fortune, her settlement, which she gave to him after inheriting her 
uncle's fortune. Because he never beat her, Maria explains, she had little recourse to 
positive laws that would protect her-that is, she could not swear the peace against him. 
She states that she was hunted like a criminal and finally imprisoned in a madhouse. Her 
attachment to Darnford, she explains, was willing and intentional, "never considering 
myself as any more bound to transgress the laws of moral purity, because the will ofmy 
husband might be pleaded in my excuse, than to transgress those laws to which [the 
policy of artificial society has] annexed [positive] punishments" (197, original brackets 
by Godwin). 
Maria rejects charges of seduction, asserting that she willingly went with 
Darnford. Based on her husband's perfidy, she claims a divorce and the right to her 
fortune. She argues, "A false morality is even established, which makes all the virtues of 
women consist in chastity, submission, and the forgiveness of injuries" (197). As 
previously discussed, forgiveness is a virtue at which Gothic heroines excel. In The 




like two "ministering angels," offering the forgiveness he requests. Yet Sleath's 
conclusion, with its self-punishing villain, releases the heroines from the burden of 
prosecution. They can freely forgive because the villain repents and because he is about 
to die. W ollstonecraft, on the other hand, does not return to a natural or internal moral 
order. No one rescues Maria, nor does her villainous husband crave her forgiveness. Left 
alone in the institutions that shape her subject position, Maria rejects the passive virtues 
that, according to Wollstonecraft, perpetuate injustices. Unlike the heroines who operate 
under the law ofnature, Maria attempts to claim property and legal independence. 
As part of her defense, Maria attempts to establish the completely separate 
\ 
interests ofher husband and herself. However, the principles ofcoverture and the laws 
governing evidence and testimony make such a separation nearly impossible. Gilbert's 
Laws on Evidence states: 
Husband and Wife cannot be admitted to be Witnesses for or against each other. 
For if they swear for the Benefit of each other, they are not to be believed, 
because their Interests are absolutely the same ... And it would be very hard that 
a Wife should be allowed as Evidence against her own Husband, when she cannot 
attest for him: such a Law would occasion implacable Divisions and Quarrels, and 
destroy the very legal Policy of Marriage that has so contrived it, that their 
Interest should be but one; which it could never be ifHusbands were permitted to 
destroy the Interests of the Wife, nor could the Peace ofFamilies be well 
maintained, if the Law admitted any Attestation against the Husband (230). 
Referring to the legal fiction of inseparable interests, Gilbert raises an issue that troubles 




husband and wife. Yet as Gilbert recognizes, positive laws can just as easily create the 
opposite effect. ~ his A General Abridgment ofLaw and Equity (1791-95) Viner agrees: 
"A feme covert cannot be a witness against her husband . .. for it would be, if admitted, 
an occasion of perpetual dissension between man and wife"{12.2). The legal experts 
present a united front in disallowing wives' testimony against husbands; however, they 

. do not dismiss completely the possibility ofwives as witnesses. For example, Viner lists 

two precedents (12.2), and even Gilbert reluctantly and with much qualification admits 

that in a case where the husband assisted in his wife's rape, the wife was allowed to 
testify against her husband (231). 
In eighteenth-century law, Maria would be barred from testifying against her 
husband. Faced with this historical problem, Wollstonecraft offers a partial solution with 
Maria's essay. However, this method has several limitations. According to Viner, 
witnesses "may assist themselves or demean in giving their Evidence." Maria does not 
appear to assist herself in her court case because she fails to follow proper protocol. First, 
her statement is read by her lover's lawyer, a proceeding that does not command the same 
attention as "viva voce" testimony. As Viner explains, "Where a witness swears to a 
matter, he is not to read a paper for evidence, though he may look upon it to refresh his 
memory; but if he swears to words, he may read it, ifhe swears he presently committed it 
to writing, and that these are the very words" (12.33). The rationale for this, Viner 
continues, is to discover the truth through questioning and spontaneous replies. In some 
cases, though, written statements are allowable: "Evidence viva voce is always best; and 
though the law requires the bestproofthat can be had, yet when better cannot be had, it 








A second consideration is the content of Maria's letter. The laws of evidence 
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state, "Witnesses are sworn to tell the truth ofwhat they know, not what they believe, for 
they are to swear nothing but what they have heard or seen" (Viner 12.40). Although 
Maria testifies to a litany of atrocities committed by her husband, she also draws 
conclusions and makes appeals to reason and justice. Viner clarifies this distinction: "A 
witness swears, but to what he hath seen or heard, generally, or more largely, to what 
hath fallen under his senses; but a juryman swears to what he can conclude, and infer 
from the testimony ofsuch witnesses, by the act and force of his understanding, to be the 
fact inquired after" (47). Even some of her husband's monstrous acts are not admissible 
as evidence, although they might have some effect on the ruling: "Licence by husband to 
the wife to lie with another man, cannot be pleaded in bar to an action of trespass by the 
husband, nor that she was a notorious lewd woman; but these matters may be given in 
mitigation of damages" (4.65).34 The legal intricacies that Viner explains are simply not 
examined in Wollstonecraft's conclusion. IfWollstonecraft did know this law of 
evidence, she ignores it in to expose women's oppression--or perhaps to illustrate the 
problems of such evidentiary laws. 
Maria's essay thus seems to be directed toward the reader, in a rhetorical rather 
than realistic setting. In the eloquent style of Gothic heroines, Maria argues, "While no 
command of a husband can prevent a woman from suffering for certain crimes, she must 
be allowed to consult her conscience, and regulate her conduct, in some degree, by her 
34 In Every Man His Own Lawyer, Giles Jacob explains, "Action oftrespass lies generally for any wrong or 
damage, which is done with force and arms by one private man to another... In all trespasses, there ought 
to be a voluntary act, and a damage" (82). Although Venables' attempts to prostitute his wife would bar 
him from seeking damages from that relationship, Maria's attempts to mitigate damages on the basis of 





own sense of right" (197). Wollstonecraft echoes Sarah Chapone's The hardships ofthe 
English laws in relation to wives (1735). Chapone argues, "[Men] have voted us Dead in 
Law, except in criminal Causes. They do us indeed the Favour to consider us as real 
Persons, when they think fit to burn or hang us: This is incorporating with a 
Vengeance!" (51). Pointing out the law's inconsistent treatment of women, Chapone also 
notes that women's bodies disappear in the law, until certain crimes "re-incorporate" 
them. Thus, positive law symbolically declares women's death until it resurrects their 
bodies for capital punishment. Through the courtroom scene, Wollstonecraft illustrates 
the difficulty ofbreaking away from this civil death and acting with self-determination. 
Maria implicitly argues that law based on force and coercion cannot bind independent 
citizens. She states, "1 wish my country to approve of my conduct; but, if laws exist, 
made by the strong to oppress the weak, 1 appeal to my own sense ofjustice, and declare 
that 1 will not live with the individual, who has violated every moral obligation which 
binds man to man" (197). Furthermore, like natural law theorists, she wants and needs the 
law to mean more than collective will, more than unjust power. 
The sense of right and justice to which Maria refers are personal feelings, yet they 
carry the impersonal authority of natural law. Wollstonecraft employs the language of 
equity, another branch ofjudicial authority that was equally as codified and systemized as 
common law, with its own jurisdiction. However, equity laws were designed to provide 
access to the courts to enforce a legal right. In her conclusion, Maria asserts, "1 appeal to 
the justice and humanity of the jury-a body ofmen, whose private judgment must be 
allowed to modify laws, that must be unjust, because definite rules can never apply to 
indefinite circumstances" (198). In A treatise ofequity (1793-95), John Fonblanque 
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explains, "For, as the universal laws ofmatter, in many instances would prove hurtful to 
particulars if art were not to interpose and direct them aright; so the general precepts of 
municipal law would oftentimes not be able to attain their end, if equity did not come in 
aid of them" (1.10). Maria's general appeals to justice apply to the jurisprudence of 
equity law. Significantly, she works within legal discourse, even as she refers to 
principles outside positive law that shape her beliefs. At times W ollstonecraft indicates 
that positive law, perhaps interpreted through laws of equity, has the potential to enact 
justice, but she ultimately forecloses such redeeming qualities. In consequence, Maria has 
no recourse to any enforceable rights, and as the fragmented endings suggest, she has few 
options. 
Wollstonecraft here also refers to the highly contested principle of "jury 
nullification," in which juries were allowed to decide according to "conscience." Simon 
Stem's article "Between Local Knowledge and National Politics: Debating Rationales for 
Jury Nullification" traces the history and legal implications of this principle. In the late 
seventeenth century, as Whig dissenters were being tried for "seditious libel and treason," 
the jurors refused to prosecute and instead "returned findings of ignoramus ('we know 
nothing of it')" (1819). Consequently, the judge had no power either to sentence the 
accused or to force the jury to render a guilty verdict. The balance ofpower shifted to the 
jury, whose ability to "find both law and fact" established their capacity to find facts 
according to their personal understanding. The new debates, then, centered on juries' 
"personal knowledge." Simon states that "one of the main factors prompting juries to 
nullify involves a sense of kinship with the defendant. In such cases, even if the jurors are 






attack as 'personal'" (1857-58). Maria's pleas to the jury fit well within a tradition of 
legal justice and within a rational, appropriate rhetorical style. The Wrongs ofWoman 
thus provides two legal means ofredress, yet neither proves effective. 
When she argues against the legal claims ofher husband and her legal status as 
wife, Maria exposes the central problem ofher experiences within both the courtroom 
and the asylum. Maria claims, "The death of my babe dissolved the only tie which 
subsisted between me and my, what is termed, lawful husband" (197). Embedded in this 
assertion is a gesture toward the definitional power of law, although she also indicates a 
limit to that definition. Wollstonecraft brings the problem ofMaria's "insanity" to bear 
on the courtroom drama. In his study of Old Bailey Trials with insanity pleas between 
1760 and 1815, Joel Peter Eigen explains, "[I]t was the subtle twists and turns ofmoral 
insanity, of inhibitory insanity, and of irresistible will which required the special insight 
ofa physician to 'bring the pathology to light'" (38). The judge's influence on the jury, 
however, remained intact. He was "examiner-in-chief for both the witness and the 
accused" and had "[apparently] unlimited power to comment on the events of the trial 
while court was in session" (39). Eigen documents the judge's broad hints and directions 
in this "judicially dominated social setting" (39) It was often in the judge's power to 
direct the jury to consider the defendant insane or not. Scientific proofs, then, were only 
partially responsible for influencing the jury's decision (45). The dialogue between 
medical and legal discourses, Eigen argues, "was conducted in a highly structured social 
setting where the language of disease was decidedly subordinate to the legal concern with 
intent.... Competing dialogues were certainly in evidence, but it was not a dialogue 




Eigen's argument illustrates two significant problems that Maria faces in the 
courtroom. First, because the judge can direct the jury's consideration of Maria's case, 
his opinion of the medical "evidence" dominates the judicial process. Her appeals to the 
jury thus become futile. Second, Maria's presence in the madhouse confrrms her insanity 
in a circular, self-evident proposition. Once inserted into this space, she cannot escape its 
defining power unless redeemed by medicine or law. Because the judge refuses to 
recognize Maria's rationality, her essay has no power, force, or efficacy in judicial 
spaces. Maria's hyper-medicalized body thus disrupts her argument that reason and self­
governance should be the basis of positive law, an argument that forms the basis of most 
political and legal philosophy·in the eighteenth century. 
The judge ultimately argues that it is a "fallacy" to let "women plead their 
feelings" (198). He continues, "What virtuous woman thought of her feelings?-It was 
her duty to love and obey the man chosen by her parents and relations, who were 
qualified by their experience to judge better for her, than she could for herself" (199). He 
dismisses what he calls the vague, unsubstantiated claims made by Maria, whose conduct 
"did not appear that of a person of sane mind" (199). There is no judgment given, 
however, and there is a hint that she might pursue a separation in the ecclesiastical courts. 
Wollstonecraft presents the judge as a particular person rather than a universal 
embodiment of law-she gives him a voice and a character. This humanization points to 
the particular prejudices and human flaws imbedded in the legal system. Although 
Wollstonecraft earlier writes, "Truth is the only basis ofvirtue" (153), she demonstrates 
here that truth and power can be contlated within unjust institutions. Madness occupies a 






that can be cured, while in law, insanity effectively removes political agency. 
Wollstonecraft's description of women as "idiots" in law brings the full implications of 
Maria's incarceration to bear on the narrative. She notes that a husband is allowed "with a 
show ofjustice, to keep this idiot, or perpetual minor, for ever in bondage" (159). Indeed, 
it is unsurprising that the judge deems Maria mentally incompetent-not simply because 
the law had already pronounced her absent through coverture, but because the entire 
structure of the novel, bound by the madhouse, renders Maria's voice suspiciously 
irrational. 
Like Fenwick, Wollstonecraft offers no utopian vision, no vindication ofwomen's 
rights, no justification of her heroine's bold claims. In The Wrongs ofWoman, the Gothic 
romance turns horrific without scenes of domestic bliss to counter the preceding terrors. 
The potential for Maria's ultimate fulfillment, for love and happiness, is held out in the 
fragments at the end, without a conclusion. Godwin, as W ollstonecraft' s posthumous 
editor, includes an extended passage in which Maria attempts suicide but decides to live 
for her child. In other sketches that W ollstonecraft listed as possible endings, however, 
Maria's fate seems to be death or wretchedness. Maria's and Sibella's attempts to create 
positive freedom (the freedom to act}-end disastrously.35 Both transgressive heroines 
suffer deeply for their transgressions and mistakes. In one of the fragmented endings, 
Wollstonecraft depicts Maria's sense of triumph as she rejects suicide. Yet, this 
triumph-"I willlive!"--comes only through a kind of sacrifice, a giving up of self: "I 
will live for my child!" Sibella, on the other hand, does not find motherhood redeeming. 
35 By contrast, the freedom that Gothic heroines such as Laurette receive is a negative freedom: they are 
free from threat or violation, although they also enjoy a measure ofpositive freedom in that they can 






Instead of living for her child or for herself, Fenwick's heroine dies in despair and 
anguish. Unable to develop agency within the spaces they inhabit, both Maria and Sibella 
exhibit the symptoms of a diseased social order. In both novels, therefore, the authors 
demonstrate the oppressive power of law and medicine, which work together to render 






Conclusion: Embodiment and Gender 
Over the course of this project I have argued that female Gothic novels of the 
1790s serve as textual agents ofresistance. The last decade ofthe eighteenth century was, 
as many historians and literary scholars note, a tumultuous period marked by revolution 
and reform. While Gothic novels written by women during this decade do indeed reflect 
revolutionary fervor and anxieties, it is my belief that the novels depict more specifically 
discourses that women experienced on a deeply personal level. As I have illustrated, 
medicine and law exerted considerable influence over the ways in which women 
perceived themselves, their bodies, their choices, their virtue. Because neither medical 
nor legal discourse is seamless, the Gothic novelists I have examined are able to respond 
with their own versions of female physicality as they attempt to imagine women's 
agency. Exposing the ideological work ofsuch dominant discourses, the novels in this 
study offer representations of the female subject that break down binaries ofmind and 
body, as well as reason and emotion. Since the heroines reflect an embodied self that 
might participate in self-determination, I have focused on particular medical and legal 
attempts to inscribe the female body. In turn, I demonstrate that the heroines often deploy 
a rhetoric ofjustice that empowers their struggles to overcome physical determinism. 
My contribution to the critical conversation lies in my examination of the 
historical and literary material that shaped cultural notions ofwomen's bodies, minds, 
and rights. Even as scholars recognize the considerable influence ofGothic conventions 
on Romantic-era literature, they frequently relegate such popular but neglected novels as 






literary history. Scholars generally skim through the Gothic genre without necessarily 
noticing finer distinctions and nuances that a closer examination would reveal. Such 
neglect is unfortunate because it fails to develop the variations that make this popular 
genre complex. Certainly Radcliffe has garnered a great deal of attention, as a cursory 
glance at Gothic studies might reveal, yet the powerful image of the Gothic female body 
has only been partially explored. Throughout this project, I have examined the cultural 
configurations of female bodies and identities which preoccupied these women writers. In 
so doing, I argue that the body's discursive shape within eighteenth-century medical and 
legal texts has a distinct bearing on the Gothic novels in this study. In tum, these 
neglected novels do not take scientific objectivity as axiomatic, even though medicine 
and law appear to approach the body with systematic detachment. Indeed, they often 
expose the interested nature of medical and legal discourses as they depict women's 
physical experiences. Although typically fantastic, the narratives address realistic 
concerns over the nature of the self and its relationship to institutional forces. 
I have examined several maj or novelists who produced Gothic works that lingered 
in the cultural imagination and in literature long after the Gothic craze had ended. 
Analyzing novels within the "Racliffean school," I have argued that the female body 
presents a cultural dilemma, which the novelists attempt to address within and against the 
professional, masculine discourses of medicine and law. While the sensitive body can be 
seen as a barrier to agency, it also serves as the solution to oppressive forces. Thus, while 
Radcliffe, Parsons, Sleath, and Roche depict women's vulnerability, they also explore the 
possibilities for resistance, freedom, and justice. In the first chapter, I have argued that 




for the sensitive heroine. In two of Ann Radcliffe's major works, sensibility's medical 
roots enable her to explore the female body's possibilities and dangers. In conversation 
with prominent medical theories, Radcliffe presents sensibility as one means of 
establishing women's autonomy, while portraying nervous disorder as an obstacle to 
knowledge and power. Significantly, it is my argument that such nervous disorders are 
not presented as women's "natural" debility; instead, such illnesses represent a 
breakdown ofbody and mind that can be prevented or cured. In Udolpho, although 
Emily's physical and emotional weaknesses hamper her ability to claim knowledge, 
rights, and agency, Radcliffe depicts her heroine's ultimate triumph through bodily and 
mental control. The connection between mind and body remains a significant challenge 
that Radcliffe must address, as The Italian makes clear. When Ellena faces unjust power, 
her claims to rights and knowledge always appear secure because Radcliffe spends much 
of the novel establishing Ellena's healthy physicality and emotional fortitude. In these 
two novels, problems with women's ability to think, feel, and know are illustrated and 
solved. In consequence, Udolpho and The Italian conclude with a vision ofjustice that 
rewards the heroines. 
My second chapter explores more thoroughly the contours of Gothic images of 
justice. Examining two novels that are typically represented as Radcliffean imitations, I 
argue that Eliza Parsons and Eleanor Sleath addressed the problematic barriers to justice 
that eighteenth-century English women faced. While conventional means of legal justice 
appear outside the reach of virtuous heroines pursued by wicked and lawless men, natural 
law offers a solution. Working within yet beyond positive law, these heroines have an 





stems from their sensitive bodies. Natural law theory's account of moral epistemology 
thus presents the body as an individualized means of virtuous self-determination. In The 
Castle ofWolfen bach, Parsons demonstrates that the heroine's innate virtue must be 
supplemented with knowledge ofpositive law. However emotionally committed to 
lawful, moral behavior Matilda might be, she finally relies on legal rights in order to 
solidify her personal agency. Sleath's The Orphan ofthe Rhine similarly presents 
innately virtuous women, yet this author depends more thoroughly on the efficacy of 
natural law to produce justice. Both novelists introduce natural and positive law in order 
to uphold the heroines' sense of morality, which enables them to elide the implications of 
\ 
natural law's gendered dimensions, while asserting the potential of the female body. As a 
source of moral knowledge, the embodied mind must retain an integrity that places it 
above suspicions of delusion or debility. Thus, Parsons and Sleath do not address, as does 
Radcliffe, the medical constructions that might cast doubt on women's ability to claim 
certainty. The novelists suppress the problems of delusion by carefully correlating the 
heroines' understanding with positive law and social custom. 
The epistemological crisis that Radcliffe depicts and that Parsons and Sleath elide 
serves as the focus of the third chapter. As she presents common Gothic themes of 
secrecy and mystery, Regina Maria Roche uses tropes ofvisuality that signal a dilemma 
in women's representation. Her novels The Children ofthe Abbey and Clermont provide 
clear examples of the scopic power of medical and legal discourses, as they address the 
problems of the secretive female subject. In The Children ofthe Abbey, Roche taps into 
the destabilized nature of vision in order to subvert the power of the masculine gaze. As 




interpretations prove dangerous. The result is a significant critique of the cultural 
expectation that women should remain transparent. In Clermont, perception enables 
women to cultivate self-determination; thus, Madeline's attempts to deploy the juridical 
gaze offer her considerable power. While both novels describe the consequences of 
observing and being an object of observation, Clermont in particular represents the dual 
nature of the gaze. Depicting Madeline's struggle to establish certainty as an activity 
fraught with emotional and intellectual difficulties, Roche clarifies the implications of the 
female gaze. In turn, she challenges the ways in which medical and legal techniques of 
visual perception turn into moral norms for women, making a transgressive argument 
against dominant modes of seeing. 
Although Radcliffe, Parsons, Sleath, and Roche undermine various oppressive 
aspects ofmedical and legal discourses by imagining their heroines as virtuous agents 
that might act against social dictates, these authors do not transgress moral boundaries. In 
the fourth chapter, I analyze texts that include such sexual transgression and, in 
consequence, do not end with utopian spaces of freedom, justice, and empowerment. 
Beyond the Radcliffean school, in the tragic Gothic novels of Fenwick and 
Wollstonecraft, the female characters again appear vulnerable and resilient, yet their 
experiences offer little hope for the autonomous woman. While the authors explicitly 
celebrate women's self-determination, they demonstrate that such radical figures will be 
confined by the power of institutional forces. Medical discourse appears complicit with 
unjust positive law in these novels, as representations ofdiseased spaces and bodies serve 
to highlight the oppressive power of legal discourse. While the authors encourage the 





examples of illicit sexuality. Intriguingly, Fenwick and Wollstonecraft implicitly argue 
for the power of the female body, since it takes extreme measures, such as death or 
"insanity," to foreclose women's potential for agency. 
The cultural concerns expressed in these late eighteenth-century novels remain 
part of feminist conversations even today. In Gender Trouble Judith Butler notes that as 
the term "woman" has become increasingly contested in feminist theory, assumptions 
about the biological basis of "sex" have been reevaluated. She argues that "sex, by 
definition, will be shown to have been gender all along" (8). Likewise, Radcliffe, 
Parsons, Sleath, Roche, Fenwick, and Wollstonecraft struggle with the medical 
definitions of the female body. Although these authors do not necessarily deconstruct 
"sex" and "gender," they do intervene in the discourses that attempted to classify women 
through physical differences. Butler argues that, within the notion of social construction, 
"'the body' appears as a passive medium on which cultural meanings are inscribed or as 
the instrument through which an appropriative and interpretive will determines a cultural 
meaning for itself" (8). Importantly, the novels discussed in this study resist either 
reading: the heroines' bodies are neither completely passive nor entirely self-willed. 
Instead, they exist within a matrix of discourses that constrain certain options while 
constructing other possibilities. Examining both medical and legal discourses has allowed 
me to treat more thoroughly the novels' cultural significance, in ways that Avril Homer 
and Angela Keane describe as necessary to feminist analysis. Continuing Butler's 
theoretical project, they assert in their introduction to Body Matters, "Attention to the 
history and to the cultural processes ... that constitute corporeality allows us to critique, 







and Keane 12-13). These statements resonate with the problems that faced the late 
eighteenth-century woman writer. As I have discussed, these authors imaginatively carve 
out a space of resistance and fulfillment for women by depicting the heroines as 
physically and intellectually capable of self-determination, even ifSecresy and Maria end 
with a bleak collapse of that space. It is my claim that the uneasy equation of the body 
with political identity creates friction between medical and legal discourses, resulting in 
the sometimes chaotic inconsistencies ofGothic representation. 
As Londa Schiebinger demonstrates in The Mind Has No Sex, eighteenth-century 
science configured the relationship between mind and body in ways that had significant 
implications for gender politics. From the early modem period to the present, the problem 
remains: how does one begin to discuss gender and the body without reifying biological 
differences? While my study does not attempt to solve such a dilemma, I do explore the 
cultural preoccupations with this problem as fictionalized within the female Gothic. 
Consequently I pay close attention to the sexed body and mind-not in an effort to reify 
gender as the primary vehicle for political change or institutional challenge, but rather in 
an attempt to understand how the "nature" of female physicality fosters a need for 
resistance and engenders a means ofpersonal agency. As I have discovered, Gothic 
expressions of the sexed body and gendered mind reveal a moment in literary history in 
which the relationship between body and mind reached a crisis. Corporeality and 
spirituality find a common ground in the Gothic heroine whose body appears at the 
forefront of her intellectual, emotional, and moral experiences. Gothicized female bodies 
thus highlight the perils and potential ofwomen's physicality. In poststructuralist theory, 





upon which institutions work. Instead, these objects are produced through the discursive 
work of institutional practices, ideas, resistance, and changes. The affective, somatic 
responses of the embodied mind, however, make such constructions seem implausible. 
We continue to theorize the body, even as we succumb to its effects: we all sicken and 
die, and death-of the body, the mind, the self--becomes the ultimate boundary, beyond 
which we can only imagine. 
The experience ofbeing a person who feels pleasure and pain, delight and 
anguish, is so visceral, immediate, and indeed sensational that the theoretical organization 
ofexperience pales in comparison. Indeed, the physicality expressed in the narratives I 
have examined overwhelms the orderly explanations scholars impose on them. Instead of 
gratifying our quest to explain the powerful effect of such narratives, the critical texts 
continue to raise more problems than they solve. The dissatisfaction that one review 
(often attributed to Coleridge) expresses over Radcliffe's "explained supernatural" 
appears particularly pertinent. In The Critical Review (August 1794), the reviewer writes 
of The Mysteries o/Udolpho, "Curiosity is raised oftener than it is gratified; or rather, it 
is raised so high that no adequate gratification can be given it; the interest is completely 
dissolved when once the adventure is finished, and the reader, when he is got to the end 
of the work, looks about in vain for the spell which had bound him so strongly to it" 
(365). In a similar manner, scholarly discussions reproduce this dissatisfaction as they 
demystify the intangible workings of literary terror, leaving a nagging sense that their 
solutions have not addressed the novels' significance. Until we recognize the force of the 
embodied mind in its literary, cultural, and historical representations, we may never grasp 
the power of the female Gothic novel. 
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